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ABSTRACT 
Interruption to water services and low water pressure conditions are commonly 
observed problems in water distribution systems (WDSs). Of particular concern 
are the unplanned events, such as pipe bursts. The current regulation in the UK 
requires water utilities to provide reliable water service to consumers resulting in 
as little as possible interruptions and of as short possible durations. All this 
pushes water utilities toward developing and using smarter responses to these 
events, based on advanced tools and solutions. All with the aim to change 
network management style from reactive to a proactive, and reduce water losses, 
optimize energy use and provide better services for consumers. 
This thesis presents a novel methodology for efficient and effective operational, 
short time response to an unplanned failure event (such as pipe burst) in a WDS. 
The proposed automated, near real-time operational response methodology 
consists of isolating the failure event followed by the recovery of the affected 
system area by restoring the flows and pressures to normal conditions.  
The isolation is typically achieved by manipulating the relevant on/off valves that 
are located closely to the event location. The recovery involves selecting an 
optimal combination of suitable operational network interventions. These are 
selected from a number of possible options with the aim to reduce the negative 
impact of the failure over a pre-specified time horizon. The intervention options 
considered here include isolation valve manipulations, changing the pressure 
reducing valve’s (PRV) outlet pressure and installation and use of temporary 
overland bypasses from a nearby hydrant(s) in an adjacent, unaffected part of 
the network. The optimal mix of interventions is identified by using a multi-
objective optimization approach driven by the minimization of the negative impact 
on the consumers and the minimization of the corresponding number of 
operational interventions (which acts as a surrogate for operational costs). The 
negative impact of a failure event was quantified here as a volume of water 
undelivered to consumers and was estimated by using a newly developed 
pressure-driven model (PDM) based hydraulic solver. 
The PDM based hydraulic solver was validated on a number of benchmark and 
real-life networks under different flow conditions. The results obtained clearly 
demonstrate its advantages when compared to a number of existing methods. 
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The key advantages include the simplicity of its implementation and the ability to 
predict network pressures and flows in a consistently accurate, numerically stable 
and computationally efficient manner under both pressure-deficient and normal-
flow conditions and in both steady-state and extended period simulations. 
The new real-time operational response methodology was applied to a real world 
water distribution network of D-Town. The results obtained demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the proposed methodology in identifying the Pareto optimal 
network type intervention strategies that could be ultimately presented to the 
control room operator for making a suitable decision in near real-time. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 Motivation and Background 
Increasing demand on water, rising energy price, diminishing water sources, 
aging water infrastructure, and population growth are serious problems facing 
water utilities worldwide. In addition to that, the current regulations require water 
utilities to provide more reliable potable water to consumers than before in terms 
of quality, less number of service interruptions, and adequate pressure at 
consumers’ taps with minimum carbon footprint level. All of the above concerns 
push water utilities toward bringing and using smarter tools and solutions in 
operation and management of a Water Distribution System (WDS) under both 
normal and abnormal conditions. All with the aim to change network management 
style from reactive to a proactive, reduce water losses, optimize energy use and 
provide better services for consumers. 
Water distribution system is considered to be one of the essential infrastructures 
in any city. The main purpose of a WDS is to convey potable water via pipes and 
other network equipment such as pumps from sources to household, commercial, 
and industrial consumers, at sufficient pressure and quantity (i.e., flow), while 
satisfying microbial and chemical standards. WDS tends to achieve these goals 
and work efficiently most of the time under normal operational conditions (i.e., 
normal demand stress condition). However, the expansive nature of a WDS 
makes it vulnerable to failures, faults, and disruptions. For example, pipe bursts, 
leakage, and equipment failure are common events and occur regularly in WDS 
operations. These events arise mainly due to the ageing of water infrastructure, 
power outage, earthquakes, intentional/ unintentional human acts, etc. The 
performance of a WDS is frequently deteriorated under these events if they not 
timely detected, located and repaired. This, in turn, produced inconvenient 
impacts (e.g., pressure drop, supply interruptions, water discolouration) to the 
consumers, economic losses to utilities and negative effects to the environment 
(e.g., damages to surrounding property).  
In the United Kingdom (UK) great efforts have been invested in reducing and 
preventing the number of failure events through applying ongoing rehabilitation 
and maintenance plans, as well as installing more monitoring tools (e.g., smart 
meters, sensors) to allow water utilities to control these events proactively and in 
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an efficient manner. However, due to the stochastic nature of failure events 
especially unplanned one such as pipe bursts, it is very hard to predict their 
occurrence as well as completely estimate and eliminate the potentially 
generated negative impacts. Thus, the need for having a more efficient, 
economic, self-healing triggered and robust response emergency methodologies 
to failure events in real-time is significant. This is important to protect water 
system from adverse impacts, improve water utilities operational performance, 
and provide uninterrupted services to consumers. 
In general, a good response emergency management plan to limit/prevent failure 
event and its produced negative impacts, especially for sudden one (i.e., pipe 
burst), comprises three main phases: (1) a real-time detection system, here data 
(e.g., pressure, flow, quality) are collected from network monitoring equipment 
such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), smart meters, and 
network sensors.  These data are then analysed using recent data mining, pattern 
recognition, mathematical and statistical methods, and network hydraulic and 
quality solvers to visualize, detect and locate the source of failure event; (2) real-
time alarm system; and (3) real-time response and decision support system to 
recover WDSs from the negative impacts.  
This study will specifically focus on the third phase (i.e., response). Water utilities 
are encouraged to prepare and develop the response, and failure emergency 
management plan to reduce/prevent negative impacts for the situation when 
event confirmed (e.g., post-event stage). The response plan typically involves a 
rapid identification and quantification of system losses and impacts (i.e., impact 
assessment, notify affected consumers). This followed by providing a number of 
interventions and alternative temporary corrective action plans for network 
operators aimed at alleviating (or possibly preventing) the potential negative 
consequences and to return to pre-event failure operation condition. This may 
involve, for example, isolating the location of the failure event and affected area, 
provide alternative water supply options, redistributing network flows or 
readjustment of flow patterns, manipulating pressure setting within the water 
system, and using temporary overland bypasses until the required maintenance 
plan performed. All with the aim to improve flow conditions (e.g., pressure and 
quality) in the affected area and increase system resilience and reliability under 
failure conditions.  
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Hydraulic and water quality models (e.g., EPANET) combined with mathematical 
programming methods, such as artificial neural networks, heuristic optimization 
and genetic algorithms, have been extensively used in WDSs (Prasad and Park 
2004; Boulos and Wiley 2013; Fu et al. 2013) for addressing different problems 
such as for example optimal design for network pipes size, strategical planning 
and optimal pumping schedule. However, most of these models work offline, and 
they are unable to perfectly predict the current behaviour and state of a WDS for 
operational purposes, especially under contingency situations (e.g., pipe bursts).  
Recently, the real-time modelling in WDSs is a topic of growing interest aiming at 
making decisions in a very short time in operation process. These models can 
help network operators to predict the WDS behaviour under different operational 
conditions, improve the performance and ensure more reliable operations at 
minimum cost and in near real-time, rather than relying solely on capital 
improvements. For example, operators can quickly assess the impacts of a 
sudden pipe burst as well as generate near-optimal solutions for enhancing 
system operation. However, few models or systematic algorithms exist to support 
the response and management process of failure consequences.  
Indeed, to date, most models and related studies in the field of response to failure 
events have been limited to primarily identifying for example the location of the 
failure event (Laucelli et al. 2016), vulnerability analysis (Laucelli and Giustolisi 
2015), strategic reliability (Bouchart and Goulter 1991; Fujiwara and Li 1998; 
Giustolisi et al. 2008b), and risk analysis (Bicik et al. 2009; Seth et al. 2016). 
Despite the consistent approaches that water utilities offered towards post-event 
failure management, limited studies have focused on the elaboration of timely 
optimum intervention strategies in the field. Possible reasons for the shortage of 
near real-time post-event failure applications could be in the difficulties imposed 
by the large amount of applicable data, simulation models, dynamically changing 
environment, computational speed constraints and spatial analysis. 
The work presented in this thesis discusses the development, implementation, 
and application of a near real-time response methodology for post-event failure, 
which forms a fundamental part of an overall near real-time Decision Support 
System (DSS) in WDS operation. The developed methodology can help WDS 
operators for making more informed support decisions, mitigating adverse and 
prioritizing timely interventions in more smarter and effective ways. Also, the 
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presented methodology can provide WDS operators considerable management 
benefits involving greater operational efficiency, emergency preparedness, 
reduced water loss and shortened response time, all with the aim to improve 
customer service and protect WDSs. Finally, the proposed methodology also can 
provide indirect benefits to water utilities through avoiding the UK Office of Water 
Services (OFWAT) penalties related to Service Incentive Mechanism (SIM) and 
Serviceability Indicator Measures, this in turn, will favourably enhance the water 
utilities profile and increase the consumers and government trust in the water 
utilities.  
 Research Aim and Objectives 
The overall aim of this research is to develop and implement a new near real-
time optimum response methodology to reduce and prevent negative 
consequences of an unplanned event in a WDS with focus on pipe bursts, and 
restore flow conditions in the network to normal service level once the event has 
been detected and located (i.e., post-event stage). This aim is achieved through 
the following specific objectives:   
1. To conduct in depth review of a wide range of the existing response real-
time approaches in operating WDS under failure conditions (i.e., pipe 
burst). Specifically, the review will focus on the identification and 
evaluation of the approaches and solution methods that can be used to 
respond to various failure events in a WDS.  
2. To develop a response methodology for reducing the negative 
consequences of unplanned failure events on consumers in near real-time 
in a WDS. This will include identification of suitable operational 
intervention, methodology for impact assessment of these interventions 
and ultimately methodology for selection of optimal interventions.  
3. To develop new methodology for pressure-driven modelling of a WDS fo 
impact assessment. The above will be approached from an operational, 
rather than strategic perspective to evaluate the effect of recovery 
interventions and enable near real-time decision-making.  
4. To test, verify and demonstrate the effectiveness and performance of the 
impact assessment model and related pressure-driven hydraulic model for 
quantifying negative consequences resulting from unplanned events on a 
number of benchmark and real-life WDSs. 
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5. To test, verify and demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the new 
response methodology for reducing negative consequences and 
identifying Pareto optimal recovery interventions in near real-time on a 
real-life case study. 
6. To summarise the work completed, key findings obtained and provide 
recommendations for future work. 
 
The implementation of the aforementioned objectives aims to answer the project 
questions summarized in Table 1.1 (references to thesis chapters and related 
candidate papers are also indicated). 
 
 
Table 1.1. Interaction between specific objectives, research questions, thesis 
chapters and published papers (list on page 4) 
Objective Research Question 
Thesis 
Chapter 
Related 
Papers 
Objective 1 
What are the major gaps in existing 
literature with regard to the operational 
response to pipe bursts and other failure 
events in a WDS? 
Chapter 2 - 
Objective 2,3 
What is the best way to respond to a WDS 
failure event in near real-time? 
Chapter 3 
P1, P3, 
P4 
Objective 4 
Is the impact assessment model based on a 
pressure-driven modelling approach valid? 
Chapter 4 P2 
Objective 5 
Are the proposed recovery interventions 
able to reduce negative consequences of a 
pipe burst? 
Chapter 5 P3, P4 
Objective 6 
What are the key findings of the research 
work conducted and related implications for 
engineering practice? 
Chapter 6 
All 
papers 
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 Thesis Structure  
This thesis is divided into six chapters, and the relationship between them are 
shown in Figure 1.1. The present chapter (Introduction) provides the background 
and motivation of the research project, the aim and objectives to be achieved, 
and the research structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The outlines of thesis chapters and their interactions. 
 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the core topics and most relevant existing 
literature related to this study, in order to identify research gaps and frame the 
thesis objectives. The review includes the following main topics: response 
approaches and techniques to failure events (for both pre- and post-event stages) 
in WDSs, the approaches for modelling and assessing the impact of failure events 
and interventions, and methods for optimising the WDS operation/operational 
interventions including related criteria and optimisation techniques. 
In Chapter 3 the overall detail for the new developed near real-time response 
methodological approach to failure event impacts in WDSs is presented. 
Chapter 6 
Summary, Conclusions 
and Future Work 
Recommendations 
Chapter 4 
Case Studies on Pressure 
Driven Model  
Chapter 5 
Case Studies on Real-
Time Operational 
Response Methodology  
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Chapter 3 
Methodology for real-
time Operational 
Response to Failure 
Events in a WDS 
Results and Discussion 
Case Studies on Pressure 
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Specifically, an overview of the response phases is given first. Next, a new 
segmentation approach for performing isolation phase (i.e., first response phase), 
which is necessary to identify the failure segments (e.g., interrupted nodes and 
pipes from water sources) and valves to isolate event location, is presented. This 
is then followed by describing recovery phase, this involves selection criteria 
(e.g., cost-benefit objectives) and solution method (i.e., optimization) used to 
identify optimum recovery interventions in near real-time. Once this done, an 
operational impact assessment model, utilizing the new pressure-driven 
modelling to quantify failure impacts, is described.  
In Chapter 4 the performance and efficiency of the developed impact assessment 
model that developed in Chapter 3 is tested, verified and illustrated under 
different flow conditions on a number of benchmarks and real-life case WDSs 
found in the literature. The case studies considered are divided into four groups 
based on the complexity of the WDSs analysed. The results obtained are also 
compared to the results reported or obtained by using a number of reviewed 
pressure-driven model (PDM) methodologies, or obtained by the demand-driven 
model (DDM) method where direct comparison was not possible, with the aim of 
assessing the overall performance and convergence of the impact assessment 
model. 
In Chapter 5 the demonstration and verification of the methodology presented in 
Chapter 3 at reducing negative consequences and identifying near real-time 
optimal recovery interventions is tested on a real water distribution network of D-
Town. The network description, data, assumptions, software used, and 
hypothetical failure-event scenarios, are given. Scenarios involve a medium burst 
on main pipe supplying a DMA and a large burst on a critical supply path in the 
network. The results obtained from both scenarios are also compared to the 
results obtained by using the Enumeration method with the aim of assessing the 
overall performance of the response methodology, and the relevant discussions 
and conclusions are drawn. 
In Chapter 6 the key findings of this thesis are summarized and relevant 
conclusions are drawn. The novel aspects introduced in this thesis are 
highlighted, followed by recommendations for further research. 
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 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Introduction 
This chapter provides a literature review of the core topics and research that is of 
the relevance to the work project presented in this thesis. This is done with the 
aim to identify the current state-of- the-art in the field and justify the work 
performed within the thesis. The main covered topics include response 
frameworks to failure events, impact models and assessment, optimization 
methods in WDSs operation/operational interventions. This the chapter is 
organized as follows. 
In section 2.2, the overall concept of responding to WDS failures is given. This 
starts with a comprehensive review of hazards, resulting failures and their 
impacts on the WDS which are discussed in the two first subsections. The best 
practice for responding to and managing the failure event and their corresponding 
generated impacts in WDSs are reviewed.  Then a review for the common 
interventions (focusing more on network interventions) that are used to respond 
to failure events in WDSs are discussed. This followed by a review for some exist 
methods on WDS segments identification. Finally, some existed intervention 
selection approaches and their issues are reviewed.  
In section 2.3, the approaches for modelling and assessing the impact of failure 
events and interventions are reviewed. First, some important performance 
indicators that have been considered in previous studies for quantifying the 
impacts and interventions are briefly reviewed. Next, the methods used to model 
failure events specifically pipe burst and interventions in WDSs are presented. 
Then, methods used to quantify impacts, specifically supply interruptions and 
pressure drops, in WDSs are reviewed and discussed. The approaches that used 
to solve the pressure-deficient issues in DDM hydraulic solvers are then reviewed 
in details. Finally, the concept of real-time modelling and some of its applications 
are discussed and given.      
In section 2.4, a brief methods for optimising the WDS operation/operational 
interventions including related criteria and optimisation techniques are presented.  
The whole literature review is summarised in section 2.5. 
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 Response to WDS Failures 
Water distribution systems (WDSs) are one of the critical infrastructures that 
deliver water to different consumers. Given their complex distributed topology 
which consist of thousands of interlinked elements (e.g., pipes, pumps, control 
valves, nodes) that are used to treat, store and distribute supply between sources 
and consumers.  In addition to their interconnectivity with the other infrastructure 
systems, such as power supply and telecommunication, WDSs are exposed to a 
variety of hazards and resulting failures.  
This section provides a review of existing response methodologies for dealing 
with hazards potentially affecting the WDS, the resulting failures and impacts and 
the interventions that can be used in the context. 
 
2.2.1 WDS hazards and failures 
Hazards in WDSs can be defined as any event with potential to reduce the degree 
to which the system delivers a defined level of service (Butler et al. 2017). 
Hazards can be classified in a different ways. The most two common ways used 
in the literature are as follows: (1) internal or external in terms of their origin; (2) 
chronic or acute, based on their rate of change. Therefore, each hazard can 
belong to one of the following subcategories: (i) external-chronic; (ii) external-
acute; (iii) internal-chronic; and (v) internal-acute. The details of these 
subcategories are summarized in Table 2.1.  
External hazards involve the effect of any external entity, force or factor, for 
instance natural, water consumers, and water utilities operators. On the other 
hand, internal denotes a hazard that originates with the water service provider or 
water infrastructure, such as a lack of investment or a poor maintenance regime. 
Chronic hazards are those that occur regularly and gradually in expected or 
predictable prospective over the time such as population growth, and ageing of 
infrastructure elements (e.g., pipes). Finally, acute hazards are those that occur 
suddenly and quickly (e.g., earthquake), and are usually unexpected, unplanned 
and/or unpredictable.      
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Table 2.1 Potential hazards and their classification in WDSs. 
 Chronic Acute 
Internal 
 Insufficient rehabilitation  
 Resources depletion  
 Loss of collective skills and 
knowledge  
 Incremental innovation  
 Lack of investment  
 Insufficient maintenance 
 Accident 
 Human and technical errors 
 Poor management  
External  
 Climate Change 
 Urban creep 
 Population growth  
 Infrastructure ageing  
 Stringent regulation 
 Demand variation 
 Demographic change  
 
 Natural Disasters 
 Earthquakes 
 Floods  
 Hurricanes 
 Tornados  
 Tsunamis  
 Wildfires  
 Extreme weather  
 Drought 
 Floods 
 Winter storms 
 Power outage 
 Terrorist attacks  
 Cyber attacks 
 
Because of the hazard, the concept of middle states (Johansson 2010) occur in 
the system and include all the possible modes of failure event for a given WDS. 
A good and popular example for middle state in WDSs is pipe break and leaks, 
which may occur as a result of various hazards (e.g., earthquake). Middle status 
can be divided to operational (functional) or structural (mechanical) fails in WDS. 
Pipe failures (e.g., breaks and leaks), pump failure, control valve failure, and other 
equipment failures (e.g., sensors, actuators), in addition to power system failure 
are examples for structural fails. Whilst, increased demand, pressure increased 
(i.e., because of water hammer), contamination, biofilms growth, internal pipe 
corrosion, and chemical reaction are consider as functional fails. This thesis 
focuses on mechanical failures such as pipe bursts.    
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2.2.2 Impacts of failures on the WDS 
The negative influences that the hazards and the resulting failures have on the 
expected level of service of a WDS are referred to as impacts (Butler et al. 2017; 
Cabinet Office 2011; IPCC 2012). Expected levels of service may be based on 
local, national, international, or global level standards and are used by regulators 
to monitor the quality of service provided. For example In the UK, the high 
standard of delivery of potable water is monitored by the Water Services 
Regulation Authority (i.e., OFWAT) using a range of performance indicators, 
which, amongst other aspects, evaluate the long term pressure adequacy (i.e., 
pressure of water mains, the DG2 indicator) and continuity of water supply (i.e., 
supply interruptions, the DG3 indicator) (OFWAT 2013, 2018c).  
The magnitude and scale of the impacts depends on a number of factors such as 
geographic location and topology of a given WDS. Although impacts can be 
understood in many different ways, the present work uses this term to define a 
disturbance on the level of service or the performance of WDS. Impacts can 
therefore be categorised depending on the level of service or performance 
attribute being disturbed, whether these are related to hydraulic performance 
(e.g., water supply interruption, drops in pressures), quality performance (e.g., 
water contamination, discolouration of the water), environmental performance 
(e.g., pollution impact), efficiency performance (e.g., energy use impact), 
economical performance (i.e., costs),etc. Impacts have been used as a measure 
of the operational performance (i.e., through indicators) of the WDS under 
different abnormal conditions. 
When impacts affecting the performance of a system are transferred to the 
broader socio-economic framework, this is referred to as consequences 
(Misiunas 2005; Casal 2016). Thereby, consequences are considered as the 
wider implications of impacts to society, the economy and the environment. 
Indeed, a pipe burst event, aside from an operational impact triggered by a failure 
of the WDS, may involve various negative consequences related to social (e.g., 
personal psychological damage, human lives), economic (e.g., loss of revenue, 
repair costs, material damage and disruption), traffic disruption, environmental 
issues (e.g., ecosystem or habitat losses) an other social consequences such as 
loss of public confidence and reduced workforce.  
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The work in this thesis focuses on the hydraulic type failures impacts, specifically 
supply interruptions and pressure drops. Further, the impact assessment model 
developed in chapter 3 is only used to capture these two components and to 
evaluate the alternative interventions. However, the model is generic and more 
impact can be add to it if require.   
 
2.2.3 WDS failure event management  
The reliability and risk analysis has been widely used as the primary criterion in 
designing, operating and managing WDSs (Farmani et al. 2006; Kanakoudis and 
Tsitsifi 2001; Islam et al. 213; Gheisi et al. 2016). Traditional risk-based methods 
have been conducted to guide protection and prevention options that seek to 
mitigate or limit the likelihood of expected failure events and the potential negative 
impact from the failure events (Kanakoudis 2004; Kanakoudis and Tolikas 2004; 
Blakmore and Plant 2008). These options can enhance water systems’ reliability 
to some extent and be helpful to prevent undesirable consequences.  
However, recent experience from natural and man-made water-related hazard, 
as shown in section 2.1.1, suggests that existing WDS cannot protect and prevent 
all disruptive events and may perform unreliably because of high uncertainty of 
disturbances, complicated interdependency of systems, and stochastic failures 
resulting from unplanned failure events such as pipe burst (Little 2002; Asefa et 
al. 2014; Butler et al. 2017; Amarasinghe et al. 2016; Shin et al. 2018). Thus, 
interruption to water services, low water pressure conditions, and water 
discoloration are commonly observed inevitable problems. These problems could 
arise as results of either planned interruptions such as periodic maintenance and 
system rehabilitation or due to unexpected events, such as pipe burst and 
equipment failures (Bicik et al. 2009; Turner et al. 2012; Cook et al. 2016; Diao 
et al. 2016). This, in turn, may cause undesirable disruptions to consumers, 
utilities, and the environment (Vamvakeridou-Lyroudia et al. 2011; Rasekh and 
Brumbelow 2015; Nayak and Turnquist 2016). In such failure condition, proactive, 
economical and fast management action is essential to protect network from 
adverse impacts and to restore the service to normal operating condition. 
In general, a good failure management plan in a WDS comprises two main 
phases (Boulos and Wiley 2013; Laucelli and Giustolisi 2015; Butler et al. 2017): 
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1. Pre-event phase, aimed at lowering the probabilities of a failure event 
occurring in the first place or minimizing its possible effects before 
disruptive failure event occurs. This is done through  improving strategies 
such as replacing/rehabilitating critical pipes/equipment or adding 
redundancy to a WDS. In general this phase include two components: (1) 
mitigation or prevention (e.g., appropriate system design and operation, 
improved organisation, risk analysis and information management) and (2) 
preparedness (e.g., improved organisation, risk analysis and information 
management).   
 
2. Post-event phase which involves the following three components: (1) real-
time detection/alarm system , where data (e.g., pressure and flow) are 
collected from monitoring equipment such as supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA), smart meters and network sensors, and then 
analysed to visualize and detect the source of failure such as pipe burst; 
(2) response, limiting the extent of loss (e.g., real-time control of the 
system to identify the source of the disruption, interventions to isolate the 
incident, minimize the resulting impacts for consumers, reduce the 
magnitude and duration of the failure mode, and trying to restore the 
normal functionality of the system); and (3) recovery which aims to return 
to a normal state (e.g., repair/ replace for pipe bursts and other damaged 
network equipment, decontamination for water quality failures, etc.). 
As described by Bruneau et al. (2003) and O’Rourke (2007), pre-event phase is 
affected by robustness and redundancy. The robustness is defined as the level 
of system service before any actions are taken. Moreover, robustness is more 
related to the design and the initial capacity of the system and its ability to perform 
under stressful conditions without failure. System redundancy in WDS can be 
described as alternative paths, such as multiple loops or options, and diverse 
sets of pumps. Post-event phase, on other hand, is affected by resourcefulness, 
and rapidity. Resourcefulness is defined as the necessary resources and 
services to detect a pipe burst, reduce generated negative impacts and repair the 
failure event. Whilst, the rapidity is the speed with which the interruption can be 
overcome, such as detecting, isolating, and repairing the component failure. 
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Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (2009); American National 
Standards Institute (2010); US Environmental Protection Agency (2011, 2014, 
2015, 2016); OFWAT (2013, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c) and Drinking Water 
Inspectorate (2011) provide general guidelines for network operators about how 
to respond to an emergency situation in WDSs, they do not provide a decision 
support tool that can help the network operators do their job even better by 
recommending specific actions to be taken in near real-time especially in 
response phase. 
According to the Planning for an Emergency Water Supply (US Environmental 
Protection Agency 2011) regulations, each WDS that serves more than 3,300 
habitants is mandated to prepare vulnerability assessment and emergency 
response plans within a specified timeframe for situations when a failure event is 
confirmed. The response plan should involve a rapid identification and 
quantification of system losses and impacts (i.e., risk assessment, notify affected 
consumers). This is followed by defining a number of temporary corrective and 
remediation intervention actions for network operators as an emergency 
response to limit the potential consequences of failure and to return to pre-failure 
operations conditions, e.g., flows and pressures (Bicik et al. 2010; Laucelli and 
Giustolisi 2015).  
Boulos et al. (2014) declares that having a robust real-time response plan will 
have a number of benefits for water utilities such as reduce overall risk through 
hazard planning, increase system availability, decrease downtime and ensure 
business continuity. Also, consumers can benefit from the response plan through 
reduce outage duration, increase awareness of restoration progress and time 
estimates and increase consumers safety. 
The methodology adopted in this thesis focuses on the second stage of the post-
event phase, i.e., response. The methodology is based on the current practice in 
the UK water industry and it is intended to provide support to network operators 
when making relevant decisions, i.e., help them do their job even better, 
especially in cases when non-catastrophic failures are affecting a larger part of 
the water distribution system (please see chapter 3). 
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2.2.4  Interventions  
Definitions and applications of the term “intervention” in the literature are varied, 
but intervention is typically considered to entail targeted actions or adjustments 
carried out in a specific system in response to actual or anticipated hazard in 
order, to minimize or prevent negative impacts (e.g., Jones and Preston 2011; 
IPCC 2012). Thus, intervention here is defined explicitly as any action taken to 
modify specific properties of the WDS to enhance its capability to maintain levels 
of service (e.g., pressure, nodal outflow) under varying conditions after failure 
event occurrence in response phase. This in turn can increase reliability, enhance 
resilience, and/or improve sustainability (Grothmann and Reusswig 2006) of the 
system. 
The operational intervention in the literature involve, for example, isolating failure 
event location (Jun and Loganathan 2007; Giustolisi and Savic 2010), providing 
alternative water supply options (Turner et al. 2012; Nayak and Turnquist 2016), 
redistributing network flows (Fujiwara and Li 1998) or readjusting of flow patterns 
(Bouchart and Goulter 1991). All with the aim to improve flow conditions (e.g. 
pressure and quality) in the affected area and increase system resilience and 
reliability under failure conditions. There other types of interventions actions could 
be potentially used to provide affected consumers with water, e.g., via water truck 
or delivery of bottled water, etc. and both are used popularly worldwide. However, 
this review section and thesis focuses on network interventions only. This thesis 
proposes three type operational interventions include (i) open/close suitable 
isolation valves; (ii) installing overland bypasses between two suitable hydrant 
points; and (iii) modifying pressure settings at the end of available PRVs (further 
detail shown in chapter 3). These interventions are used to improve flow and 
pressure conditions under failure events such as pipe bursts. 
For example, Jeong et al. (2006) developed an approach to provide water only to 
critical consumers (e.g., hospitals) while the WDS is only partially functional due 
to natural disaster such as earthquake, and this lead to the reduction in the 
negative impacts. Later Jeong and Abraham (2009) tried to improve upon the 
previous study by developing a scheduling model to supply water to each 
consumer temporarily during some time of the day, hence all network consumers 
can receive some water. The contribution of Turner et al. (2012) and Nayak and 
Turnquist (2016) focused on identifying unaffected consumers (i.e., required 
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demands fully satisfied) after a failure event occur, and then supply water by 
using distribution trucks to affected consumers (e.g., those that cannot receive 
any water). However, the aforementioned approaches exhibit one or more of the 
following limitations for wider implementation: (i) assumed static water demand 
patterns for water consumers; (ii) nodal head flow relationship is ignored, in which 
nodal outflow may be reduced due to reduction in pressure head; (iii) isolation of 
segments conducted regardless of valve locations in the network; and (v) offline 
models (driven by collected and historic data sets, i.e., without connection to any 
real-time source of data such as SCADA). 
Vamvakeridou-Lyroudia et al. (2011) proposed a hierarchy structure algorithm to 
reduce the negative impacts of a single pipe burst. For every possible pipe event 
scenario in the network, a unique offline list of interventions is produced based 
on the historical data of flow and pressure. When the failure event is detected 
and located, the relevant response interventions are retrieved from this list and 
are conducted as real-time response solutions. However, this approach seems 
too rigid and not generic enough to provide network operators with enough 
flexibility when selecting intervention options.  
Zhuang et al. (2013) introduced an adaptive pump and valve operation 
methodology (non-optimization-based method) to mitigate the hydraulic effect of 
pipe failures in a WDS. Their method identifies the best set of pumping units with 
various capacities after isolating the affected subsection of the system. Zhuang 
et al. concluded that having multiple pumps of various capacities increases the 
system water resilience/ availability under failure conditions. This conclusion was 
also summarized by Lansey (2012), who described multiple pumps as an 
example of system redundancy. However, this approach is unable to provide 
water supply to unintentionally disconnected consumers (i.e., consumers that are 
disconnected from the water sources as a result of isolating the event in the pipe 
network).  
Morosini et al. (2016) developed a response methodology based on the nodal 
demand control, with the aim to increase the pressure head, and hence the flow 
rate actually delivered at critical nodes (i.e., hospitals, vulnerable customers, 
etc.). This was done to avoid or minimize service interruptions between the failure 
and the repair times, due to a pipe burst isolation which cause a portion of the 
 
36 
 
network faced to reduction of head in some nodes. However, applying such 
methodology on a large WDS would be a difficult task.  
On the other hand, evolutionary algorithms such as non-dominated sorting 
genetic algorithm (NSGA-II), decision trees, and heuristic methods have been 
used for making better decisions to protect public health against contamination 
events (Preis et al. 2007; Poulin et al. 2008; Baranowski and Leboeuf 2008 ; Preis 
and Ostfeld 2008; Alfonso et al. 2010; Poulin et al. 2010; Alvisi et al. 2012; 
Rasekh and Brumbelow 2014, 2015; Rasekh et al. 2014). Flushing suitable fire 
hydrants and manipulating valves were considered as response actions to 
alleviate the consequences in these studies. However, most of these approaches 
are offline models and the problem of interest presented in this thesis refers to 
different types of unplanned failure events such as pipe bursts.  
 
2.2.5 Intervention selection approaches  
The selection and implementation process of intervention actions should be 
accurate and quick as the wrong or slow decisions could make the situation 
worse. However, this relies on the current configuration of the existing WDS in 
the affected area, the accessibility of alternative interventions for providing the 
water, and the availability of valve control options for isolating affected areas and 
rerouting water (Tian et al. 2007; Vamvakeridou-Lyroudia et al. 2011).  
Additionally, performing this in a timely manner is difficult because of the 
uncertainty, complex hydraulic and water quality behaviour in WDSs under failure 
operating conditions (Rasekh and Brumbelow 2015). Clearly, the availability of 
information about current operation conditions in a particular situation such as 
pipe burst on real-time basis is crucial for decision making and response models 
in WDSs. For example, demand management is a dynamic process, changing 
hourly, daily, weekly or monthly depending on customer requirements (Romano 
et al. 2013). Also, Walski (2015) stated the models used in emergency situation 
must be accurate and trusted, as misleading results may be more dangerous than 
no models or action taken at all. However, because situations differ so widely 
from one case to another, it is impossible to develop rigid rules for acceptability 
of models. 
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Hydraulic and water quality network models such as EPANET combined with 
mathematical programming methods, such as for example artificial neural 
networks, heuristic optimization and genetic algorithms, have been extensively 
used in WDSs (e.g., Prasad and Park 2004; Boulos and Wiley 2013; Fu et al. 
2013). These models help network operators to predict the WDS behaviour under 
different operational conditions, improve the performance and ensure more 
reliable operations at minimum cost and in near real-time. For example, operators 
can quickly assess the consequences of a sudden pipe burst or other equipment 
failure in a specific WDS (Walski 2015), as well as generate near-optimal 
solutions for enhancing system operation. However, few models or systematic 
algorithms exist to support the response and management process of failure 
consequences. Indeed, to date, most models and related studies in the field of 
response to failure events have been limited to primarily identifying the location 
of the failure event (Laucelli et al. 2016), vulnerability analysis (Laucelli and 
Giustolisi 2015), strategic reliability (Bouchart and Goulter 1991; Fujiwara and Li 
1998; Giustolisi et al. 2008), unaccounted-for (non-revenue) water reduction 
(Kamani et al. 2012), pipe deterioration modelling (Osman 2010), early 
contamination warning (Ostfeld et al. 2004), pipe replacement/rehabilitation (Yoo 
et al. 2014), event detection systems (Romano et al. 2014), pump energy cost 
optimization (Sunela 2017) and leakage management (Berardi et al. 2015), and 
risk analysis (Bicik et al. 2009; Seth et al. 2016). Where limited studies have 
focused on the elaboration of a timely intervention strategies in the field after a 
failure event (i.e., pipe burst) has been detected and located.   
On the other hand, mathematical programming methods are able to produce 
good quality solutions but computationally inefficient, especially in 
analysing/designing large WDS (Zheng et al. 2013; Maier et al. 2014). Searching 
for near optimum solutions instead of trying to find all possible best optimal 
solutions is a way to address this issue (Gibbs et al. 2015). Alternatively, 
graphical method (Kadu et al. 2008), network decomposition algorithm (Zheng et 
al. 2011, 2013), and heuristic method (Jayaram and Srinivasan 2008; Poulin et 
al. 2008) have been used to reduce the global search space, as well as 
computational time for the optimal design and operation issues in WDSs. But 
even with this reduction, the overall computational time is still substantial for 
analysing WDS in near real-time (i.e., greater than one hour) the further detail of 
this methods are already discussed in section 2.4. 
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2.2.6 Segment identification in WDSs 
The partitioning of WDSs into segments and district metered areas (DMAs) 
provides various management benefits for system operators. These benefits 
include, for instance, improved pressure management, more efficient leakage 
control and effective isolation of network parts in cases of pipe breakages. All 
this, in turn, increases system reliability and resilience. Identification of network 
segments depends mainly on the distribution and location of valves in a given 
WDS. In general, valves are used for controlling flow conditions (i.e., pressure 
and flow) and for isolating a failure area due to pipe breakage failure or 
contamination events. 
Typically, the distribution of isolation valves is followed general rules of thumb 
such as locating at least three isolation valves at cross-sections (i.e., junctions) 
and two valves at each T-intersection (i.e., N-1 rule), or the N valve rule, 
consisting of installing isolation valves in all of the adjacent pipes of each junction 
(Jun and Loganathan 2007;Jun et al. 2008). This in turn will reduce the sizes of 
the isolated segments (Mays 2000). However, in terms of budget limitation, 
installation/maintenance fees, and increased risk of leaking water at cracks, the 
N − 1 and the N valve placement rules are not followed always. Walski (1993) 
defines a segment as the portion of the network that can be isolated by closing 
valves to contain the damaged pipe. A segment will be a single pipe, only if, that 
pipe has two valves located at its both ends. Otherwise, isolation of a pipe will 
require closing valves on other pipes and nodes; thus the resulted segment will 
be comprised of pipes and nodes bounded by isolation valves. Jun and 
Logathatan (2008) claims that as a result of regular segment isolation, other 
portion (i.e., pipes and nodes) of the network may unintentionally isolated from 
the available water source(s) in the network. How to optimize a valve system to 
achieve reasonable segments and minimal isolated segments is a crucial topic in 
the field of reliability research in WDNs (Creaco et al. 2012; Walski 2011). 
A number of methods for segment identification in WDSs are available in the 
literature. For example, Jun and Loganathan (2007) introduced matrices to 
present the topological relationships between the nodes and links of a WDS and 
used a depth-first search-based algorithm to identify segments. Also in their 
methodology, an unintended isolation algorithm was proposed to identify the 
unexpected shut-off areas for closing a critical segment. In each identification 
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step, the depth-first search-based algorithm traverse all connectable nodes from 
water sources before an unintended isolation can be identified. If all critical 
segments in a WDS are desired, the approach should be performed the same 
times as the number of segments in a network. The proposed algorithm was able 
to effectively identify all critical segments in a single hydraulic run.  
Kao and Li (2007) and Li and Kao (2008) use a topologic matrix and a deep 
search algorithm in segment identification and vulnerability analysis. Kao and Li 
(2007) consider hydraulic characteristics in the analysis of unintended segments. 
The links connected to an arbitrary node are first identified and stored and if one 
of the components is a valve, it is marked as a boundary for the segment. The 
connected nodes and pipes are then stored as a new segment and identified as 
being “visited”. Then, the process is repeated using a new unvisited node until 
the entire network is examined. Once the segments have been identified, the 
computer program uses an algorithm based on the articulation point identification 
method (Li and Kao 2008) to detect the critical segments, or the segments that 
block the water supply downstream. 
Giustolisi and Savic (2008) regard valves as pseudo-pipes and solve pressure 
driven equations to identify segments. Recently, Giustolisi and Savic (2010) have 
improved their method by using a valve topological matrix and computing an 
incidence matrix of power to the pipes to identify all pipe transitive closure sets 
(Even 2011), i.e., segments in a single hydraulic run. Also the Giustolisi and Savic 
(2010) use the incomplete Cholesky factorisation (Zhang 1996), instead of the 
pseudoinverse matrix (Penrose 1955), for the simplified hydraulic simulations 
aimed at the detection of the undesired disconnections (i.e., unintentional 
segments). 
Similarly, by using topological matrices and assuming valves as fictitious 
pipelines, Creaco et al. (2010) compute node transitive closures by moving 
fictitious water sources and solving hydraulic equations to identify segments one 
by one. Instead of using fictitious pipelines, Alvisi et al. (2011) use an auxiliary 
valve matrix and vector to model valves and identify segments one by one. They 
also analyse the hydraulic impacts of equipment such as check valves, pumps, 
and PRVS on unintended segments by modifying a node-to-node connectivity 
matrix. 
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Kaldenbach and Ormsbee (2012) proposed a simple method to identify intended 
segments based on a node-node connectivity matrix in which valves are also 
treated as nodes. The method also proceeds to list the unintended isolations in 
the network and the impacts of each failed segment. Di Nardo et al. (2013) 
proposed a methodology uses graph theory principles and a heuristic procedure 
based on minimizing the amount of dissipated power in the water network to 
identify segments. 
Gao (2014) used an algorithm based on the theory of transitive closure of graphs. 
The algorithm models real valves as fictitious valves, uses valve pairs to simulate 
valve on-off status, and improves the Warshall algorithm to compute node 
transitive closure sets to identify all network segments at a time. In addition to 
that, the algorithm was able to identify, redundant valves, endpoint valves, leaf 
segments, orphan segments, and regular segments. Also, one-way valves are 
considered in an unintended segment analysis. 
In this thesis, a methodology is proposed to identify network segments (i.e., sets 
of pipes and nodes) that belong to an individual valve or a set of valves. The 
methodology is developed based on the basic network topological matrices (i.e., 
node-link connectivity matrix, valves topological matrix). In comparison to other 
existing methods, the proposed methodology has able to produce all segments 
for a given WDS in single network run without introducing pseudo valves, pipes 
and auxiliary valve matrix or performing hydraulic analysis. Additionally, it is very 
simple for computer coding and does not require the user to have extensive 
programming knowledge. The detail of the segmentation methodology is shown 
in section 3.3.1. 
 
 Impact Modelling 
2.3.1 Operational performance assessment 
The performance indicators or metrics of WDSs have been widely studied in the 
literature with the goal of assessing the system’s operational performance before, 
after and during the failure event. Also, they are used to identify the best way to 
respond to failure event and restore the normal functionality of a WDS before the 
event. Moreover, the performance indicators are measures used to describe the 
behaviour of the WDS under abnormal conditions in terms of its tangible 
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operational properties. The indicators and metrics are used interchangeably in 
thesis to indicate to measure for quantifying the impacts.  
In general, for WDS performance, the indicators can be categorised into 
topographic, hydraulic, water quality/security, greenhouse emissions, social 
welfare, and economic (i.e., cost). These performance indicators are typically 
used in the development of the implicit measures of risk, reliability, resilience, 
robustness, and redundancy analysis. For a WDS and in consumers’ point of 
view, the performance indicators predict the system behaviour primarily based on 
hydraulic/quality properties in term of demand node outflows, available pressure 
head at consumers taps, supply interruptions and water quality problems. This 
section presents several popular hydraulic key performance indicators. A full 
overview of aforementioned metrics especially hydraulic metrics can be found in 
Ostfeld (2004); Mansoor (2007); USEPA (2014b); Gunawan et al. (2017); and 
Shin et al. (2017). 
Hydraulic metrics are derived based upon spatially and temporally variable flows 
and/or pressure; calculation of these metrics require simulation of WDS 
hydraulics that reflect how the system operates under normal and emergency 
conditions. Reliable networks must be able to deliver required flows to consumers 
at adequate pressure during these emergency conditions; however, not all 
hydraulic reliability metrics explicitly consider all of these conditions. While some 
hydraulic reliability metrics are calculated over a time interval, others are 
calculated using flows and pressures at a single time.  
Su et al. (1987); Wagner et al. (1988); Bao and Mays (1990); Fujiwara and 
Ganesharajah (1993); Ostfeld (2001); and Ostfeld et al. (2002) use stochastic 
simulation to analyze reliability in WDS networks. With stochastic simulation, an 
ensemble of hydraulic scenarios can be defined by sampling from probability 
distributions of, for example, demand profiles, initial water quality, the time and 
location of pipe breaks, and the time it takes to repair individual components. This 
helps to estimate the reliability and resilience of a WDS to a wide variety of 
conditions. 
Ostfeld et al. (2002) developed an approach which uses stochastic EPANET 
simulations and computes the fraction of delivered volume (FDV), and fraction of 
delivered demand (FDD).To be able to more accurately calculate demand under 
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failure scenarios, modelled demands were corrected based on the pressure and 
flow rate. In this way, a node is only supplied its fully requested demand when a 
minimum pressure constraint is met, otherwise only a fraction of the demand is 
satisfied. FDV is the ratio of total volume delivered to the total volume requested, 
and FDD is the fraction of time periods where demand is met at each network 
node. Similarly, Ozger (2003) measure available demand fraction (ADF) using a 
pressure dependent correction of EPANET hydraulic simulations. 
Awumah and Goulter (1989) compute the percentage of demand supplied at 
adequate pressure (PSPF). This metric requires a hydraulic simulation for each 
pipe removal in the system. For each simulation, the fraction of demand that is 
supplied when pressure is above a specified threshold is recorded. Wagner et al. 
(1988) also measure the number and duration of failure event like pipe failures, 
the number and duration of reduced service events, and the between failure time 
and repair duration. 
Zhuang et al. (2013) described the concept of “availability” as system resilience 
of a water distribution network, which is defined as the fraction of water supplied 
to required demand nodes over the time involving the failure event period.  
Shuang et al. (2013) defined system hydraulic metrics as the probability that 
water is successfully supplied to consumers allocated to nodes during a failure 
period. Clearly, it is expressed as the ratio of the total actual water demand versus 
the total required water demand given different failures. 
Todini (2000) developed a resilience indicator for the looped water distribution 
networks to cope with uncertainties in failure events. The physical and hydraulic 
failures (e.g., pipe breakage) in the WDS may entail more internal energy 
dissipation with variation of the water flow and pressure. He considered that the 
resilience of a water distribution network depends on sufficient energy surplus to 
overcome increasing internal energy dissipation in the case of disruptions. The 
energy surplus represents the available energy storage that can be dissipated 
under changes in operation conditions by a failure event. In this regard, the 
proposed resilience indicator was defined as the fraction of the available energy 
surplus at the nodes over the maximum energy surplus in the network, which 
would be internally dissipated to meet the required demand and head at the 
nodes.  
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Cimellaro et al. (2015) proposed a global resilience measure by combining social, 
technical, and environmental system performance. The social, technical, and 
environmental performance was defined as the functionality of each domain 
under failure event compared to their functionality under normal operating 
conditions. The performance is estimated by use of the ratio of the numbers of 
households satisfying water requirements after failure event over a total number 
of households for the social domain, the ratio of the tank water level over the level 
corresponding to the tank reservoir capacity during a control time period for the 
technical domain, and the ratio of water quality over the pre- and post-failure 
event for the environmental domain. 
Supply Interruption Scale (SIS) and Supply Interruption Duration (SID) indicators 
have been developed by OFWAT (2018a, b) to estimate supply interruption, 
which defined as the number of consumers disconnected from the water supply 
or a situation when no water is available at the consumers’ tap (i.e., the pressure 
is below the minimum pressure threshold Pmin), due to failure event in WDS, and 
lasting longer than 3 hours, 6 hours, 12 hours and 24 hours. Also, OFWAT 
(2018a, b) developed Scale of the Low Pressure (LPS) indicator to calculated the 
total number of consumers receiving substandard pressure (i.e., the pressure is 
between the minimum pressure (Pmin) and required pressure (Preq) thresholds) for 
more than 1 hour throughout the whole day. 
It can be seen from the above that a number of performance metrics exist in 
literature to capture the supply interruption and pressure conditions in WDS. The 
pros and cos of each metric can be found in the above papers. The metrics of 
Zhuang et al. (2013) were applied in this thesis to evaluate the performance of 
the developed PDM (see chapter 3). Also, these and two newly developed 
metrics shown in chapter 3 are used to estimate the impact associated with a 
pipe burst (and to test the performance of the proposed interventions in this 
thesis).   
   
2.3.2 Modelling of failure events in a WDS 
Modelling of failure event especially pipe failure (e.g., burst and leak) has 
received significant attention in the literature, primarily due to its important rule in 
reliability, resilience studies and risk assessment. This section provides details 
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regarding the modelling of failure event in the hydraulic solver in particular 
EPANET (Rossman 2000a). Based on the purpose of the simulation and the 
capabilities of the hydraulic solver used, the methods of modelling pipe failure 
can be broadly divided into: (1) strategic or (2) operational applications. 
In strategic applications, the time over which a pipe/equipment needs to be 
isolated for repairs is dominant and, therefore, the outflow from a burst in case of 
pipe before the isolation takes place is neglected. The simplest technique applied 
by several researchers (e.g., Farmani et al. 2005) is to disconnect the failed pipe 
from the network. In EPANET a single pipe/equipment can be disconnected by 
either (i) setting the status of pipe/equipment to CLOSED, (ii) setting the diameter 
(in case of pipe) to very small value (e.g., 0.0001) or (iii) physically removing the 
pipe/equipment from the system. The last option, although being the most difficult 
one to implement, can be considered as the best way since it effectively reduces 
the complexity of the governing nonlinear equations and thus speeds up the 
convergence of the global gradient algorithm (Todini and Pilati 1988) used in 
EPANET. It also eliminates potential convergence problems caused by the other 
two approaches, which introduce abnormally high resistance coefficients in the 
hydraulic equations. 
In operational applications, the failure event such as pipe burst can cause large 
changes in system hydraulic conditions (e.g., drops in pressures, supply 
interruptions). Operational method aims to explicitly model the water lost due to 
a burst/leak between the time when it starts and the time when repair crews can 
isolate the leak/burst by using nearest set of available isolation valves. Hayuti et 
al. (2008); and Mansoor and Vairavamoorthy (2003) modelled pipe bursts in 
EPANET by inserting an artificial reservoir in the middle of a pipe and setting its 
water surface level to correspond to the elevation of the pipe. The outflow through 
the pipe was then controlled by changing its properties (i.e., diameter, length and 
roughness). Placing the burst into the centre of a pipe is an approximation which 
is reasonable for relatively short pipes, however, might become less applicable 
in rural areas where pipe lengths tend to be significantly longer than in urban 
areas. 
More frequently, pressure sensitive outflows are modelled using emitters, which 
are devices used typically to model sprinklers or irrigation networks governed by 
the equation for orifice flow (Walski et al. 2003): 
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ghACQ d 2                                                                                            (2.1) 
 
Where: Q is the outflow (discharge), Cd is a discharge coefficient, A is the area 
of an orifice, g is the gravitational acceleration constant (9.81 ms-2), and h depth 
of water measured from the centre of the orifice opening (m). 
The orifice equation can be generalised and written as: 
 
Q=CdPγ                                                                                                    (2.2) 
 
Where: Q is the flow rate, P is pressure at junction, Cd is a discharge coefficient 
and γ is a pressure exponent. 
Studying the behaviour of bursts and leakage has attracted the attention of many 
researchers. Van Zyl and Clayton (2005, 2007); and Klise et al. (2017) 
investigated that leak hydraulics, pipe material behaviour, soil hydraulics and 
water demand are the main factors affecting magnitude of pipe a leak/ burst. Van 
Zyl and Clayton (2007) further noted that specific types of failures are likely to 
develop depending on pipe material. Results of their experimental study related 
pipe material and type of the opening to the pressure exponent γ which had the 
most significant effect on the flow through a burst. The value of γ typically ranged 
from 0.52 to 1.85 for round holes and longitudinal cracks, respectively. Lambert 
(2002) reported that values of γ typically ranged from 0.5 to 1.5 and occasionally 
also between 2.0 and 2.5 during field tests conducted in the UK. Lately, Cassa et 
al. (2010) conducted a numerical study into the effects of pressure on holes and 
cracks and concluded that values of γ > 1.5 did not have theoretical justification. 
In the work presented here, the approach of Klise et al. (2017) was adopted to 
simulate pipe break scenarios. Where, break at pipe is simulated by adding a 
dummy pipe (with large diameter and small length) and an emitter at the middle 
of the damaged pipe. The emitter coefficient is equal to Cb = 6.07 *10-5*d2 (d is 
the diameter of the pipe in mm and Cb is in L/s/m0.5), while the exponent is γ=0.5.    
A new method was developed to simulate the proposed interventions in this 
thesis in hydraulic solver as shown in chapter 3, 4 and 5. 
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2.3.3 Impact quantification  
Because of the different social aspects, an accurate estimation and quantification 
of impacts in WDS is highly subjective and complex problem. In this section, we 
will specifically focus on the methods and tools that can be used to quantify the 
impacts of events such as supply interruptions and pressure drops in the WDS. 
This is done because this is of direct interest to the work done in this thesis (see 
chapters 1 and 3). 
Hydraulic and water quality network models represent the most effective, efficient 
and viable tools to predict WDS behaviour under a wide range of demand loading 
and operating conditions including emergency loading conditions resulting from 
different hazards as described in section 2.2.1. Mays (2000) defines emergency 
loading conditions that distribution networks are designed to handle on a routine 
basis: fire-fighting water demands, pipe breaks, sensor failures,  pump failures, 
power outages, control valve failures, and insufficient storage capacities. The 
network models used to analyse the resilience of WDSs to hazards need to be 
able to robustly handle failures and emergency/ stresses on the system. 
The hydraulic and water quality models use the laws of mass and energy 
conservation and reaction kinetics to determine pressure, flow, and water quality 
(movement and transformation) conditions for specified system characteristics 
and operating conditions (e.g., steady-state, EPS analysis). Through their 
predictive capabilities, these deterministic models provide a powerful tool for 
evaluating system response to various operational and management strategies 
to meet specific performance goals (Sunela 2017).  
Most of the currently available hydraulic models that used for analysing WDSs 
have been traditionally derived by using demand-driven models (DDM) (Wood 
and Charles 1970; Isaacs and Mills 1980; Todini and Pilati 1988). These methods 
assume that the demand required will be delivered irrespective of the system 
pressures available. The DDM hydraulic models are based on the well-known 
mass and energy balance equations that are used to compute pipe flows and 
nodal pressures in the network.  
These methods work well under normal flow conditions in which sufficient 
pressures are available in the pipe network. However, pressure can fall 
substantially under certain conditions, such as pipe bursts (or isolation) or during 
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excessive water use (Wu and Walski 2006; Kapelan and Giustolisi 2006; 
Giustolisi et al. 2008). Under these flow conditions, DDM methods cannot always 
deliver realistic predictions of pressures and flows, because it is not always 
possible to deliver all desired demands in such circumstances. As a result, DDM 
methods may produce unrealistically low, sometimes negative nodal pressures 
that are, in some cases, physically impossible (Kapelan and Giustolisi 2006; 
Tanyimboh and Templeman 2010; Romano et al. 2014).  
The pressure-driven models (PDM) address the aforementioned shortcomings by 
representing the water flow delivered as a function of available pressure (Bhave 
1981; Germanopoulos 1985; Wagner et al. 1988; Chandapillai 1991; Fujiwara 
and Ganesharajah 1993; Gupta and Bhave 1996; Tanyimboh and Templeman 
2010; Siew and Tanyimboh 2012). This is termed nodal head–flow relationship 
(NHFR). Having said this, some authors have proposed alternative approaches 
that do not make use of NHFR. Examples include (1) Collins et al. (1978), who 
proposed using optimization techniques instead; (2) Todini (2006), who 
developed a heuristic-type solution with three corrective steps to the demand-
driven global gradient algorithm (GGA) (Todini and Pilati 1988), in order to correct 
nodal outflows whenever pressure is insufficient; and (3) Piller and Van Zyl (2007, 
2009), who used mass balance–based constraints in the minimization of their 
content model.  
Since the 1980s, many attempts have been made to simulate WDS under 
pressure-deficient conditions (Ozger and Mays 2003; Giustolisi et al. 2008; Wu 
et al. 2009; Tabesh et al. 2011; Siew and Tanyimboh 2012) and to formulate the 
NHFR. However, only a limited number of approaches succeeded in producing 
acceptable results under certain boundary conditions. Nevertheless, most of 
these approaches are not ideal, because they are either difficult to implement or 
computationally inefficient. This makes them difficult and sometimes impossible 
to use in larger networks, especially under extended period simulation (EPS) 
conditions (see the next section for details). 
Probably the first NHFR function was suggested by Bhave (1981), who assumed 
that the actual (or available) nodal flow delivered (Qn,del ) depends only on the 
minimum pressure head , Pn,min , for flow to occur at node n, as shown in Figure 
2.1. This work was extended by Germanopoulos (1985) to avoid the discontinuity 
properties in the aforementioned function. He proposed two characteristic head 
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values for defining the NHFR, namely, Pn,min , the minimum head for flow to occur 
at node n (where enough information is not available, the value of Pn,min is 
frequently considered equal to the elevation of node n), and Pn,req , the head 
required to provide full flow, i.e., the demand required (Qn,req ) at node n.  The 
Pn,req value for a node depends on the type of service connection and the type of 
development in the area served by that node. For instance, the pressure required 
at the street level for excellent flow to a three story building is about 290 kPa (30 
m). The Office of Water Services in England specifies a minimum acceptable 
static pressure of 7 m (68.5 kPa) below which consumers may be entitled to 
compensation for less than satisfactory service. In general, nodal heads of 15 to 
25 m will guarantee satisfactory service at all related stop taps in a distribution 
system (Tanyimboh et al. 1999). Salgado-Castro (1988) assumed a linear 
relation for the NHFR. Further, Wagner et al. (1988) proposed a continuous 
quadratic relationship for modeling partial flow between Pn,min  and Pn,req as 
follows:  
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Where nn is the empirical exponent coefficient at node n, where nn varies between 
1.5 and 2 (Tabesh 1998), but Wagner et al. (1988) suggested nn=2. Ackley et al. 
(2001) claim that the Wagner et al. (1988) function is hydraulically significant but 
not differentiable when outflow begins (i.e., Pn,avl approaches Pn,min) or when it 
reaches Qn,req, which may sometimes lead to numerical oscillations and 
convergence problems in iterative methods that upgrade the NHFR in the GGA 
(Kovalenko et al. 2014). Thus, later, a differentiable function was suggested by 
Fujiwara and Li (1998) to simulate and assure a smooth transition for the partial 
flow between Pn,min and Pn,req.  
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Figure 2.1. Comparison of different head-flow relationships used in PDM. 
 
For the same reason Tanyimboh and Templeman (2010) proposed a logit 
function–based formulation to model partial flow. All the formulations mentioned 
for modeling the NHFR have been derived primarily on the basis of mathematical 
considerations and have not been validated by experimental or laboratory data. 
Also, Todini (2006) stated “it is impossible practically to derive a realistic NHFR.” 
This is consists what Ciaponi and Creaco (2018) concluded: “only the comparison 
with experimental data can reveal which formula is the most consistent with the 
real WDS behaviour”. However, the function proposed by Wagner et al. (1988) 
was highly recommended by Gupta and Bhave (1996), and Abdy Sayyed and 
Gupta (2013), among other existing functions at that time. Also, Todini (2006) 
states “it is impossible to drive a realistic NHFR”. Furthermore, Shirzad et al. 
(2012) and Walski et al. (2017) investigated the performance of the existing 
NHFRs by comparing them to laboratory and field measurements collected from 
tap outlets under different pressure head scenarios. The NHFR functions 
presented by Wagner et al. (1988) matched the best experimental data. 
Kovalenko et al. (2014); and Vairagade et al. (2015) performed a further 
comparison between the Tanyimboh and Templeman (2010); and Wagner et al. 
(1988) functions for some networks and calibration parameters, and concluded 
that the Tanyimboh and Templeman (2010) function gives better convergence 
properties, especially when Pn,avl approaches Pn,min.  
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Thus having a robust PDM with a reliable NHFR that is able to predict the 
hydraulic behaviour of a network under pressure deficient conditions in an 
accurate manner is essential for the work done in the thesis. Such a PDM does 
not currently exist in the literature. It is also noteworthy that the PDM presented 
in chapter 3 has the ability to model a more general NHFR and, therefore, even 
though the Wagner et al. (1988) function is used here (as recommended by 
several other authors) this is not a must, i.e., other NHFRs could be used as well. 
 
2.3.4 Approaches to model pressure-deficient conditions using DDM 
Hydraulic Solvers  
Most of the currently available WDN hydraulic solvers (except some commercial 
one e.g., WaterGEMS 8i) such as free open source EPANET2.0, WaterGEMS, 
and Mike, work as DDM-type solvers utilizing the GGA (Todini and Pilati 1988). 
Moreover, existing solvers were not designed to handle sudden failures resulting 
in inadequate pressure or rapid changes in system operation. Further, they were 
not designed to handle situations when sections of a water system become 
isolated because of a pipe or equipment failure, and tanks or reservoirs drain. 
However, the DDM-type hydraulic solvers (specifically EPANET2.0) can be used 
to analyze WDSs under pressure-deficient and emergency conditions as well, 
which can be done in two principal ways.  
The first approach relies on using a specific pressure-demand relationship that 
requires changing the source code of the DDM simulator. A number of examples 
of this approach exist. Ackley et al. (2001); and Yoo et al. (2012) presented 
optimization methods that maximized nodal outflow under abnormal operating 
conditions. Although they delivered results for simple WDNs, no generic solution 
approach was developed for practical applications. More recently, Goldstein’s 
algorithm was used by Elhay et al. (2015) to upgrade different NHFRs in the GGA 
(Todini and Pilati 1988). This approach was successfully demonstrated on eight 
challenging (i.e., one has 20,000 pipes) case study networks. However, this 
involved only steady-state hydraulic analysis. Rossman (2000b) extended 
EPANET by implementing a flow emitter at a node to simulate demand delivered 
as a function of available pressure. However, a flow emitter produces negative 
outflow (i.e., inflow) when nodal pressure becomes negative and there is no upper 
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limit for the discharge value. Cheung et al. (2005) modified the source code of 
EPANET by introducing emitters into the network model to simulate pressure-
driven demands by using an object-oriented toolkit (OOTEN). Yet this approach 
failed to converge when attempting to model highly looped WDNs under low flow 
conditions and EPS analysis. A modification of the emitter methodology was 
proposed by Morley and Tricarico (2014) through EPANETpdd by allowing each 
emitter to have its own empirical exponent. However, EPANETpdd fails due to 
convergence-related issues when applied to medium and larger or more complex 
WDNs.  
Liu et al. (2011); Siew and Tanyimboh (2012); and Jun and Guoping (2013) 
introduced backtracking, line search, and relaxation of parameter techniques to 
correct the nodal heads only (i.e., not flows) in EPANET. Alternatively, Giustolisi 
et al. (2011) proposed an entirely new system tool, WDNetXL, for simulating 
WDN under both DDM and PDM conditions. However, all these approaches 
exhibit one or more of the following limitations for wider implementation: (1) they 
require underlying algorithm modifications to be made, (2) they are not in the 
public domain, (3) they are iterative in nature, (4) they have been demonstrated 
on limited case studies often involving small or simple networks, and (5) they are 
unable to handle EPS analysis.  
A second principal way of simulating pressure-deficient conditions in a pipe 
network is by using DDM methods that add artificial hydraulic elements to the 
network nodes (e.g., valves, emitters, reservoirs, and pipes) without the need to 
introduce a NHFR function. This is followed by a DDA run in an iterative manner 
until convergence is achieved. Ozger and Mays (2003); Ang and Jowitt (2006); 
Todini (2006); and Suribabu and Neelakantan (2011) connected (and removed, 
when necessary) artificial reservoirs to pressure-deficient nodes to calculate the 
actual flows delivered. However, this type of approach has the drawback of 
withholding demands until the minimum nodal pressure head is satisfied, which 
usually needs a large number of iterations to converge. Furthermore, it can be 
very difficult to apply this type of approach to large networks, because adding and 
removing artificial reservoirs at various stages of the iterative methodology is not 
an easy task, especially under EPS analysis (Wu 2007; Wu et al. 2009). This is 
because the network topology must be changed iteratively at each time step to 
identify the correct pressure-deficient and pressure sufficient nodes.  
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Hayuti et al. (2008) found that the number of iterations in the aforementioned 
approaches could be reduced by using the successive solution-seeking method, 
but even with this reduction, the overall computational time is still substantial. 
Also, Jinesh Babu and Mohan (2012); and Sivakumar and Prasad (2015), 
addressed the limitation of the Ang and Jowitt (2006) method by introducing 
artificial flow control and check valves to ensure that flows into artificially added 
reservoirs did not exceed the required demand and to restrict the negative 
pressure in the network, respectively. This led to a smaller number of iterations 
when compared to the Ang and Jowitt (2006); and Todini (2006) approaches. 
Nevertheless, the artificial reservoirs still could not simulate the important partial 
flow between the minimum and the desired pressure head levels. Gorev and 
Kodzhespirova (2013) tried to address this shortcoming by introducing an 
additional artificial pipe with a suitable resistance coefficient at all demand nodes. 
Although the results were obtained with a single hydraulic run, the approach only 
supported the specific, parabolic type of NHFR (Wagner et al. 1988).  
Sayyed et al. (2014, 2015) replaced the artificial reservoir and pipe with a suitably 
chosen flow emitter to reflect the properties of each node in the network. Both 
algorithms delivered good results under steady-state analysis. However, neither 
algorithm considered the effect of minimum pressure head level for a head value 
higher than zero. In summary, the implementation of existing PDM approaches 
by introducing artificial elements in all the network nodes results in the increased 
size and computational time of the pipe network problem. This, in turn, often leads 
to convergence failures and crashing hydraulic solvers, especially in large WDNs 
under EPS analysis.  
Even though the single-iteration PDM approach (SIPDM) proposed in this thesis 
in chapter 3 makes use of the similar sequence of artificial elements (check 
valve–flow control valve–emitter) to model pressure-deficient conditions, unlike 
in other approaches (Sayyed et al. 2014, 2015), the artificial elements in SIPDM 
are added on a selective basis, i.e., only to pressure-deficient nodes with 
demands (i.e., demand nodes with pressure head less the required value: Pn,avl < 
Pn,req). These nodes are identified by running the DDM-type hydraulic solver (e.g., 
EPANET) once before PDM simulation. This is very important, especially in the 
case of larger, real-life networks, where it is well known that typically only a small 
part on the network (i.e., a small number of nodes) is likely to experience 
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pressure-deficient conditions during a failure event (e.g., a pipe burst or 
equipment failure). Therefore, there is no need to add the proposed artificial 
elements to all demand nodes as other PDM methods currently suggest. As will 
be shown in the case studies that follow, this leads to several benefits, including 
(1) increased computational efficiency of hydraulic calculations; (2) more stable 
convergence of the PDM simulator, ending in more realistic results; and (3) less 
effort required to add artificial elements to the network, which, in this case, can 
be done manually. However, this is virtually impossible with other approaches. 
Furthermore, the approach works well under both steady-state and EPS 
conditions, even in the case of large and complex WDNs, as illustrated in chapter 
4. 
 
2.3.5 Real-time WDS models 
Real-time WDS model is defined as an integration of network hydraulic and 
quality model with operations data collected and stored via SCADA. Real-time 
water system models (e.g., hydraulic and quality) have become an important tool 
in planning and design of WDSs, and are now more frequently used in operations 
under a wide range of demand loading and operating conditions (Boulos et al. 
2014; Savic 2014; Sunela 2017). Mass and conservation equations, and reaction 
kinetics are used in these models to predict pressure, flow and water quality (i.e., 
movement and transformation) for specified system properties and operating 
conditions. These models are capable of providing powerful tools for determining 
responses to different operational (i.e., various demand stress conditions) and 
management strategies in order to meet required performance goals (Boulos et 
al. 2014).  
In order to achieve these goals, the models require an accurate, continuously 
updated view of WDS status condition. This can accomplished by synthesizing 
SCADA and other real-time telemetry data with networks models.  
The resulting networks models provide utility operators continuous real-time 
insights regarding water network performance. A constant stream of data for 
small time steps (i.e., 15, 30, 60 min) coupled with predictive modelling 
capabilities, enables network operators to quickly assess events as they occur, 
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identify potential problems before they reach critical level, respond to operational 
challenges, and minimize potential impacts (Walski 2015; Rasekh 2015).  
For example, network operators can analyse the effect of predicted low storage 
tank level on network hydraulics and determine consumers who will be likely 
adversely affected by low pressure and service interruptions (Kang 2014). 
Alternative operating scenarios can be quickly analysed and compared to find the 
most appropriate solution. Operators can also assess the effects of main breaks 
and other equipment failures, and maintain or repair; as well as any other planned 
or unplanned incidents (Paluszczyszyn 2015; Odan et al. 2015). These models 
can also predict import pressure and flow key network parameters, where data 
loggers are not available and predict systems performance should SCADA feeds 
go offline. Introducing real-time modelling to networks can help network operators 
to change network mode from fully reactive to proactive network management 
(Boulos et al. 2014; Savic et al. 2014). All above can then beneficially results 
more efficient and low-cost operations systems, greater network integrity and 
ultimately improve network maintenance and customer service.  
One area that has not received much attention is the use of real-time models in 
emergency planning and response (e.g., response to pipe burst impacts). 
However, simulation models have been used for emergency planning and 
response and there is a significant potential for additional application in support 
of decisions makers (Walski 2015). WDS operators rely heavily on their SCADA 
systems for information during emergencies. However, SCADA systems cannot 
be used to analyse the impacts of emergency response (Boulos et al. 2014). By 
combining the live information from a SCADA system with the power of a 
hydraulic model to interpolate and extrapolate system behaviour, decision 
makers can obtain a much better picture of measures to deal with emergencies. 
There are some preconditions for using a real-time model in emergencies. To be 
useful in an emergency response situation, the model must be calibrated for the 
area of interest and an individual who can run the model must be available. The 
model user must also have information on the current state of the system. Initial 
and boundary conditions that were used in building the model may not be 
appropriate for the given situation. The model user must be able to quickly or 
automatically open/close valves, turn pumps on/off, adjust demands, set tank 
levels and other intervention settings in the model (Alonso et al. 2010; Rasekh et 
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al. 2014). There are several situations where a model can be helpful in decision 
support for example detecting an emergency (e.g., pipe burst) through detection 
system, simulating no-action impact (i.e., impact assessment), testing 
alternatives (e.g., interventions), and restoring normal operation (i.e., pre-failure 
event conditions). 
The above review reveals the importance of using real-time models for various 
WDS purposes. For example, real-time hydraulic model can be used to assist 
network operator to evaluate the impact of a failure event such as pipe burst on 
the future status of the system assuming ‘do nothing’ scenario. The same model 
can be used to evaluate the impact of alternative interventions under failing 
network conditions, especially when a quick decision needs to be taken. If this 
model is coupled with an optimisation model then the network interventions can 
be optimised too resulting in more consistent/objective operational interventions 
being suggested to the network operator. Such a methodology is currently lacking 
in the literature. 
 
 Real-time Operational Optimization Models of WDS 
These models were extend the use of WDSs to assist network operators improve 
efficiency and ensure more reliable operation (e.g., increasing benefits) at 
minimum cost level under normal and abnormal network operation conations. A 
typical complete real-time operational optimization model framework comprises 
SCADA connection, demand forecasting, optimization algorithm, and solution 
evaluation module (Sunela 2017). The models automatically read real-time field 
data, instantly update the network model, and determine for example pump, and 
valves operation schedules that will produce minimum operating cost that 
satisfying the network required performance such as boundary limits for flows, 
pressures and velocities, total pump flow capacity and tank trajectory curves. 
Linking optimum mass-balance storage model with the real-time network model 
is common in WDS applications which used to produce optimal solutions quickly 
for improving system operating performance in the short-term horizon, typically 
for the next 24 hours. The linking models spontaneously defines the mass-
balance storage model, consider the variation in demand, control elements (e.g., 
pumps, valves) and other network factors in a timely manner (i.e., each time step 
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in the simulating period). Optimization methods are then used to optimise 
operational interventions (such as pump operations).  The generated optimal 
solutions can be then send to the integrated SCADA system and network 
operators for implementation purposes. 
In general, optimisation methods in WDS modelling can be divided into three 
categories: deterministic, stochastic and mixed techniques. The deterministic 
techniques include enumeration, linear programming (e.g., optimal power surface 
(OPUS) methodology), nonlinear programming (e.g., Mock Tree II algorithm), and 
dynamic programming. The stochastic techniques consist of metaheuristics 
population-based algorithms (e.g., genetic algorithms, evolutionary strategies, 
harmony search, particle swarm optimization, ant colony optimization, shuffled 
leaping frog algorithm, etc.) and metaheuristics single point-based methods (e.g., 
simulated annealing, Tabu search, simple (1+1) evolutionary strategies, 
trajectory or local search methods, etc.) (Maier et al. 2015; Sunela 2017). Mixed 
techniques combine both deterministic and stochastic methods. Some examples 
include combining linear programming and GA (Reis and Pinheiro 2005), linear 
programming with hybrid discrete dynamically dimensioned search (HD-DDS) 
(Puleo et al. 2014), particle-swarm with harmony search (Geem 2009), and linear 
programming with greedy algorithm (Giacomello et al. 2013).The above 
optimization methods are frequently used in WDS optimization for the purpose of 
network operation (e.g., pump scheduling, pressure management problems, risk 
analysis) as well as calibration (e.g., calibration of pipes internal roughness, leaks 
detection), and (re)design problems (e.g., optimum pipe sizes, network structure, 
valve location). 
In comparison to deterministic, stochastic methods are efficient, both in terms of 
precision and computational effort, in solving many real-life WDS problems (Maier 
et al. 2015; Sunela 2017) in near real-time. Stochastic methods not required to 
formulate the problem in analytical form and the formulation can be non-
differentiable. Also, the advantages include their ability to handle discrete choices 
and to identify near-optimal solutions to complex optimisation problems (Simpson 
et al. 1994). Finally, they are capable of identifying a set of promising solutions 
that may be compared on other non-quantifiable criteria and are suited to discrete 
problems (Simpson et al. 1994). 
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Genetic Algorithms (GAs) are probably the most well-established class of 
metaheuristics used for solving WDS problems and are inspired by various 
mechanisms of biological evolution (e.g., reproduction, mutation, crossover, 
selection, etc.) (Nicklow et al. 2010). The genetic algorithm starts with a randomly 
generated population of solutions, and after each iteration, the best solutions are 
most likely to survive into the next iteration (generation). The surviving solutions 
exchange design variable values (genes) with each other, and there is a chance 
for mutations (random changes in design variable values).  
However, the computational efficiency of using the meta-heuristic optimization 
approach involving GAs at identifying the real or near real-time global or near-
global optimum solutions is still a challenging problem, due to two reason: (i) great 
number of hydraulic simulations are required, even though a single simulation 
can be reasonably fast, the simulations can still be the bottleneck in the 
optimization process; (ii) some of the performance metrics are computationally 
demanding, especially in large WDSs. Consequently, limitations in available 
computational resources could have a negative impact on the quality of the 
evaluation of optimization algorithm performance. The magnitude of this problem 
could be reduced, but not completely resolved, by using: (i) surrogate modelling 
(e.g., ANNs), (ii) parallelization (i.e., by utilizing multiple CPU cores or cloud 
computing services), (iii) population pre-processing (e.g., fixed-length encoding, 
such as Dynamic Parameter Encoding (Schraudolph and Belew 1992)) and (iv) 
heuristic information to reduce the size of the search space, such as graph 
decomposition methods Kadu et al. (2008); Zheng et al. (2011, 2014); global 
sensitivity analysis (Fu et al., 2011) or engineering judgement and historical 
information (Pasha and Lansey, 2010). Having said that, a reduction in the size 
of the search space generally may results in approximation, either because a 
number of decision variables have to be fixed prior to optimisation or because the 
nature of interactions among the decision variables precludes effective size 
reduction. This could potentially exclude the region that contains the true global 
optimum. 
The above reveals that solving optimization problems and obtaining optimal 
operational interventions in near real-time is still a difficult task that has not been 
resolved completely, i.e. in a satisfactory manner so far. Therefore, in the work 
presented in this thesis, a novel method for the optimal selection of interventions 
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that is based on two new effective preparation stages (i.e., offline and online) is 
developed with the aim to reduce the search space and speed up the follow on 
optimisation process. This, in turn, enables real response problems to be solved 
in near real-time (see chapter 3). 
 
 Summary  
This literature review highlights the need for continued evolution and innovation 
in the field of real-time modelling specifically operational response methods for 
WDSs in the UK (and worldwide) to improve the current best practice for the 
management of emergency conditions. A number of existing real-time modelling, 
impacts assessment and response methods for handling failure events and 
mitigating/ reducing their impacts are discussed and the need for further 
comparative studies of the various methods and metrics is highlighted, including 
additional testing on complex real-world case studies. The review reveals the 
pertinent timing of this work for the water industry and derives numerous areas 
for further qualitative and quantitative research. 
Based on the literature review, this thesis aims to develop a near real-time   
response methodology to reduce negative impacts of unplanned events 
(specifically pipe bursts) in a WDS in a more automated way and by optimising 
the network interventions in near real-time. The interventions considered in the 
thesis are based on the current practice of the UK water industry. The aim is to 
provide additional support for WDS operators when making relevant decisions by 
mitigating adverse impacts and prioritizing timely interventions in a more effective 
way, especially in cases when failures are more complex in nature (e.g., affecting 
a larger part of the water distribution system and consumers) and decisions need 
to be made quickly. This, in turn, is expected to result in improved operational 
efficiency and emergency preparedness, reduced water loss and shortened 
response time. Finally, the new methodology should enable less experienced 
operators to make equally good decisions, all with the aim to improve customer 
service and protect the WDS.  The complete framework and detail of the near 
real-time response methodology developed in this thesis are presented in the 
following chapter (chapter 3). 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY FOR REAL-TIME 
OPERATIONAL RESPONSE TO FAILURE 
EVENTS IN A WDS 
3.1 Introduction  
Water distribution systems are regularly subject to operational failure conditions 
caused either by emergencies or planned maintenance events. Under such 
circumstances, certain elements and parts become inoperable, and the system 
can no longer provide the minimum level of service to consumers. Dealing with 
failure conditions in a WDS and providing continues services is one of the primary 
functions of control room operators in the UK water utilities. The process of 
discovering that a WDS is not functioning normally, investigating potential 
incidents (pre-event stage) and deciding on how to deal with them (post-event 
stage) is still challenging, even with recent progress in monitoring and 
communication technologies. The immediate initiation of effective response 
actions can be critical and essential for reducing and limit spreading the adverse 
impacts (i.e., supply interruption, pressure drops) resulting from failure events. 
However, so far, most decisions and response tools are currently made on an ad-
hoc basis, primarily based on the experience of skilled operators. 
The developed real-time operational response methodology presented in this 
chapter of the thesis aims to reduce adverse impacts under unplanned event in 
a specific WDS (e.g., pipe burst) in a more automated/optimal way and in near 
real-time by using locally available network interventions. The methodology is 
based on the current practice in the UK water industry. It is intended to provide 
additional support to WDS operators when making relevant decisions by 
mitigating adverse impacts and prioritizing timely interventions in a more efficient 
way, especially in cases when failures are more complex in nature (e.g., affecting 
a significant part of the water distribution system and consumers), and decisions 
need to be made quickly. This, in turn, is expected to result in improved 
operational efficiency and emergency preparedness, reduced water loss and 
shortened response time. Finally, the methodology enables less experienced 
operators to make equally good decisions, all with the aim to improve customer 
service and protect the WDS. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. After this introduction, a general overview 
of the real-time response methodology and its phases following on from a failure 
event is presented in section 3.2. Once this is done, section 3.3 provides the 
methodological details of the segmentation method (i.e., first response phase) 
that enables to isolate an event location and to identify the interrupted consumers 
from the water source(s).  The recovery phase is then formulated and presented 
in section 3.4 with all the required calculation details and solution method 
explained. An impact assessment model able to capture various operational 
aspects of adverse impacts caused by a failure event is described in section 3.5. 
Finally, in section 3.6, the entire chapter is summarized.  
 
3.2 Response Methodology Overview  
The automated response methodology, presented here, involves two basic 
phases (as shown in Figure 3.1). In the first phase, following a failure event, the 
affected part of the network is isolated from the rest of the system by closing 
appropriate valves. The affected part is kept isolated until the failed pipe 
undergoes repair or is fully replaced. The isolation aims to eliminate the impacts 
of the failure event spreading to the entire WDS, for instance pressure drops. The 
isolation leads to interrupted service to consumers that were supplied from the 
now disconnected segment and may likely affect additional consumers 
downstream of the isolated area. The affected consumers can be classified to: 
(1) those that are unaffected, (2) those that have completely lost the water supply 
and (3) those that are partially affected, i.e., experience a drop in pressure and, 
if the failure event persists long enough to drain tanks, may lose service (Walski 
2015). Once isolation is completed, further decisions should be taken so that the 
operation of the “non-isolated” parts of the network experience minimal negative 
impacts (e.g., low pressure, supply interruptions) and the effects of failure event 
are contained. This can be performed through second phase, i.e., recovery, which 
involves selecting and implementing an optimal combination of operational 
interventions for network operators as temporary alternatives, i.e., until pre-event 
failure conditions are restored.  
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Figure 3.1. Phases of the response methodology. 
 
For the particular event in the WDS that is being detected at time td, located at 
time tf and isolated at time ti, the impact (IM), defined here as the cumulative 
undelivered volume of water to consumers over a specific impact horizon Th, is 
estimated next in a near real-time operation mode. The impact (i.e., IMR) of doing 
nothing is assessed first, shortly after event detection and location, with the aim 
to assess the scale of the event impact, i.e., to see if something needs to be done. 
This is achieved by conducting the necessary online hydraulic simulation analysis 
that makes use of the SCADA data (e.g., observed tanks levels, flows, 
pressures). This data are normally collected in a constant cycle of pre-specified 
time steps (e.g., every 15 minutes). The impact horizon is measured over a pre-
specified time frame (e.g., 6, 12, or 24 hours) from the moment of locating the 
event failure (tf). Once it is concluded that something should be done, a number 
of optimal intervention solutions are identified and introduced to aid temporary 
recovery until the failure element is fully replaced or repaired. These solutions are 
automatically selected from a pre-defined interventions list (for a specific WDS) 
by using a suitable methodology (please see section 3.4.4). The SCADA data are 
used in the process to assess the effect of introducing different interventions 
(impact reduction) and also to continuously monitor the affected area. 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Failure event development stages vs system performance. 
 
Figure 3.2 provides an illustration of the development stages of a failure event 
against system performance indicator (SPI) in real-time. The selection of the 
suitable SPI relies upon on the particular service provided by the WDS under 
analysis as explained in section 2.3.1. In this work, the SPI is assumed to be the 
ratio of water delivered by the system to the water required by the consumers 
(over the time). The SPI, therefore, has a value between 0 and 1, where 0 
indicates that no water is delivered to the system and 1 is the target SPI value 
(i.e., under normal operation conditions). Note that other, more complex and 
refined impact assessment models could be developed (Mansoor 2007; Bicik et 
al. 2010) or company specific models could be used. The point is that the 
response methodology shown here is generic in nature and, as such, it can 
accommodate any of these models as long as they can quantify the impact of 
operational interventions considered in terms of specific SPI(s) used. 
Note further that the diagrammatic process presented in Figure 3.2 is shown only 
for illustration purposes and is not drawn to scale. The solid blue line indicates 
system performance under normal operational conditions. At the time to, the 
system experiences a failure event (such as a pipe burst) at a specific location in 
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the network. The system performance may suddenly deteriorate (as illustrated by 
the dashed red line), with this process continuing until the event is detected at 
time td and then located at time tf. At that time (tf), the first phase of the response 
methodology is applied and the event is isolated at time ti. Still, the system 
performance is likely to deteriorate further due to pressure deficient conditions 
resulting from isolating a part of the network (including the failure event location) 
and this may reach a minimum at time te. 
In order to alleviate the impact of system deterioration from time tf to te, a recovery 
phase is introduced. Optimal recovery interventions may be introduced in the field 
at any time from tr to te. Recovery phase calculations can be initiated immediately 
after identifying shut-off valves to isolate the failure event. This involves 
generating a list of initial, possible interventions, followed by the selection of the 
optimal ones by trading off the cost of interventions and likely negative impact 
reduction. The details of the process for the screening and obtaining optimal 
recovery interventions is given in section 3.4.4. 
From time tr, the system performance (indicated by dashed green line) starts 
recovering to the normal operating conditions, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. The 
figure also shows the response delay as the time period between when the 
location of the event is identified and when the recovery intervention solutions are 
implemented.  
 
3.3 Isolation Phase  
Once the early warning system has detected a failure event(s) in the WDS, it is 
crucial to take appropriate, timely decisions to isolate the affected part of the 
network. This is done by identifying an appropriate set of shut-off valves, which 
need to be closed in order to separate (i.e., isolate) the affected network 
segment(s) from the rest of the WDS. Isolation should result in the minimum 
impact (i.e., supply interruptions) on consumers through locating the nearest set 
of isolation valves that need to be closed. The isolation phase enables network 
operators to retrieve all necessary information about the location of valves and to 
identify consumers on segment (s) that are affected by a total loss of supply 
service.   
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The affected network segment(s) is/are divided into two types: (i) Regular network 
segment(s) that involve(s) the isolated part of the network that contains a failed 
element (e.g., failed pipe), and (ii) Unintended network segment(s), defined as 
part of the network that is unintentionally disconnected from the water sources, 
as a consequence of isolating the regular segment(s). A segment(s), including 
both regular and unintended, are likely to involve additional network elements 
(e.g., pipes, nodes, other network equipment) that are not damaged, including 
the affected consumers who are isolated in the process. Depending on the 
location and the number of valves that need to be closed, the number of elements 
in a segment may vary. For instance, a single segment isolation needs to have 
two valves at both upstream and downstream ends of the failed network element 
(e.g., pipe), which is unlikely to exist in a real WDS.  
Isolation process calculations and implementation starts when the location of the 
failure event has been confirmed by the detection system. The primary purpose 
of separating the failure event is to prevent both economic and social impacts 
associated with it and this may involve the following: 
 Lost water: the quantity of water lost until the affected element(s) isolated 
after the failure event has occurred can be considerably large especially if 
a large pipe fails.  
 Interrupted supply: the failure event may likely cause certain changes in 
hydraulic behaviour (e.g., flow, pressure) of the WDS. This changes may 
include, for example, dropping the pressure head in the system to an 
insufficient level (i.e., dropped below required standard level). In addition 
to this, the supply can get disconnected at a number of connection points 
(e.g., nodes), and this, in turn, may lead to leaving a number of consumers 
without water.  
 Structural damages: the surrounding infrastructure can be affected by 
failure event. However, this depends on the type of event failure and its 
scale. For example, a large burst can cause flooding of streets and 
houses. 
 Other potential impacts: for example direct and indirect costs that could 
affect water utilities resulting from lost water, property damage, lost 
revenue due undelivered demand, and third party damage; the 
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introduction of pollutants causing deterioration of the water quality; traffic 
congestion, closing of businesses, environmental impacts, etc. 
The impacts of failure events listed above can be both expensive and harmful to 
consumers, utilities and environment, therefore, are undesirable. The overall 
damage resulting by a failure event depends on the time when the event occurred 
and the time when it isolated. To minimise the relevant impacts associated with 
failure event a real-time technique for quick detection and location is necessary, 
especially in case of pipe burst and leakage events. The duration of time for which 
the network segments remain isolated is defined as a time between the point 
when the maintenance team obtains access to valves that should be closed to 
the point when the failed system element (e.g., a burst pipe) is either replaced or 
repaired. The duration of the repair depends on the availability of resources (e.g., 
material, tools, and personnel). 
Once an alarm has been raised and a potential failure event located, the isolation 
phase derives and extracts in real-time the list of isolated elements and set of 
shut-off valves from the network information. This information retrieves 
automatically from network input data file, e.g., by reading and automatically 
processing the relevant data from the EPANET2.0 input file. The information 
contains necessary detail such as size, location, and settings for each network 
element (e.g., valve, pipe). The detail also includes the number of consumers 
allocated to each network node. The network input information is updated 
periodically to consider the modifications on valves and other equipment (e.g., 
pipes added or removed, inoperable valves, etc.). The lists are presented to the 
network operators for making suitable decisions such as sending maintenance 
team to close valves (e.g., in case if the valves are not remotely controlled) and 
notify the isolated consumers.  
The identification of the list of isolated network elements (e.g., pipes, nodes) 
belonging to both regular and unintentional segments (in addition to the 
calculation for locating the set of nearest isolation valves) is carried out by using 
new network segmentation method which is presented in the following section.  
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3.3.1 Segment identification methodology 
The identification of network segment(s) that should be isolated following a failure 
event is based on the information contained in two network topological matrices. 
These matrices are the Node-Link matrix (defined here as Anl) and the Valve-
Location matrix (defined here as Avl). The form of both matrices is similar, with 
each column corresponding to a specific network node (e.g., reservoir, tank, 
demand node) and each row corresponding to a particular network link (e.g., pipe, 
pump). All elements in these two matrices have a value of either 1 or 0. The matrix 
element ij has a value of 1 if the link in row i (i.e., li) is connected to the node in 
column j (i.e., ni) of the Anl, and it has a value of 0 otherwise. On the other hand, 
each element of matrix Avl  gets the value of 1 if a valve placed on a link li and 
next to a node ni (i.e., V (li,nj)=1), and gets the value of 0 otherwise.  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Regular and unintended network segments under p2 failure for a 
simple network. 
 
The regular network segments are identified through the following steps:  
1. Construct valve deficiency matrix Avd = Anl - Avl. 
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2. Construct matrix Vp, which is obtained by removing zero columns from 
matrix Avl and then splitting columns having more than one element with 
value greater than zero into multiple columns in a way to have only one 
element with value greater than zero in each column. 
3. Construct symmetric matrix V= (Avd|Vp) x (Avd|Vp) T; V(I,j) > 1 =1. 
4. Pipes belonging to each segment can be identified by reading non-zero 
elements (i.e., pipe index) in each column of matrix Vm. Where m is the 
maximum allowed pipes belong segment. 
5. For each pipe, belonging to each regular segment in step 4, read non-zero 
element value for the corresponding row number for the pipe from matrix 
Vvd and then read the corresponding column number (i.e., node) to the 
segment.  
6. Identify the list of isolation valves belong each segment from matrix Avl. 
 
The unintended network segments are identified through the following steps: 
1. For each regular segment, construct new Anl (i.e., 𝐴𝑛𝑙
𝑠𝑖  , where i indicates 
regular segment order) matrix by removing pipes and nodes belong target 
regular segment i. 
2. Apply steps 3, 4, and 5 considering Vsi= ( 𝐴𝑛𝑙
𝑠𝑖  )×( 𝐴𝑛𝑙
𝑠𝑖  )T. 
3. Segments that do not contain water source nodes are considered as 
unintentional segments for the target regular segment i.  
To illustrate the implementation steps of the above network segmentation method 
and detail of the proposed matrices, the proposed algorithm was applied to a 
simple network shown in Figure 3.3 under a hypothetical pipe failure scenario, 
i.e., burst on pipe p2. The network consists of: one water source (i.e., R1), hence 
ns = 1, where ns is the total number of source nodes in the network; six demand 
nodes, nj= 6, where nj is the total number of junctions in the network (i.e., demand 
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nodes, dummy nodes, hydrant points); eight links, nl = 8, where nl is the total 
number of pipes and pumps in the network; and, finally, five isolation valves, nv = 
5, where nv is the total number of isolation valves in the network. Thus, matrices 
Anl and Avl  are as follows: 
 
Table 3.1. Node-Link and Valve-Location matrices for the network in Figure 3.3. 
   n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 R1    n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 R1 
Anl = 
p1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Avl = 
p1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
p2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 p2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
p3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 p3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
p4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 p4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
p5 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 p5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
p6 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 p6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
p7 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 p7 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
p8 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 p8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
From the Anl and Avl, the valve deficiency matrix (Avd) is obtained by subtracting 
Avl from Anl (i.e., Avd = Anl - Avl). A “1” in the Avd matrix means no valve is placed 
at that position. Because no valve is placed at the position, pipe failure cannot be 
confined at that position and it propagates to the adjacent pipes and nodes. The 
Avd matrix enables us to trace the valveless paths. The pipes, nodes, and valves 
located on these paths together form a segment. Accordingly, the structure of Avd 
for our simple example can be written as follows (Table 3.2):   
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Table 3.2. Deficiency (Avd) and Vp matrices for the network in Figure 3.3. 
  n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 R1 
        
 p1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 p1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 p2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 p2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 p3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 p3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Avd= p4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Vp= p4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 p5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 p5 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 p6 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 p6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 p7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 p7 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 p8 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 p8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Once the above three matrices (e.g., Aln, Avl, Avd) are established, the segment 
identification method is used to automatically identify the elements (e.g., nodes, 
pipes) within the regular network segment, which should be isolated to contain 
the failure element location (e.g., p2 in our simple network example). This can be 
done starting from the symmetric matrix V, which can be calculated as follows: 
 
V= (Avd|Vp) x (Avd|Vp) T                                                                          (3.1) 
 
The matrix Vp is obtained by removing the columns of zeros in Vvl and dividing 
the remaining columns that have more than one non-zero element into multiple 
columns in order to get only one non-zero element in each column, as shown in 
Table 3.2. 
It is fair to say that the non-zero element V (i,j) of V in each column or row 
(considering I ≠ j) provide the i-th indices of the links which are adjacent to j-th 
link. For instance, the adjacent link to link p3 is p4, as shown in Figure 3.3 and 
Table 3.2. Accordingly, the non-zero elements in each column or row of V2 
represent the links which are connected by a path of length (number of links on 
the path) less than or equal to two (Brualdi and Ryser 1991). By taking into 
account the power m for V, it is possible to state that the non-zero elements in 
each column or row of Vm (after replacing non-zero elements in Vm by one) 
represent the links that are connected by a path (i.e., network segment) of length 
less than or equal to m. Note that for a fully connected network the matrix Vm 
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becomes full (i.e., it will not have zero elements), m depends on the maximum 
and the minimum path lengths between two pipes of the network, i.e., maximum 
or minimum number of links that are connected by one path (Brualdi and Ryser 
1991).  
For our simple network, Table 3.3 shows the matrix Vm (with m=4), indicating 
those links in Figure 3.3 that have non-zero values in the same unique columns 
(e.g., pipes that are connected by one path). For example, columns two and six 
show that p2 and p6 belong to a single segment (i.e., s2), as shown in Table 3.4 
(the details for other segments are reported in the same table). It is also 
interesting to note that for the N valve rule scenario (i.e., having an isolation valve 
at each end of all pipes in the network), Vm is an identity matrix (or each pipe will 
be belong a segment and the number of regular segments will equal to the 
number pipes in the network). By replacing non-zero elements with the 
corresponding link number in the column’s header, by removing duplicate 
columns and zero elements, regular network segment lists for all links in the 
network are obtained. It can be observed from Table 3.3 that the proposed 
network segmentation method can generate simultaneously all possible 
segments for all links in the network. This is important in case of having two or 
more coinciding failure events at the different parts of a particular network. 
 
Table 3.3. Matrix V and Vm (with m=4) for the network in the Figure 3.3. 
   p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8    p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 
V = 
p1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vm = 
p1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
p2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 p2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
p3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
p4 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 p4 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
p5 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 p5 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
p6 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 p6 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
p7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 p7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
p8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 p8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Once the links belonging to each segment are identified, the nodes belonging to 
each segment can be obtained from the matrix Vvd. This is done by considering 
for each i-th row (i.e., link), in the target regular network segment, the j-th non-
 
71 
 
zero elements (i.e., node). For example, nodes n2 and n5 belong to the regular 
network segment s2, as shown in matrix Avd and Table 3.4. Also, it can be seen 
from the same table that each node only belongs to one single segment. 
 
Table 3.4. Segments isolation detail for the network in the Figure 3.3. 
Regular 
network 
segment  
Pipe list Node list Valve list Unintentional network 
segment 
s1 p1 R1 v1 n1,n2,n3,n4,n5,n6,p2,p3,p4,p5,
p6,p7,p8 
s2 p2,p6 n2,n5 v2,v3,v4,v5 n3,n4, p3,p4,p5 
s3 p3,p4,p5 n3,n4 v3,v4 - 
s4 p7 - v5,v6 - 
s5 p8 n1,n6 v1,v2,v6 n2,n3,n4,n5,p2,p3,p4,p5,p6,p7 
 
The next step is to associate each segment to the corresponding valve subset 
(the set of nearest isolation valves to isolate each network segment). This subset 
can be obtained in two stages from the Avl matrix. In the first stage for every link 
in the regular network segment, each element (e.g., valve V (li,nj)) in the 
corresponding i-th row in matrix Avl is examined. If a “1” is found, then that valve 
is added to the valve subset list. In the second stage, for each node in the regular 
network segment, each element (e.g., valve V (li,nj)) in the corresponding j-th 
column in matrix Avl is exanimated and if a “1” is found, then that valve is added 
to the valve subset list.  
For example, Figure 3.3 highlights all isolation valves that should be closed to 
separate segment s2 from the rest of the network due to pipe p2 failure. For 
segment s2, we have the links {p2, p6} and nodes {n2, n5}. Thus, the value (“1” 
or “0”) in all elements in row two and six is checked firstly. Accordingly, the valve 
V (l2, n1), i.e., v2, located in the second row is only added to the valve subset list 
at the first stage. In the second stage elements V(l3,n2),i.e., v3, in column two 
(assigned column for node n2), and V(p5,n5) ,i.e., v4,and  V(p7,n6), i.e., v5, in 
column six (assigned column for node n6) are added to valve subset list as shown 
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in Table 3.4 (also the valve subset list for the rest network segments are given in 
the same table).  
The final step is to calculate unintentional network segment. As mentioned earlier, 
due to isolating a regular segment which contained failure element, other parts of 
the network may unintentionally disconnected from the water sources in the 
network. For instance, due to the isolation of s2, the nodes n3, n4 and pipes p3, 
p4, p5 do not have a path from the water source R1. As the results, the 
consumers allocated within these elements will not receive any supply, and they 
must be counted as consumers affected by the pipe p2 failure.  
The calculation for identifying unintended network segment(s) for each regular 
network segment is started by constructing a modified Node-Link matrix (𝐴𝑛𝑙
𝑠𝑖
 ), 
where I refers to the order of regular segment s, from the original Node-Link 
matrix (Anl). This can be done by removing all columns assigned to nodes and all 
rows assigned to links in the regular network segment from the Anl. For example 
under isolating segment s2 scenario, the structure of Anl (i.e., 𝐴𝑛𝑙
𝑠2
 ) will be as 
shown in Table 3.5, after deleting row two and six, and column two and five.  
Next, a modified V matrix for 𝐴𝑛𝑙
𝑠𝑖  is constructed using the following equation: 
 
Vsi= ( 𝐴𝑛𝑙
𝑠𝑖  )×( 𝐴𝑛𝑙
𝑠𝑖  )T                                                                                     (3.2) 
 
Considering the power m for Vsi, all link segment (group of links which are 
connected together by one segment, i.e., path) can be obtained for the modified 
topology network matrix 𝐴𝑛𝑙
𝑠2
  by considering non-zero elements in each column or 
row (Bruadli and Ryser 1991). For instance for m=4, the detail for these link 
segments is given in Table 3.5 (under removing s2 scenario).  
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Table 3.5. Node-Link and Vm matrices for the network 
in Figure 3.3 after removing segment s2. 
𝐴𝑛𝑙
𝑠2 
  n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 R1 
𝐴𝑠2
𝑚  
  p1 p3 p4 p5 p7 p8 
p1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 p1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
p3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 p3 0 1 1 1 0 0 
p4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 p4 0 1 1 1 0 0 
p5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 p5 0 1 1 1 0 0 
p7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 p7 1 0 0 0 1 1 
p8 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 p8 1 0 0 0 1 1 
 
Further, it can be observed from Vm matrix that p1, p7, and p8 are connected by 
one link segment (e.g., su1), whilst p3, p4 and p5 are belong to another link 
segment (e.g., su2). Next the list of node belong each of these link segments are 
identified by considering for each i-th row (link) the j-th non-zero elements (node) 
in matrix 𝐴𝑛𝑙
𝑠𝑖  (e.g., 𝐴𝑛𝑙
𝑠2 under segment s2 failure scenario). Hence, R1, n1, and n6 
are belong to the link segment su1, and n3 and n4 are belong to the link segment 
su2. Therefore, the link segments that not include any source nodes are 
considered as unintentional network segment. For example, the only water 
source for our simple network shown in Figure 3.3 is R1and it is not include in 
su2, which means that this link segment is considered as unintentional network 
segment under s2 failure.  
 
3.4 Recovery Phase 
When the location of failure event is identified, the isolation phase begins 
immediately, followed quickly by the beginnings of recovery phase. Recovery 
phase is aimed at alleviating the negative impacts of failure (e.g., supply 
interruptions, pressure drops) to consumers located in the area adjacent to the 
affected isolated area. This can be performed by selecting a combination of 
suitable operational recovery interventions from a number of choices available in 
a specific WDS. The detail of recovery phase is provided in the following sub-
sections. 
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3.4.1 Recovery interventions 
The recovery interventions are used as temporary preventative actions and 
operate on the system to reduce negative impacts of a failure. The recovery 
interventions considered in this work include the following (assuming a WDS 
comprised of a number of DMAs): (a) opening/closing boundary valves to bring 
water into the affected part of the network from within the DMA and/or from 
nearby DMA(s), (b) modifying PRV outlet pressure setting(s), where possible, to 
aid recovery by increasing the pressure, and (c) installing temporary overland 
(pipe) bypasses between two suitable fire hydrant points with the aim to bring 
water into and increase pressure in the affected part of the network. These 
interventions are used regularly in the engineering practice in the UK. Of course, 
other interventions also exist (e.g., supply of water to the affected area by trucks 
or bottles), but are not considered here as the focus of this work is on network 
type interventions (please see section 2.2.4). Also, the operational interventions 
enlisted above are considered here because they could generally be applied to 
different companies and systems. Note also that the interventions considered 
cover a range of possible interventions, from less costly and efficient (e.g., 
changing PRV settings or manipulating valves) to more expensive and able to 
bring water into the affected area (e.g., overland bypasses) and hence provide 
sufficient complexity to illustrate and validate the proposed response 
methodology. Finally, the response methodology presented here is generic in 
nature, hence additional response operations could be added to it in a 
straightforward manner.  
Various types of valves are available in a WDS. This work investigates the effect 
of isolation valves and PRVs in reducing impacts in the recovery phase.  Isolation 
valves are commonly utilized in WDS to separate a pipe segment for repair or to 
divert flow in a pipe segment. The PRV is used to reduce the pressure of the 
water conveyed through it, to obtain a regulated and constant pressure value at 
its outlet, as well as to meet the water demand of consumers at adequate 
pressure. The pressure at a PRV exit is set to a pre-specified service level and 
during recovery, it can be increased by a certain amount/percentage. 
The fire hydrants are ordinarily implemented as stand-post or underground 
hydrants, approximately at a distance of 100 m from each other, to withdraw 
contaminated water and/or for firefighting purpose in the system. Flexible hose 
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pipes (e.g., lay flat hose) can be used to create overland bypasses, and they can 
be modelled as dummy pipes (with initially closed status) in the system. The 
lengths of the overland bypasses are calculated based on the distance between 
two target hydrants while their diameters are selected based on the available 
nominal sizes in the system (please refer to section 3.4.4 for further details). In 
general, overland bypass pipes could be placed along roads to avoid traffic jams 
and other obstacles. 
The selection of a suitable intervention(s) from the above options should be 
performed based on the criteria such as negative impact reduction, operational 
cost, time to implement and potential unintended consequences resulting from 
implementing the intervention (as explained in section 2.2.5). Performance in 
preventing or reducing the negative impact of the failure on consumers is the 
most important criterion in this work. A recovery intervention should be efficient 
and reliable. For instance, installing bypass is a promising tool for delivering 
water, but a lack of understanding of a given WDS hydraulics behaviour could 
lead to inefficient or worsened consequences (e.g., flow direction reversal, 
discoloration problems). Also, interventions that come with lower costs for 
equipment and installation are more preferable. 
On the other hand, and from a technical perspective, the number of implemented 
interventions should be as small as possible as this tends to reduce the 
associated operational cost. It also makes the implementation simpler, hence 
more reliable. The performance of each recovery intervention (or a mix of 
recovery interventions) in terms of impact reduction needs to be evaluated. This 
requires simulating the consequence of these interventions by using a WDS 
hydraulic solver (or otherwise). Ultimately, selecting the best mix of interventions 
to implement requires using optimisation. This is likely to require a long 
computational time, i.e., the time that may not be available when solving the 
response problem in near real-time. Hence, it is necessary to narrow down the 
list of recovery interventions and then select the optimal mix of these. This can 
be done by applying the automated technique described in the section 3.4.4.   
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3.4.2 Interventions selection criteria  
Two criteria are used here to quantify the performance of operational recovery 
interventions, once the failure event is located and isolated. The first criterion 
measures the negative impact of an event on consumers (IM). The second 
criterion measures the operational recovery effort (as cost) required to fully or 
partially recover from the failure, i.e., to return the network to pre-failure condition. 
A developed impact assessment model is used to measure negative impact IM 
over the short term horizon Th (e.g., 6, 12, or 24 hr). The impacts are evaluated 
from the perspective of consumers’ requirements (e.g., supply, pressure) rather 
than of the water utility. The detail of impact assessment model and calculation 
for estimating impact IM are given in section 3.5.   
The operational effort required to reduce the negative impact of a failure event 
can be surrogated with the total number of interventions associated with their 
costs and it is calculate as follow: 
 


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                                               (3.3) 
 
Where: 
CINV= total operational cost for the recovery interventions 
IV, OV and PRV= candidate isolation valves, overland bypasses and 
pressure reducing valves, respectively, whose operation mode may 
change during recovery intervention phase over horizon Th 
niv, nob and npr = total number of feasible isolation valves, overland bypass 
pipes and PRVs in the network for a specific failure event in a specific 
WDS 
i, j and k = the index for isolation valves, overland bypass pipes and PRVs  
wv = unit cost weight for changing the status of an isolation valve in the 
network (surrogate for actual unit cost) 
wo = unit cost weight for installing an overland bypass pipe in the network 
wp = unit cost weight for changing the setting of a PRV in the network. 
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IVi,Th has a value of 1 if the operational status (close/open) of the i-th valve 
changed during recovery phase (i.e., over time horizon Th) from the current status 
(open/close) and zero otherwise. OVj,Th has a value of 1 if j-th overland bypass is 
used (i.e., ‘opened’) and zero if it is not used (remains closed) during recovery 
phase (i.e., over time horizon Th). PRVk,Th gets a value of one if the pressure at 
the k-th PRV outlet is equal to the current pre-specified value and a value of 
integer larger than one otherwise.   
The unit cost (i.e., wp wo ,wv) values  can be provided by the local water utilities 
and they can determined based on size, location, and operational costs. It is 
worth to mention that the unit cost of changing the operation mode of an isolation 
valve or PRV (i.e., wp ,wv) it may small when compared to installing an overland 
bypass between two hydrants (i.e., wo). 
The reference impact value IMR is calculated assuming a “do nothing” 
intervention. This reference value can be used for assessing the relative effect of 
possible recovery interventions. 
3.4.3 Intervention optimization problem 
The selection of recovery interventions is driven by the minimisation of IM 
(volume of undelivered water to consumers) and minimisation of CINV (number 
of operational recovery interventions).The mathematical formulation of the two-
objective optimization problem is as follows:   
 
Min    f(X) = (IM, CINV)T                                                                            (3.4) 
 
Where: 
 nprknobjnivixxxX
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X is the vector of problem decision variables representing different interventions; 
𝑥𝑖
𝐼𝑉  represents the status of valve i and it takes value of a {0} for closed status 
and {1} for opened status; 𝑥𝑗
𝑂𝑉represents the status of overland bypass j and it 
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takes a value of {0} for closed status and {1} for opened status; 𝑥𝑘
𝑃𝑅𝑉  is the 
pressure setting at the exit of PRV k and it takes one of the following integer 
values {1, 2, 3,4,…, prs}, where prs is the total number of settings for k PRV 
candidate. Each integer represents a predefined increased percentage in the 
pressure setting at the exit of the PRV (s), according to a given mapping, for 
example: 1=no increase, 2=increase by 5%, 3=increase by 10% and 4=increase 
by 15%. 
The optimization constraints are as follows:  
 
{0,1}xIVi                                                                                                    (3.6)                                                
{0,1}xOVj                                                                                                   (3.7) 
}...pr{1,2,3,4,.x s
PRV
k                                                                                   (3.8) 
RIMIM                                                                                                      (3.9) 
maxINVINV                                                                                              (3.10) 
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Where INVmax is the maximum allowed number of interventions; Ql (t) is flow rate 
in link l = (u, d) at time t; in(n) and out(n) represent the set of pipes that are 
supplying to and delivering flow from node n at time t, respectively; L is the 
number of network links; Kl is the head friction loss coefficient at link l; α is Hazen-
Williams coefficient (α=1.852); and Pu (t) and Pd (t)are the head pressures at the 
ends of pipe l at time t, respectively. 
Constraint (3.9) ensures that the introduced recovery interventions improves the 
operational conditions. Constraints (3.11) and (3.12) represent mass 
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conservation and energy conservation equations for the network. Finally, 
constraint (3.13) ensures that the available pressure at each network node is 
above the minimum required. 
3.4.4 Intervention selection methodology 
The solution method starts with preparing the list of potential operational recovery 
interventions. This list is obtained by narrowing down the number of interventions 
available in a specific WDS through two preparation stages (i.e., offline and 
online) as shown in Figure 3.4. The calculation for the preparation stage starts 
after the location of the failure event was identified at time tf followed by identifying 
the set of isolation valves to isolate event. The initial list of possible interventions 
is generated from network elements (e.g., isolation valves, fire hydrants, PRVs) 
data in the first stage (i.e., offline) without estimating the impact IM. In the second 
stage, the list obtained in the first stage is further screened based on real-time 
hydraulic analysis results for the network (e.g., IM and the direction of flow) over 
horizon Th (assuming the event is isolated at ti). The key advantage of the above 
procedure is a decreased search space size and hence reduced computational 
time required to search for optimum recovery solutions. The successful 
intervention candidates from the two preparation stages are then optimised at the 
final, optimization stage to find the optimal mix of recovery interventions which 
can be identified at time tc. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Stages for identifying optimum interventions in the recovery phase. 
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3.4.4.1 Offline preparation 
After identifying shut-off valve list (e.g., isolation phases) and estimating impact 
assessment over the horizon Th, the offline preparion stage is introduced. In this 
stage the intervention lists (e.g., lists of isolation valves, fire hydrants and PRVs 
in a given WDS), are prepared from the network data at this stage (e.g., by 
automatically processing the relevant data from the EPANET2.0 input file by 
using suitable Matlab script). The data contains necessary information for each 
network element (e.g., size, location, settings, etc.), please see section 3.4.5. 
This data is updated periodically to consider the modifications on network 
elements (e.g., valves, hydrant and pipes added or removed, inoperable valves, 
etc.). When a specific failure event is detected and located in real-time, the initial 
list (i.e., obtained offline) of possible operational recovery interventions is 
developed automatically from the above lists and it involves: 
1. All isolation valves (except those used for isolating the failure location) in 
the DMA, where the failure event is detected and located, and those 
located on the neighbouring WDS DMA(s), if any. The affected DMA(s) 
are defined here as the DMA(s) that have deficient-pressure condition in 
one or more nodal demands. This/these DMA(s) are identified by running 
the PD hydraulic solver over horizon Th.   
2. The isolation valve(s), if any, connecting affected DMA(s) and the nearby 
unaffected DMA(s).  
3. Possible overland bypass routes connecting nearby (pairs of) fire hydrant 
points in the affected DMA(s). Furthermore, for a specific failure event in 
the WDS, a list of overland bypasses that originate and end in the affected 
DMA(s) are automatically created (excluding those that start and end in 
the isolated area or those that start from the affected DMA and end in 
nearby unaffected DMA(s)). Connecting fire hydrants between the affected 
and unaffected DMA(s) is allowed if the distance between the two fire 
hydrants LD is smaller than some pre-specified threshold LDmax (bearing 
in mind that installing overland bypass between different DMAs is 
dependent on the network topological conditions as well, e.g., if an 
accessible route between two fire hydrant points exists or not). The list of 
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the above overland bypasses are obtained by applying the shortest path 
algorithm technique (Gallo and Pallottino, 1988).  
4. Overland bypasses that connect fire hydrant points in the unintentionally 
isolated segments (i.e., nodes and pipes that are separated from water 
sources in the network because of the isolated failure area) and non-
isolated fire hydrant points.  
5. PRV(s) located upstream of the affected area. 
 
 
3.4.4.2 Online preparation 
Online preparation is applied in near-real time prior to conducting the actual 
optimization of interventions. The list of potential candidate solutions (that are 
obtained from the offline preparations list) is reduced further as follows: 
1. The direction of flow at all isolation valves and network pipes parallel to 
each overland bypass candidates (that were identified at the offline 
preparation stage) is observed over the horizon Th (see section 3.2). 
The overland bypass candidates that connect the affected DMA(s) and 
nearby unaffected DMA(s) are excluded from this evaluation and are 
directly nominated to point three in this section. The flow directions are 
detected by using directed Graph Theory (Duval 1988; Cheng et al. 
2009) and the SIPDM hydraulic solver. Based on the observed flow 
directions, the following cases are possible:  
 
a. If the flow direction in each isolation valve, which connects the 
affected DMA and nearby unaffected DMA, is pointing toward the 
affected DMA, that isolation valve is nominated for optimization. 
b. The isolation valve and overland bypass candidates that do not fall 
on the critical flow path line are dropped, and the rest of candidates 
are nominated for the individual evaluation stage (point three in this 
section). The critical path lines here are defined as the flow paths 
that feed deficient nodal demands (including the isolated nodes) for 
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the most critical time snapshot in the analysed horizon time Th 
(usually the peak hour of the day). For example, in Figure 3.5, the 
decisions (i.e., overland bypasses and isolation valves), which are 
not located on the highlighted critical path flow line (i.e., pipes) that 
supply water to the deficient nodes N1 and N2, are dropped at this 
stage. This is because they are unable to enhance the flow and 
pressure conditions at deteriorated nodal demands. Conversely, 
resetting or installing them could make pressure conditions worse at 
the other non-affected part of network.  
 
 
Figure 3.5. Flow path line definition to the deficient nodal demands. 
 
2. Only the PRVs that are located upstream of affected area are 
nominated for optimization stage. This is done because they can 
improve pressure conditions downstream. 
3. Each isolation valve and overland bypass candidate that remains at the 
end of point one of online preparation is considered as a potential 
individual recovery intervention, but only if they produce impact IM less 
than the impact IM for “doing nothing” intervention scenario (i.e., IM < 
IMR). Having said that, if one or more decisions reduce the undelivered 
volume of water to that which is equivalent to supply the isolated 
consumers, the recovery phase may stop at this point making 
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optimization unnecessary. In that case, the operational recovery 
intervention with the lowest cost is considered as the optimal recovery 
solution. 
 
3.4.4.3 Optimization of candidate interventions  
At this stage the candidate recovery interventions identified in the online phase 
are optimised by using objectives shown in equation 3.4 and constraints shown 
in equation 3.6 through 3.13. This optimisation problem is solved by using the 
Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm-II (NSGA-II) (Deb et al. 2002) coupled 
with the SIPDM hydraulic solver to evaluate solutions. The final set of Pareto 
optimal solutions obtained could be then presented to the network control room 
operators to help them choose the intervention(s) to implement in near real-time. 
NSGA-II is considered one of the most efficient and popular multi-objective 
evolutionary algorithms (MOEAs) being used to solve different and complex 
optimization problems in WDSs (Preis and Ostfeld 2008; Alvisi et al. 2012; Boulos 
and Wiley 2013). The key advantages of using NSGA-II over other optimization 
algorithms are reduced computational complexity, speed up of the search 
process (i.e., evaluation of solutions in near real or real-time), avoidance of 
repeated solutions, the ability to handle constraints and both real and binary 
(integer) values (Alfonso et al. 2010; Wang et al. 2013).  
The NSGA-II parameter values for the population size, the number of 
generations, crossover probability and mutation probability are selected based 
on the recommended settings from the literature (Deb et al. 2002; Reed et al. 
2003; Wang et al. 2013). The overall process for estimating optimum decision 
variables (i.e., recovery interventions) is given in Figure 3.6. 
Note that the optimisation-based response methodology is meant to provide only 
support for the operator who is still in charge of making decisions. The 
methodology proposed can be helpful, especially when events are more complex, 
affecting a large area/number of consumers and/or the response needs to be 
identified quickly. Also, decisions made this way are likely to be rational and 
consistent. Finally, the methodology should enable less experienced operators to 
make equally good decisions. 
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Figure 3.6. The process of estimating decision variables in the proposed 
response methodology. 
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3.4.5 Simulation of interventions in a hydraulic solver 
The data required for the response methodology (both the isolation and recovery 
phases) are typically retrieved from the hydraulic simulation solver (e.g., 
EPANET), or other tools such as Geographic Information System (GIS). These 
data include the necessary information about network elements such as pipes, 
control valves, pumps and nodal demands, as well the information about the 
exact location recovery interventions (e.g., isolation valves, hydrant points, 
PRVs). Since every hydraulic solver uses different mapping method for 
introducing elements, above listed information cannot always be extracted. For 
instance, the well-known hydraulic solver EPANET (which is utilized in the 
response methodology in this thesis) does not offer a direct and efficient format 
for an isolating valve or a hydrant. Although, isolation valve can be modelled as 
the link (valve type) with two nodes and a hydrant point as a node. However, the 
extra added nodes will increase the overall size of the network, which in turn will 
slow down the speed of hydraulic solver. This also decreases the performance of 
the response methodology in identifying optimal recovery solutions in near real-
time.  
Because of the reason mentioned above, a unique mapping method is used in 
the proposed response methodology to simulate isolation valves and hydrant 
points. This is done through developing pre-processor (e.g., Matlab code). The 
pre-processor allocates every hydrant point that is located at the ends of each 
feasible overland bypass in offline preparation stage in the network to the nearest 
existing model node as illustrated in Figure 3.7. Having said that, the length of 
each overland bypass was measured based on the original location of hydrant 
points (as mentioned earlier). The overland bypasses with their properties (e.g., 
length, diameter, roughness) are then added to the network data file as an extra 
pipe with initially closed status.  
 
Figure 3.7. Representation of isolation valve and hydrant in hydraulic simulation 
solver. 
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On the other hand, a pre-processor has allocated each isolation valve in the 
network to the nearest existing model pipe (i.e., the pipe where the valve is 
located on it), as shown in Figure 3.7. During hydraulic simulation, the status 
open/close for each isolation valve is considered by changing the status of the 
allocated pipe. This assumption may leave the whole section of the pipe out of 
work when closed, and this, in turn, leads to isolating all consumers within the 
pipe (e.g., not only the valve location section). However, most hydraulic solvers 
including EPANET only allocate consumers (e.g., house connections) to model 
nodes. Finally, each PRV is introduced as a normal link (PRV type), having a 
node at each end in the network. The setting of each PRV is modified based on 
pre-defined set of pressure at their downstream (as explained in earlier 3.4.3 
section).   
 
3.5 Impact Assessment Model 
Impact assessment model aims to evaluate and quantify impacts due to failure 
events as well as to evaluate the recovery interventions efficiency in water 
distribution system. The model captures the dynamic relationships between the 
parts of the system and helps to reveal unforeseen influences of failure events in 
one part of a system on other parts. Such a model enables examination of the 
linkages between system components, and the changes in the system due to 
internal or external loading conditions. Impact assessment model can 
demonstrate the interactions, side effects, and unexpected consequences of 
actions designed to enhance resilience on a system.  
The impact assessment model in this thesis has been developed using a novel 
impact assessment methodology based on consumers’ requirements in terms of 
pressure head and demand delivered. However, the aspects of water quality are 
not considered in this thesis. The impact assessment model consists of two 
components, namely the hydraulic simulation model (i.e., pressure-driven model) 
and impact measure. The description of each of this component is given in the 
following sections, 3.5.1 and 3.5.2.  
In the hydraulic simulation model, the failure event is represented and the 
behaviour of network under failure scenario is simulated. The method used to 
describe the failure events in WDS influences the predictions from the hydraulic 
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model. For example, a pipe failure in a WDS can be represented either by just 
isolating the pipe or by more accurately describing the dynamic failure 
(immediately after failure) and the isolation (for repair) stages. Besides, hydraulic 
simulation is needed to model whether a system can supply sufficient quantity 
and pressure levels for satisfying social functions and consumers requirements.  
Impact measure are indicator that describe the behaviour of a system in terms of 
its operational characteristics. In this thesis, for a water distribution system, 
performance indicator IM is used to quantify its behaviour mainly based on the 
nodal outflows, supply pressure head at consumer outlets, and supply 
interruptions. 
 
3.5.1 Pressure driven model  
The pressure-driven model (PDM) method developed and presented in this thesis 
is based on adding a specific sequence of artificial network elements to all 
pressure deficient nodes with a non-zero demand (i.e., nodes where Qn,req > 0 
and Pn,avl< Pn,req). These nodes are identified by running the demand-driven 
model (DDM) type hydraulic solver (e.g., EPANET) once before PDM simulation. 
This is very important, especially in the case of larger, real-life networks, where it 
is well known that typically only a small part on the network (i.e., a small number 
of nodes) is likely to experience pressure-deficient conditions during a failure 
event (e.g., a pipe burst). Therefore, there is no need to add the proposed artificial 
elements to all demand nodes as other PDM methods currently suggest. The 
sequence of elements added is comprised of a Check Valve (CV), a Flow Control 
Valve (FCV), an internal dummy node (DN) and an emitter (EM), as shown in 
Figure 3.8. The role of a check valve is to prevent flow reversal (i.e., inflow at 
demand nodes when Pn,avl < Pn,min); the role of the flow control valve is to prevent 
delivery of a demand larger than required (i.e., limiting the flow in the artificial 
added elements to Qreq), the internal dummy node is used to link the check and 
flow control valves in series (an EPANET requirement) and the emitter is used to 
represent pressure- dependent demand delivery. Given this and the assumed 
nodal head-flow relationship (NHFR) shown in Equation 3.14, parameter settings 
of all these elements are allocated as specified in Table 3.6. The proposed PDM 
solves completely the system of equations that drive a PDM (energy 
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conservation, mass balance and NFHR) while also ensures a persistence in time 
of all the state variables of the network for the EPS. The name SIPDM (Single 
Iteration Pressure-Driven Method) is used in this thesis to indicate the above 
PDM method. 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Setup at each deficient demand node. 
 
Table 3.6. Properties of added elements to deficient demand nodes. 
Network element Parameter  Setting  
Demand node n 
Required 
demand  
Qn,req 
Elevation  ELn 
Check valve, CVn 
Length  Small value (e.g., 0.01) 
Diameter large value (e.g., 1000) 
Roughness  
Large value (e.g., 140) for Hazen-
Williams formula and small value 
(e.g., 0.001) for other formulas 
Dummy node, DNn Elevation  ELn 
Flow control valve, 
FCVn 
Diameter  Large value (e.g., 1000) 
Setting  Qn,req  
Emitter, EMn  
Elevation Pn,min + ELn 
Emitter 
coefficient, Cd 
Equation 3.14 
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The small length, large diameter and large H-W coefficient values are chosen to 
ensure that all additional elements do not introduce (significant) head loss 
between the demand node j and the emitter. The delivered flow (Qn,del) to deficient 
nodes can now be estimated as follows: 
  


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







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Q            (3.14) 
 
Where Cd is the emitter coefficient estimated as Cd=Qn,req/(Pn,req-Pn,min)γ and is the 
emitter exponent estimated as γ =1/nn. The values of both variables depend on 
the properties of each node that is defined in terms of empirical exponent 
coefficient nn, and the characteristic heads (Pn,req, Pn,min).  The overall SIPDM 
algorithm is presented step by step in Figure 3.9. The procedure shown in Figure 
3.9 is for the steady-state analysis in a pressure-deficient network. When 
performing the EPS analysis, the diurnal demand variation in nodes, the water 
level in storage tanks and the valve/pump control settings need to be considered 
over a predefined simulation period. This involves changing the parameters of 
the connected FCVs and emitters according to the current values of the desired 
demands in deficient nodes. The number of deficient nodes is estimated by 
running the DDM solver prior to conducting the SIPDM analysis and it is equal to 
the number of demand nodes having pressure lower than Preq for the most critical 
time snapshot in the analysed time period (usually the peak hour of the day). This 
will guarantee connecting the artificial elements to all potential pressure nodal 
demands during extended period simulation. Once these nodes are identified, 
they are able to handle changes from DDM to PDM and vice versa by using the 
sequence of artificial elements added to these nodes. For example, whenever 
pressure drops enough for conditions to change from the DDM to PDM, the 
emitters start ‘working’ on these nodes. Also, when pressure increases back 
sufficiently (i.e., above Preq) and conditions change from PDM to DDM, the FCVs 
ensure that only the demands required are delivered at these nodes. 
Qn, del = 
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Figure 3.9. Flowchart of the SIPDM approach. 
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3.5.2 Impact assessment 
Impact IM expressing the volume of water undelivered to consumers (including 
undelivered volume to the isolated consumers) is used here to assess the 
adverse impacts of low-pressure conditions and interruption from water sources 
in the network as a result of a failure event over the horizon Th. IM is calculated 
as system demand shortfall defined as the difference between the total demand 
required and the total water actually supplied to consumers during the failure 
event. System demand shortfall is comprised of two components: (1) undelivered 
demands at nodes that are disconnected either inevitably or unintentionally from 
the source as a result of isolating the failure event location (2) the amount of water 
not delivered because of insufficient pressure arising from failure event and its 
isolation, mathematically impact IM is calculate as follows:  
Impact IM is calculated as follow: 
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                                                         (3.15) 
 
Where:  
IM = impact of failure over the time horizon considered, m3 
Qn, req (t) = required demand at node n and time t, l/s 
Qn, req (t)- Qn, del (t)=undelivered volume of water at node n and time t, l 
Qn, del (t) = delivered demand at node n and time t, l/s 
t = simulation time, hours 
∆t= simulated hydraulic time step, s 
te = end time of impact horizon, hours 
N = number of network nodes 
tf= moment of detection and location of the failure event 
In Equation 3.15, it is assumed that the demands are located at model junctions, 
and this may introduce a certain level of inaccuracy in the problem being 
addressed. This is because consumers at each house are connected to a tap 
along pipe in the real network, not directly to the network node. However, this not 
considered as critical for assessing and demonstrating the effectiveness of the 
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proposed methodology. In cases where this is necessary, the user can always 
create an EPANET model that models individual house connections which would 
remove the above inaccuracy. Also, it is well known that nodes that supply critical 
consumers such as hospitals and schools should be given more priority in 
providing recovery interventions than other demand points in a specific WDS 
(Bicik et al. 2009; Rasekh and Brumbelow 2014; Nayak and Turnquist 2016). For 
simplicity sake, the importance of different consumers was ignored in Equation 
3.15, but could be easily added if required. 
The required demands, Qn,req (t), can be estimated in near real-time over the 
impact horizon using some demand forecasting model. These models are able to 
forecast hourly water demands for the next 24-48 hrs (Bakker et al. 2013; 
Romano and Kapelan 2014; Hutton and Kapelan 2015). Note that, even though 
not used in this thesis, demand forecasting model can be easily coupled with the 
real-time recovery methodology shown in this paper.  
It is worth mentioning also that when the failure event occurs and the consumers 
have been alerted, their water consumption behaviour may change (Shafiee and 
Zechman 2013; Rasekh et. al. 2014; Berglurd 2015). Moreover, consumers may 
start to suspend using water for drinking, hand washing, bathing and dishwashing 
purposes. However, uses such as toilet flushing and garden watering may 
continue (Rasekh et al. 2014). As the hydraulic operating conditions in the system 
depend mainly on consumer demands, the consumer behaviour thereafter may 
influence considerably the hydraulic situation in the system. The agent-based 
models (Shafiee and Zechman 2013; Rasekh et. al. 2014) are usually 
implemented to incorporate consumers mobility, water demand reduction, and 
word-of-mouth communication in the response emergency approaches. 
However, in the response methodology presented here, the effect of consumers 
demand behaviour (i.e., reduction in required demand Qn,req (t)) is not taken into 
account in the analysis.  This was done because it is very difficult to quantify the 
impact of changed behaviour on the consumption. Also, the planning for the 
recovery is done assuming more stringent conditions, i.e., the largest possible 
water consumption in the affected area.  
Instead, PDM is used here to try to tackle this shortcoming and to model the 
reduced water consumption under failure conditions. The predictions of the PDM 
solver are more realistic and accurate when compared to DDM based solvers 
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(Giustolisi et al. 2008; Kovalenko et al. 2014). The PDM hydraulic solver used 
here is created by adding a specific, artificial set of elements to each deficient 
demand node in the network and then running the DDM hydraulic solver. The 
PDM hydraulic solver details can be found in section 3.5.1.  Using the PDM solver 
is an imperfect approximation and the behaviour of consumers under deficient 
circumstances needs to be studied as part of future research. Having said this, 
the proposed response methodology is generic in a sense that it can make use 
of a better corresponding model once it becomes available.   
On the other hand PDM solvers represent the most efficient and viable means for 
predicting the actual demand delivered (Qn,del (t)) to network nodes under an array 
of demand loading (i.e., normal, abnormal) and operating conditions. Where PDM 
assumed that the actual demand delivered is a function of available pressure at 
each network nodes (i.e., Pn, avl (t)) and this function is frequently termed as nodal 
head–flow relationship (NHFR).The most commonly adopted form of NHFR 
relationship reads (Wagner et al. 1988), i.e., Equation 2.3, which are used in this 
thesis and its identical to Equation 3.14, and some alternative formulations can 
be found in Kovalenko et al. (2014).  
In Equation 2.3, water demand (Qn,del) is completely satisfied when nodal 
pressure head is above a required threshold (Pn,req ). When pressure lies below 
the minimum acceptable value (Pn,min), no water is delivered. If the pressure value 
is between these two characteristic pressure value, water demand is only partially 
satisfied. 
Steady-state and extended period simulations (EPSs) over the horizon Th are 
used to calculate the system demand shortfall at each network demand node. 
Steady-state runs are useful for identifying the results of outages that are not 
particularly long (e.g., less than an hour).With EPS runs, the effects of the failure 
event (e.g., pipe burst) which take long time to fixed are estimated. EPS runs are 
much more likely to have nodes that become disconnected such that the 
hydraulic calculations will not balance. The analyses based on connectivity only 
and steady-state runs are snapshots that give shortfall in flow units (e.g., liter per 
second), whereas the EPS runs calculate shortfall in volume units (e.g., cubic 
meter) as given in Equation 3.15. The detail of the PDM used in this thesis is 
described in the previous section 3.5.1. 
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3.6 Summary  
This chapter presents a near real-time operational response methodology to 
reduce the impacts of a failure events (e.g., pipe bursts) in a WDS and restore 
the flow conditions in the network to the normal service level once the failure 
location has been located. The methodology proposed is intended to provide 
support to operators when making relevant decisions, i.e., help them do their job 
better, especially in cases where failures are complex in nature and decisions 
need to be made rather quickly, i.e., in near real-time.  
Two phases were defined for response methodology: (i) isolation phase, followed 
by (ii) the recovery phase. The isolation phase identifies the necessary set of 
isolation valves, which need to be closed to separate the failure event from the 
rest of network. The recovery involves selecting the optimal combination of 
individual operational interventions in near real-time, with the aim to minimize 
both the negative impact of reduced/interrupted supply (resulted because of the 
isolation) over a predefined impact horizon and the associated operational costs. 
The optimal set of interventions is determined using a new methodology that 
makes use of two-objective optimisation coupled with the impact assessment 
model to evaluate potential solutions and driven by two aforementioned 
objectives.  
The operational interventions considered are opening valves within the affected 
DMA and between the affected and nearby DMAs, resetting pressure at the outlet 
of PRV(s) and installing temporary overland bypasses between suitable hydrant 
points. The impact assessment model is based on a newly developed direct 
pressure-driven model (i.e., SIPDM) that is based on using a specific set of 
elements added to each deficient pressure demand node in the network. 
In the next chapter the performance of the pressure driven model (PDM) 
presented in section 3.5 is tested, verified and demonstrated under different flow 
conditions on a number of case studies. The results obtained are also compared 
to the results reported/obtained by using a number of reviewed PDM approaches 
from the literature. 
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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDIES ON PRESSURE-DRIVEN 
MODEL 
4.1 Introduction  
The pressure-driven model (SIPDM) presented in Chapter 3 has been tested, 
verified and illustrated under different flow conditions on a number of benchmarks 
and real-life case water distribution systems (WDSs) in this chapter. The case 
studies considered are divided into four groups based on the complexity of the 
WDSs analysed. The results obtained are also compared to the results reported 
or obtained by using a number of reviewed PDM benchmarking methods (or 
obtained by the DDM method where direct comparison was not possible) with the 
aim of assessing the overall performance and convergence of the SIPDM 
approach.  
This chapter is organized as follows. After this introduction, the details of software 
and assumptions used are presented in section 4.2. Next, SIPDM approach is 
tested on a simple small looped network under steady-state analysis, and the 
obtained results are compared to a number of existed PDM methods. In section 
4.4, the SIPDM is demonstrated on more complex and large networks under 
steady-state analysis. The ability of the SIPDM approach to perform extended 
period simulation (EPS) is demonstrated on a simple network in section 4.5.  
Once this done, section 4.6 provides detailed results obtained for EPS analysis 
on a real-life network under two flow scenarios. Finally, in section 4.7, the entire 
chapter is summarized.  
 
4.2 Assumptions and Software 
All hydraulic simulations were conducted by using EPANET2.0 and its toolkit 
functions for steady-state and EPS analyses. The process of adding the artificial 
elements to the demand nodes with pressure-deficient conditions requires 
making changes in the EPANET2.0 input file. A program script written in MATLAB 
is used with the EPANET2.0 programmers’ toolkit to do this in the first part A of 
the program script. The modified data file can be used to perform steady state 
analysis using EPANET2.0 Graphical User Interface (GUI). Part B of the program 
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is then used to carry out the steady-state analysis and extended period 
simulation. However, additional toolkit operations are further required to modify 
the relevant emitter coefficients and FCV settings based on the current demand 
value. 
The diameter, Hazen-Williams roughness coefficient and length for the added 
artificial CVs and FCVs to pressure-deficient demand nodes (also where added 
to demand nodes with sufficient-pressure for comparison purpose) are assumed 
to be equal to 1.0 m, 130 m and 0.1 m respectively. These values have been 
chosen in order to neglect the friction head-losses between each demand node 
and the corresponding added artificial emitter to it (this was illustrated earlier in 
section 3.5.1 in Chapter 3). Note, that the Darcy-Weisbach roughness coefficient 
of 0.0001 mm is used instead of Hazen-Williams coefficient where Darcy-
Weisbach formula applied. 
All simulations are conducted on a computer with the Intel(R) processor, Core 
(TM) i5-4570 CPU @ 3.2 GHz and 64-bit Windows 7. The default values of 
accuracy parameters in EPANET2.0, CHECKFREQ, MAXCHECK, and 
DUMPLIMIT are 0.001, 2, 10 and 0, respectively. It should be noted that even 
though EPANET2.0 was used in all case studies here, the SIPDM method is 
generic in a sense that it can be replicated using any other existing hydraulic 
solvers. 
 
4.3 Case Study 1: Steady-State Simulation in a Simple Looped 
Network 
4.3.1 Network description  
The first network analysed is from the paper by Ang and Jowitt (2006) (see Figure 
4.1). This network was used by a number of researchers as a benchmark problem 
to validate their PDM methods. This network consists of a fixed head reservoir 
(i.e., source) feeding six demand nodes through eight pipes in a looped 
configuration. The properties for the pipes and nodes are given in Table 4.1. The 
value for the empirical exponent coefficient (nn) that introduced in Equation 3.14 
for all demand nodes is assumed to be equal to 1.85. Also, the value for minimum 
nodal pressure threshold level in the same equation (i.e., Pmin) is assumed to be 
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50 m at nodes N1 and N2, 45 m at nodes N3 and N4 and 55 m at nodes N5 and 
N6. And finally, the required threshold pressure (i.e., Preq) in the node head-flow 
relationship is assumed equal to 60 m for all demand nodes.  
The network is examined under two fictional scenarios: normal network flow 
condition and a failure in one of the pipes in the system (i.e., closing pipe P3). 
Thirty-six source head levels between 40 m and 110 m were used to demonstrate 
the influence of system pressures on nodal outflows for each scenario using 
EPANET2.0 and SIPDM approach. Also for further performance demonstration 
purpose in term of the accuracy, results converge and computational 
performance, SIPDM method is compared to results reported/obtained by Ackley 
et al. (2001), Hayuti et al. (2008), Babu and Mohan (2012), Gorev and 
Kodzhespirova (2013), and Sayyed et al. (2015) methods under normal flow 
condition for source head level = 60 m. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Network layout for case study 1. 
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Table 4.1. Properties for (a) nodes (b) pipes for the network shown in Figure 4.1. 
(a)  (b) 
Node 
ID 
Elevation 
(m) 
Demand 
(lps) 
Pmin 
(m) 
Preq 
(m) 
 Pipe  
ID 
Length 
(m) 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Roughness 
Coefficient  
N1 0 41.70 50 60  P4  1000 400 140 
N2 0 41.70 50 60  P6 1000 250 140 
N3 0 41.70 45 60  P7 1000 250 140 
N4 0 77.80 45 60  P8 1000 250 140 
N5 0 88.90 55 60  P2 1000 400 140 
N6 0 55.60 55 60  P3 1000 400 140 
Source Vary -347.40    P5 1000 250 140 
  P1 1000 500 140 
 
 
4.3.2 Results and discussion 
A total of 72 DDM (i.e., EPANET2.0) runs, resulting from the two scenarios and 
36 head levels at source, were conducted on the network. Those runs were 
chosen to create different pressure conditions at all network nodes and later to 
show the performance and capability of SIPDA for predicting nodal pressures 
outflows under these condition. Figure 4.2 shows the results of the pressure 
heads at each network node for all runs. It can be observed from the figure that 
all network nodes under normal flow condition scenario produced three types of 
pressure conditions. First, the deficient pressure condition (i.e., pressures below 
the minimum threshold level) under the low-pressure condition in the network 
(i.e., low head levels at source). Second, the sufficient-pressure condition (i.e., 
pressures above the required threshold level) for the high head levels at the 
source. Finally, the partial pressure condition (i.e., pressures between two 
threshold pressure levels) for the medium head levels at the source. For example, 
the available pressure head at node N3 is below the minimum pressure threshold 
value 50 m (i.e., 40 m) for source head level 50 m, whilst it is about 70 m (e.g., 
above the required threshold  level 60 m, for source head level 80 m, and it is 45 
m for source head level 60 m. On the other hand, under closed pipe P3 scenario 
 
99 
 
all network nodes except N1 are subjected to more severe low-pressure 
conditions for all head levels at source in comparison with the normal flow 
condition (i.e., nodal pressure heads drop further) as shown in Figure 4.2.  
As expected the initial DDM runs predicted the available (i.e., actual) flows equal 
to the required values (Qreq) in all nodes for all runs regardless to available 
pressure head value at the nodes. Hence, the results obtained for nodal outflows 
are correct only when the Pavl is equal or greater than required threshold value 
(i.e., Preq = 60 m). The SIPDM approach is introduced to the network at this point 
by adding the proposed sequence of artificial elements (shown in Figure 3.8 with 
the corresponding properties shown in Table 3.6) to the nodes with pressure less 
than Preq = 60 m. For example, for head source 80 m, the artificial elements are 
added only to nodes N5 and N6 for the normal flow condition scenario while, for 
the same source head value, artificial elements are added to all nodes except 
node N1 under the closed pipe P3 scenario, as shown in Figure 4.1. Once the 
artificial elements are added, the DDM solver is re-run. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Results of DDM analysis on the network shown in Figure 4.1. 
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SIPDM approach was successfully applied on the network and the method has 
converged in limited EPANET2.0 solver iterations (i.e., varying between 5 and 
20) resulting in a balanced system for all 72 runs. Figure 4.3 shows source head 
values obtained versus the SPI ratio of water delivered (Qdel) to the water required 
(Qreq) for each network node (dashed blue lines). The secondary vertical axis in 
the same figure indicates the values of available pressure head and threshold 
pressure level at each node (dashed red lines). 
It can be observed from Figure 4.3 that under the normal flow condition scenario, 
the outflows from nodes N1-N4 start (i.e., SPI > 0) when the head at source is 
equal to the minimum pressure threshold level at respective node. The same 
cannot be said for nodes N5 and N6. This is because these two nodes are located 
far from the water source compared to other nodes, consequently, more system 
friction losses which require more head at the source to initiate the flow at these 
two particular nodes. Also, the SIPDM method delivers a partial demand (i.e., 0 
< SPI < 1) to network nodes at different source heads, when the pressure head 
values are between the two characteristic threshold levels at each node as shown 
in Figure 4.3. In addition, from the same figure it can be seen that the relationship 
between head at source and SPI at nodes in the partial water delivery stage 
agrees well with the common Wagner et al. (1988) function for nn = 1.85. For 
example, partial flow occurs at node N3 when head level at source varies 
between 45 and 70 m. The demands at nodes N5 and N6 are satisfied (i.e., SPI 
= 1) only when the head level at source is about 85 m or higher. 
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Figure 4.3. Results of SIPDM analysis on the network shown in Figure 4.1. 
For the case of isolating pipe P3, the SIPDM shows that the order and 
commencement of nodal outflows are again not particularly intuitive. For 
example, the outflow at node N6 only begins at a source head of 65 m which is 
considerably higher than the normal flow condition case (i.e., first scenario). 
Referring back to Figure 4.1, it can be observed that pipe P3 is a critical pipe 
linking node N6 to the source, which explains the required higher source head.  
Another interesting observation from the Figure 4.3 is when pipe P3 is isolated, 
which reveals that the outflow at nodes N4, N5 and N6 meet the respective 
required demands at a higher source head level compared to the normal network 
flow condition scenario. This can be explained by the fact that the outflows at N4, 
N5, and N6 are provided by P4 only. This make the path flow line to these nodes 
longer and put more stress on pipe P4 compared to the normal flow condition 
where the outflows were provided by both P3 and P4.     
For further demonstration, Table 4.2 shows the results obtained by the SIPDM 
method in comparison with methods reported by Ackley et al. (2001), Hayuti et 
al. (2008), Babu and Mohan (2012) , Gorev and Kodzhespirova (2013), and 
Sayyed et al. (2015) for head level 60 m at source under normal flow condition 
scenario. 
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Table 4.2.  Comparison of the results obtained for case study 1 network under normal flow condition for the source head 60 m. 
Node Id. 
DDM Results, F 
PDM Results 
A B C D E 
Qdel 
l/s 
Pavl 
m 
Qdel 
l/s 
Pavl 
m 
Qdel 
l/s 
Pavl 
m 
Qdel 
l/s 
Pavl 
m 
Qdel 
l/s 
Pavl 
m 
Qdel 
l/s 
Pavl 
m 
N1 41.7 54.33 35.0 57.23 34.1 56.88 35.0 57.22 41.7 50.00 35.4 57.19 
N2 41.7 51.75 32.6 56.32 31.0 55.77 32.7 56.32 41.7 50.00 33.0 56.27 
N3 41.7 50.40 35.2 55.98 29.5 55.26 35.2 55.98 41.7 45.00 35.6 55.92 
N4 77.8 50.83 66.0 56.06 55.9 55.42 66.0 56.06 77.8 45.00 66.6 56.00 
N5 88.9 42.91 22.5 55.39 46.4 53.00 22.5 55.39 13.4 55.00 22.6 55.32 
N6 55.6 43.40 14.8 55.43 29.7 53.14 14.8 55.43 15.1 55.00 15.0 55.36 
Source -347.4 60.00 -206.0 59.00 -226.6 59.00 -206.1 59.00 -231.4 59.00 -208.2 59.00 
CT, s - 4.2×10-5 - - 4.9×10-5 5.5×10-5 
Notes: A= SIPDM approach; B= Ackley et al. (2001) approach; C=Hayuti et al. (2008) approach; D= Babu and Mohan (2012) approach; 
E= Gorev and Kodzhespirova (2013) approach; F= Sayyed et al. (2015) approach; Italic numbers indicate partial flow and bold numbers 
indicate nodes with heads below the minimum pressure head limit, Pmin; CT= computational time; CTs not available for methods B and 
C due to the complexity of obtaining these values by usingboth PDM approaches. 
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SIPDM and Hayuti et al. (2008) approaches outperform the Ackley et al. (2001), 
Gorev and Kodzhespirova (2013), and Babu and Mohan (2012) methods in terms 
of prediction accuracy. This can be seen in Table 4.2 by comparing the values of 
206.0, 206.1 226.6, 208.2, and 231.8 l/s, respectively, for the total flow (i.e., total 
demand) drawn from the source. Also, all methods except Babu and Mohan 
(2012) predict partial delivery at all network nodes. This is because the solutions 
estimated by the SIPDM and Hayuti et al. (2008) approaches produce pressure 
dependent nodal flows similar to those derived by using the well validated 
Wagner et al. (1988) model.  While, the value of nn for this network is 1.85, the 
assumption in Gorev and Kodzhespirova’s (2013) paper causes errors in 
calculation of nodal flows and pressure in heads. On the other hand, the Babu 
and Mohan (2012) method cannot model the partial flow as it is based on the Pmin 
only (i.e., it does not consider Preq), this leave only two nodes with partial delivery 
as given in Table 4.2.   
SIPDM outperforms the EPANET2.0, Ackley et al. (2001), and Sayyed et al. 
(2015) methods in terms of convergence/numerical stability. This can be seen in 
Table 4.2 by comparing the values of nodal outflows (i.e., Qdel) and pressures 
(i.e., Pavl). For example, EPANET2.0 predicted available (i.e., actual) heads 
below the required threshold value (Preq) in all nodes. Hence, the DDM results 
reported for the failure scenario are meaningless as the demand at nodes cannot 
be met in full. On the other hand, the Ackley et al. (2001) method generated 
unrealistic results, in which the pressure head at nodes N5 and N6 were below 
the minimum Pmin = 55 m. This could be because a formal optimization technique 
was used in this method to maximize nodal flows and the NHFR function was 
considered as an additional constraint. Finally,  the Sayyed et al. (2015) approach 
failed to change the demand-driven conditions to pressure-driven conditions for 
all nodes, as shown in Table 4.2 (column 2 and 3), even though they both used 
the same artificial elements as were used in SIPDM. This is because Sayyed et 
al. (2015) approach assumes that the elevation of the connected dummy nodes 
and emitters were equal to the elevation of demand nodes regardless of the 
minimum pressure head value (Pmin). The above assumption causes errors in 
pressures and outflow calculations for all nodes, where the connected emitters 
have Pmin values greater than zero, as shown in Table 4.2. 
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Finally, SIPDM outperforms the Hayuti et al. (2008), Babu and Mohan (2012), 
and Gorev and Kodzhespirova (2013) methods in terms of computational 
efficiency. This can be seen again in Table 4.2. Where SIPDM approach needs 
only a single internal iteration in EPANET2.0 to converge, as compared to the 10 
iterations used by Hayuti et al. (2008). Also, the SIPDM approach obtained the 
solution quicker than the Babu and Mohan (2012), and Gorev and Kodzhespirova 
(2013) methods by 14% and 23%, respectively.  
 
4.4 Case Study 2: Steady-State Simulation in a Large Pipe 
Networks 
This case study assess and compares the performance of the SIPDM approach 
to other PDM approaches on large real-life pipe networks under steady-state 
simulation. To achieve this, a number of WDSs of different sizes and with different 
failure scenarios are considered. The results obtained are compared to those 
produced by using the DDM built in EPANET2.0; and the PDM methods of Babu 
and Mohan (2012), Gorev et al. (2013), and Sayyed et al. (2015) in terms of 
prediction accuracy, convergence and computational time. For the purpose of 
comparison, the artificial sequence of elements proposed in this thesis is 
connected randomly to 30 % , 60 %  and 100% of non-zero demand nodes in 
networks NW3 and NW4 (where no deficient pressure conditions were found), 
but only connected to nodes with pressure less than the required threshold level 
(i.e., Pavl < Preq) in NW1 and NW2. The details of these networks and failure 
scenarios created are given in the following sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. 
4.4.1 Networks description 
The first network, referred to as NW1, is Network 2 from the Battle of the Water 
Sensor Networks (Ostfeld et al. 2008). This network is considered as a large and 
challenging real life network in the literature. The NW1 serves 250,000 people 
over an area of 490 km2. The network model contains 12,523 nodes and 13 
hydraulic controls (2 reservoirs, 2 tanks, 4 pumps, and 5 valves) as shown in 
Table 4.3. The elevation of nodes range from 0 to 74 m. There are 10,552 non-
zero demand nodes in the model, and their base demands range from 0 to 16 l/s. 
The network model was analysed under two pressure deficient conditions: (i) the 
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current demand stress conditions (referred here as scenario one) and (ii) large 
burst on pipe LINK-7496 (referred here as scenario two). 
The Exeter network, referred as to NW2, (Farmani et al. 2005) resembles a large 
real-life reinforcement problem in a water distribution system with a single 
loading. The network serves a population of approximately 400,000. It has 1891 
nodes of which five are source nodes and 283 have no demand. Two of the 
source nodes have constant heads. The network consists of relatively small pipes 
and few transmission mains, with a large head-loss range at the extremities of 
the system, making it highly sensitive to demand increases. The deficient 
pressure condition in the network was created using demands projected to the 
year 2020 (i.e., subjecting the existing network to excess demands). 
The Modena network, referred to here as NW3 (Wang et al. 2014), includes 317 
pipes, 268 demand nodes and 4 reservoirs with fixed head within 72.0 m to 74.5 
m. The pipe material is cast iron. A uniform Hazen-Williams roughness coefficient 
of 130 is applied to all pipes. On the other hand, the Pescara network, referred 
here as NW4 (Wang et al. 2014), includes 99 pipes, 68 demand nodes, and 3 
reservoirs with fixed head within 53.08 m to 57.00 m. The pipe material and 
Hazen-Williams roughness coefficient are the same as Modena network. Both 
networks are analysed under sufficient pressure condition.  
The EPANET2.0 input files for all network models can be downloaded from the 
Centre for Water Systems at the University of Exeter (CWS 2018). The value for 
the minimum pressure head (Pmin), required pressure head (Preq), and nn for 
demand nodes in each network model are summarized in Table 4.3. The table 
also shows the type of head-loss equation used in each network model.  
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Table 4.3. Characteristics of network models used in the performance tests for case study 2. 
Network 
ID 
Network  
name 
Num. of  
Nodes 
Num. 
of 
Pipes 
Num. of  
Reservoirs 
Head-loss 
Equation 
nn Pmin 
m 
Preq 
m 
Total required 
 demand 
(l/s) 
NW1 BWSN  12,523 14,830 7 D-W 2.0 0 20 1,463.86 
NW2 Exeter 1,891 3,032 2 D-W 1.5 0 20 3,245.81 
NW3 Modena 268 317 4 H-W 2.0 7 20 406.93 
NW4 Pescara 68 99 3 H-W 2.0 7 25 257.40 
Note: D-W = Darcy-Weisbach; H-W = Hazen-Williams. 
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4.4.2 Results and discussion 
To check the accuracy of the reported results using the SIPDM approach under 
sufficient-pressure network conditions, the EPANET2.0 solver was applied to 
networks NW3 and NW4 in which the DDM assumption (i.e., no pressure deficient 
nodes) is satisfied. 
Figure 4.4 shows the total errors obtained in pressure and outflow at demand 
nodes when comparing the results of the SIPDM approach with those of the 
EPANET2.0 solver. From an analysis of the errors, it can be seen that the SIPDM 
approach delivers almost the same predictions for pressure and outflow at all 
nodes in both networks as the EPANET2.0. For example, by adding artificial 
elements to 30% of demand nodes in both networks, the total error in nodal 
outflows is 0.0001 and 0.0004 l/s for NW3 and NW4, respectively. Where, the 
total error in nodal pressure head is 0.01 and 0.001 m. However, by connecting 
artificial elements to more demand nodes (e.g., 60 % and 100%), the error 
percentage increased in both total pressure head and outflow (but still within 
acceptable ranges) as shown in Figure 4.4.     
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Errors observed in (a) total outflow (b) pressure head at demand 
nodes for networks NW3 and NW4. 
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Further, the EPANET2.0 solver and SIPDM approach are applied to networks 
NW1 and NW2 with identical abnormal conditions. The simulation results 
obtained are shown in Table 4.4. The first three rows show the number of demand 
nodes for which the pressure is below Pmin (zero), the number of nodes with 
pressures between Pmin and Preq (20 m), and finally the number of nodes with 
pressures above Preq, respectively, all obtained by using the EPANET2.0 solver. 
The last three rows show the number of demand nodes in failure mode (Pavl < 0), 
the number of demand nodes in partial delivery mode (0 < Pavl < Preq) and the 
numbers of demand nodes in full delivery mode (Pavl ≥ Preq), all for the case when 
SIPDM approach is used.  
 
Table 4.4. Comparison of the results observed in networks NW1 and NW2 
using EPANET2.0 solver and SIPDM approach. 
  NW1 
NW2 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
EPANET2.0 
solver 
Pavl < 0 0 2265 97 
0 < Pavl <20 185 2402 723 
Pavl ≥ 20 10370 5887 783 
SIPDM 
Approach 
Pavl < 0 0 619 0 
0 < Pavl < Preq 72 3684 511 
Pavl ≥ Preq 10753 6249 1092 
 
The results demonstrate the capability of the SIPDM approach in changing the 
status of demand nodes from failure mode to fully or partially delivery modes and 
deliver logical results based on the network boundary conditions (e.g., size, 
topology, failure intensity, location, and pressure) when compared to 
EPANET2.0. In the case of the DDM (i.e., EPANET2.0) solver, the deficient 
pressures were observed in both network. Hence, the DDM results reported for 
the failure scenarios are meaningless because the outflow at nodes with pressure 
less than 20 m cannot be met in full. For instance, 820 nodes in NW2 have 
pressure values below 20 m. In the case of the SIPDM approach, although in all 
three cases the situation of most demand nodes with deficient pressure were 
changed to either partial or full delivery mode (as reported in Table 4.4), there are 
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some quite marked differences. In network NW2, out of 820 pressure deficient 
nodes, 511 have partial delivery mode and the rest have the full delivery mode. 
This is because the most deficient node in network (i.e., 723) has pressure 
between 0 and 20 m. At the same time, in NW1, under scenario two, where the 
number of nodes with pressure less than 0 m are relatively high (i.e., 2265), the 
SIPDM changed the situation of most of them from failure to partial  delivery 
mode.    
Table 4.5 reports further comparison results between SIPDM approach with other 
PDM methods and EPANET2.0 solver in term of accuracy and computational 
time performance.  
The accuracy was measured through the effect coefficient nn shown in the 
Equation 3.14 on the NFHR in the Equation 3.16. According to results obtained, 
the SIPDM approach delivers more realistic predictions for nodal outflow and 
pressure reflecting the properties of the network nodes. Where, the SIPDM 
approach and Gorev et al. (2013) method produced the same demand 
satisfaction ratio, (DSR): the ratio of water delivered to the water required (Siew 
and Tanyimboh 2012), for networks NW1 (under first scenario), NW3 and NW4 
with DSR values of 0.970, 1.0 and 1.0, respectively. This is because the value of 
nn in all three networks is 2.0 as given in Table 4.3.  However, the SIPDM 
approach obtained a smaller DSR value of 0.926 for NW2 in comparison with 
Gorev et al. (2013) method of 0.934. This is because the proposed SIPDM 
approach uses the Wagner et al. (1988) pressure dependent nodal flow function 
where nn =1.5, whilst the shape of the NHFR function in Gorev et al. (2013) 
approach is fixed at nn =2.0 regardless to the actual value nn (e.g., 1.5) value for 
nodes. The effect of this assumption on nodal pressures are shown in the Figure 
4.5. Also, the same figure highlights the results obtained using Mohan and Babu 
(2012) and EPANET2.0 methods. The Babu and Mohan (2012) method produced 
DSR values of 1.0 and 0.988 NW1 and NW2, the reason for this being that their 
method cannot simulate partial nodal flows. On the other hand, as expected, 
EPANET2.0 produced unrealistic negative pressure heads and DSR values (i.e., 
1.0) in NW1 and NW2.  
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Table 4.5.  Results comparison for (a) DSR (b) computational time performance 
in Steady-State simulation in a large pipe networks for case study 2. 
(a) 
Network 
DSR 
EPANET2.0 SIPDM Babu and Mohan 
(2012) 
Gorev et al. 
(2013) 
NW1 1.0 0.97 1.0 0.97 
NW2 1.0 0.926 0.988 0.934 
NW3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
NW4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 
(b) 
Network 
Time (s) 
EPANET2.0 SIPDM Babu and Mohan 
(2012) 
Gorev et al. 
(2013) 
NW1 5.60×10-3 5.60×10-2 5.65×10-2 5.75×10-2 
NW2 4.60×10-4 1.30×10-3 5.90×10-3 1.05×10-2 
NW3 1.35×10-4 3.85×10-4 3.11×10-4 3.98×10-4 
NW4 3.20×10-5 8.80×10-5 6.60×10-5 1.71×10-4 
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 (a)                                                                 (b) 
                
                             (c)                                                                  (d) 
    
        Nodes with Pavl < 0       Nodes with 0 < Pavl < 20        Nodes with Pavl ≥ 20 
Figure 4.5. The pressure values observed for nodes in network NW2 using (a) 
EPANET2.0 (b) SIPDM approach (c) Gorev et al. (2013) method (d) Babu and 
Mohan (2012) method. 
 
In terms of computational performance comparison, as expected, EPANET2.0 
produced the solutions notably faster than the SIPDM approach for all networks, 
as shown in Table 4.5.  In comparison to the results of Gorev et al. (2013), the 
SIPDM approach shows a better performance in terms of computational time for 
all networks, where additional artificial elements are only added to the deficient 
nodes, and an extra calculation of friction loss in the CV pipes is not required. 
The computational performance of the SIPDM approach is also better than the 
Babu and Mohan (2012) approach in large networks (NW2 and NW3). However, 
the Babu and Mohan (2012) method is faster for smaller network NW4. This is 
because of the large number of artificial reservoirs that need to be added to all 
nodal demands in the Babu and Mohan (2012) method, which slows down 
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computations increasingly more in larger networks (to obtain relevant water 
balances between the reservoirs). 
Finally, in order to illustrate the advantage of SIPDM over the other approaches 
which add artificial elements to all network nodes (such as Babu and Mohan 
2012; Gorev et al. 2013; Sayyed et al. 2015), the SIPDM and Sayyed et al. (2015) 
approaches are applied to network NW1 for the first scenario. When the DDM 
solver (EPANET2.0) is applied to this network it shows that only 185 nodes with 
demands experience low pressure conditions (i.e., Pavl < Preq =20 m). Accordingly, 
in the SIPDM approach, artificial elements are connected only to these nodes, 
which represent about 1.5% of the total network of nodes, whilst in Sayyed et al. 
(2015) artificial elements are added to all 12,523 nodes. As a result, SIPDM is 
68% faster in performing the PDM simulation than the Sayyed et al. (2015) 
approach. In addition, the Sayyed et al. (2015) approach fails to converge when 
the above network is exposed to more serious failure scenarios. For example, 
when a large burst modelled on pipe LINK-7496 (scenario two), EPANET2.0 
shows that 2,265 demand nodes are subjected to pressure deficient conditions 
(i.e. Pavl < Pmin) as shown in Table 4.4. SIPDM successfully changes the status 
of 1,646 of these nodes from no outflow to partial outflow under these conditions 
whereas the Sayyed et al. (2015) approach fails to change the status of any of 
these deficient nodes. Therefore, the Sayyed et al. (2015) approach fails to 
converge and produces unrealistic predictions of nodal pressures and outflows. 
 
4.5 Case Study 3: Extended Period Simulation in a Small 
Network 
The SIPDM approach is applied to a single source pumped WDN with the 
consideration of a diurnal variation in demands to assess SIPDM performance 
under EPS conditions. The network was tested under two pressure-deficient 
conditions. The first condition was obtained by increasing the base demand at all 
nodes 2.5 times. The value of 2.5 has been chosen to ensure that all demand 
nodes are subjected to the pressure-deficient condition for some time in the 
analysed simulation period. The second condition was produced by assuming 
pipe P7 isolation for the whole simulation period. 
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4.5.1 Network description  
The network consists of a reservoir, a tank, 8 demand nodes and 12 pipes (Figure 
4.6). The details associated with the demand nodes and pipes are listed in Table 
4.6. Figure 4.6 also provides the location of the 8 isolation valves in the network. 
The reservoir R1 provides water to the system via pump station shown in the 
Figure 4.6. The tank connected to pipe P3 completes the model. The initial head 
level of the tank is 36 m, while the minimum and maximum head level are 31 and 
46 m, respectively. Although gravity flow does play a role in supplying flow, 
pumping is still required. The pump curve is defined by one head versus flow 
coordinate, 76.2 m for 94.6 l/s.  
Figure 4.7 shows the typical diurnal profile of demand multiplier factors for 
demand nodes over 24 hours. The simulation time and hydraulic time step are 
fixed at 24 and 1 hr for all runs. The required pressure head (Preq), the minimum 
pressure head (Pmin) and the emitter exponent for demand nodes are assumed 
to be 20 m, 0 m and 0.54, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.6. Test case study 3 network configuration. 
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Table 4.6. Properties for (a) nodes (b) pipes for case 3 network. 
  (a)   (b)  
Node ID Elevation 
(m) 
Base 
demand 
(l/s) 
 Pipe ID Length  
(m) 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Roughness 
coefficient 
N0 216.41 0.00  P0 3209.54 457.2 100 
N1 216.41 9.46  P1 1609.34 355.6 100 
N2 213.36 9.46  P2 1609.34 254.0 100 
N3 211.84 6.31  P3 60.96 457.2 100 
N4 213.36 9.46  P4 1609.34 254.0 100 
N5 211.84 12.62  P5 1609.34 304.8 100 
N6 210.31 9.46  P6 1609.34 203.2 100 
N7 213.36 6.31  P7 1609.34 254.0 100 
N8 216.41 6.31  P8 1609.34 304.8 100 
    P9 1609.34 203.2 100 
    P10 1609.34 152.4 100 
    P11 1609.34 152.4 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Demand multiplier factors for case study 3 network. 
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4.5.2 Results and discussion 
4.5.2.1 First pressure-deficient condition – increased demand 
In order to reveal the maximum number of demand nodes with pressure-deficient 
condition over the analysed simulation period, a 24 h hydraulic simulation using 
EPANET2.0 was conducted first. Figure 4.8 shows the results of pressure values 
with the time at each network node. It can be observed from the figure that all 
nodes start with sufficient pressure until time 4:00. From this time onward, all 
nodes exposed to sudden negative pressure and reach to the minimal values at 
the peak demand times between 6:00 and 8:00. The pressure in the system 
increase gradually after 8:00 and nodes were receive sufficient pressure from 
time 14:00 to the end of simulation time (e.g., during the low demand loading 
time). Thus, the artificial elements are connected to all nodes for the whole 
simulation period before conducting SIPDM approach. This is important to 
change the situation of nodes from DD to PD during low pressure condition time, 
and from PD to DD during sufficient pressure condition time. 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Pressure predictions at demand nodes for case study 3 network 
using EPANET2.0 solver under increased demands condition. 
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To achieve this, the extent of demand satisfied at nodes N1 to N8 during the 
above abnormal flow condition using SIPDM are shown in Figure 4.9. It can be 
observed from the figure that all nodes are receiving only partial flow during the 
period from 4:00 to 12:00, when the value of demands are peaked and the 
pressure values are below Preq. Among these nodes, N1 is less affected by 
shortfall flow and receives around 85% of its required demand at time 6:00 to 
8:00. At the same time, N8 is the worst affected node when only about 30% of 
the demand is delivered to it. Also N1 receives full delivery earlier (at 10:00) than 
N2 through N7 (at 12:00), and N8 at 14:00. This is because N8 is located a far 
away from the only supply provider R1 in the network from 4:00 14:00 (e.g., no 
flow from the tank) when compared to N1 and other nodes as shown in Figure 
4.9. All above, reveals the capability of the SIPDM for changing the status of 
demand nodes between DD and PD during EPS, as well as predicting the more 
realistic values for flows with time, all based on the pressure, demand and 
topological conditions in the network.    
 
 
Figure 4.9. Demand satisfaction ratios at demand nodes for case study 3 
network using SIPDM approach under increased demands condition. 
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4.5.2.2 Second pressure-deficient condition - pipe failure 
For demonstration purposes, a failure of P7 during the whole simulation time is 
considered to create a pressure-deficient condition. In order to isolate P7, the 
isolation valves located on P4, P7 and P9 are closed. As a result, P4 and P9 are 
also isolated from the other parts of the network and demand node N4 
disconnected from the water sources (Jun and Loganathan 2007). Note that in 
the SIPDM approach the settings of the added elements at the isolated demand 
nodes (e.g., N4) do not need to be reset to zero during hydraulic calculations for 
the isolated network nodes (which normally needs to be done). However, in order 
to apply the Ang and Jowitt (2006) and Jinesh Babu approaches for analysing 
isolation in a WDS, the additional artificial reservoirs should be removed, as they 
provide water to the isolated parts.   
A 24-hour EPS was carried out with a one-hour time step. Demand pattern values 
were changed every two hours for all nodes. Furthermore, FCV and emitter 
settings were updated at the beginning of each pattern time step based on the 
corresponding required nodal demands (Qreq) for deficient nodes N7 and N8. 
These nodes are only exposed to pressure deficient condition, using EPANET2.0 
solver as shown in Figure 4.10. While, all nodes in the first scenario were exposed 
to failure mode conditions as illustrated in section 4.5.2.1.  
The results obtained demonstrates that the SIPDM approach provides logical and 
numerically stable results under EPS conditions which cannot be said for the 
majority of the other proposed PDM methods in the literature. For instance, the 
hydraulic simulation of the network by the SIPDM approach shows that shortfall 
in supply occurred over the whole simulation period, as it can be seen from Figure 
4.11. This shortfall increases slightly with the time and reaches the peak of 33.5 
l/s at 6:00 through 8:00, then drops to around 7.0 l/s at 18:00 and 19:00 and then 
increases again to 14 l/s at 23:00, as shown in Figure 4.11. The shortfall is 
occurring mainly because of the isolation of N4 and partial flows at nodes N7 and 
N8 during the peak demand times.  
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Figure 4.10. Pressure predictions at demand nodes for case study 3 network 
using EPANET2.0 solver under isolating pipe P7 condition. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Supply shortfall in case study 3 network under isolating pipe P7 
condition. 
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Further, Figure 4.12 shows that node N7 is unable to deliver the full demand from 
4:00 until 12:00 because the pressure head in this period is below the required 
value (Preq). However, the pressure head from 12:00 to 24:00 is sufficient to 
supply the full demand, as shown in Figure 4.12. Consequently, the network 
experiencing the above failure condition provides the required demand at all 
nodes during the low demand period but not during the peak-demand period 
when some pressure heads drop below Preq. All this reveals the ability of SIPDM 
approach in delivering more realistic and numerically stable results under EPS 
conditions. 
 
Figure 4.12. Supply shortfall and available pressure head at node N7 in case 
study 3 network under isolating pipe P7 condition. 
 
4.6 Case Study 4: Extended Period Simulation in a Large Real-
life Network 
In order to further validate the robustness of the SIPDM approach and measure 
its computational performance, a 24-hour simulation was conducted on a large 
and more complex WDN, the of C-Town network (Ostfeld et al. 2010). This was 
done under both normal and abnormal flow conditions simulated in respective 
scenarios. The results obtained by the SIPDM approach were compared with the 
DDM (EPANET2.0) hydraulic solver results.  
 
120 
 
4.6.1 Network description  
The C-Town network consists of 6 DMAs, 443 pipes, 399 nodes, 4 PRVs and one 
TCV. The water is supplied to the system by a large reservoir (RES1) with a 
constant head and via seven balancing water tanks. The water is pumped through 
pumping station S1 to tanks T1 and T2, and the water supply to T2 is controlled 
by a TCV. Pumping stations S2 and S3 draw water to tanks T3 and T4, while 
stations S4 and S5 pump supply from T1 to T5, T6 and T7 as shown in Figure 
4.13. The required pressure head (Preq), the minimum pressure head (Pmin) and 
the emitter exponent for demand nodes are assumed to be 15 m, o m and 0.5, 
respectively. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4.13. Network layout for case study 4 network. 
 
 
 
121 
 
4.6.2 Results and discussion 
4.6.2.1 Normal flow scenario 
Different values for hydraulic time step are used, as shown in Figure 4.14, to 
investigate the computational time and the numerical convergence for the SIPDM 
approach under different EPS conditions. The demand pattern time step is fixed 
at one hour. Also, for comparison purpose, the artificial elements are connected 
selectively to only 60% of the network demand nodes for all hydraulic time steps 
during using SIPMD approach.  
Both the EPANET2.0 and the SIPDM approaches yielded almost the same 
results in terms of nodal flows and pressures for all time steps. This can be clearly 
observed from the Figure 4.15. Where the difference in total water delivered (e.g., 
error) to the network using two approaches is very small and can be neglected 
(i.e., varied from 0.0115 to 0.0135 l/s) for all hydraulic time steps considered. 
Figure 4.14 shows also that the computational times for both solvers are 
increasing from 0.7 s to about 2.5 s with decreasing hydraulic time steps. As 
expected, the SIPDM approach is slower that the EPANET2.0 solver in all cases, 
but not significantly. For example, for 60 s time step, SIPDM is 29% slower than 
EPANET2.0. This difference is acceptable and is due to the fact that in the SIPDM 
approach artificial elements are added to 60% of network demand nodes to model 
pressure-driven demand. Thus, the flow settings for FCV and emitter coefficient 
for all demand nodes are updated at the beginning of each pattern time steps 
(i.e., every hour here). While, in the EPANET2.0 solver, the demand values are 
only updated at demand nodes (i.e., every 2 hours here).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14. Average computational time comparison for EPS for the normal 
flow scenario for case 4 network. 
EPANET2.0 
SIPDM Approach 
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Figure 4.15. Errors observed in term of the total system flow between SIPDM 
and EPANET2.0 for the normal flow scenario for case 4 network. 
 
4.6.2.2 Abnormal flow scenario 
The abnormal flow scenario is created by subjecting node N1 in DMA6 (as shown 
in Figure 4.13) to an additional constant demand of 15 l/s from 12:00 to 20:45, 
thus simulating a large burst (or abnormal demand) at that location. Accordingly, 
the base demand at node N1 has changed from 0 to 15 l/s during this period, 
whilst the required demands for N1 are presented in the corresponding emitter 
connected to N1. The hydraulic time and pattern time steps were fixed at 15 
minutes and one hour, respectively. Simulations by EPANET2.0 predicted 
pressure heads below Preq at all 10 nodes with demands in DMA6 during the 
whole overloading condition period as shown in Figure 4.16. This number 
increased at 17:00 (the most severe time) to 26 nodes affected in DMA2. 
Because of these failure conditions, the proposed artificial elements are 
connected to all 36 deficient demand nodes for the whole simulation period 
considered.  
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Figure 4.16. Number of nodal demands deficient under abnormal flow scenario 
in the case 4 network. 
 
In comparison to EPANET2.0, the SIPDM approach predict less nodes with no 
or partial flow. Where, the SIPDM approach shows that only 24 nodes were 
affected by low pressure conditions at 17:00, as illustrated in Figure 4.16. This is 
because the water depth in tank T4 dropped to zero, as shown in Figure 4.17 and 
pumping stations S2 and S3 were unable to deliver the required demands to all 
nodes. The number of pressure deficient nodes decreased slightly in both solver 
solutions during low demand patterns. By 20:15 the number of pressure deficient 
nodes increased again in EPANET2.0 and the SIPDM approach to 36 and 24, 
respectively. Therefore, the proposed SIPDM method estimated less deficient 
nodes in comparison with EPANET2.0. This is because the SIPDM approach 
applied the NHFR function for each node individually, whilst EPANET2.0 satisfied 
demands at all nodes regardless of the available nodal pressure heads, which 
produced more nodes with pressure heads below Preq or below Pmin. Both solvers 
predicted four pressure deficient nodes in DMA2 after the additional demand at 
N1 was removed (e.g., at 21:00). This is because the water depth in tank T4 is 
zero as compared to around 0.5 m during normal loading conditions (see Figure 
4.17). By 22:00 the system was back to the normal pressure conditions.  
Also, the obtained results reveal that the SIPDM approach converged to a 
numerically stable and deliver logical solution under the deficient pressure 
conditions and it was faster by approximately 5% under normal flow conditions. 
For example, Figure 4.18 shows the prediction of delivered demands and 
pressure heads at node J278 (the location of this typical node is shown in Figure 
EPANET2.0 
SIPDM Approach 
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4.13). As can be seen from this figure, both EPANET2.0 and SIPDM delivered 
identical flows at this location when the available pressures were sufficient to 
deliver the required demand. On the other hand, as expected, only a partial 
demand was delivered at this node in SIPDM when the pressure head went below 
the threshold required (Preq). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17. Water depth at tank T4 for case 4 network. 
 
 
Figure 4.18. The prediction of (a) pressure heads and (b) flows at node J278 
for case 4 network. 
EPANET2.0 
SIPDM Approach 
Preq 
 
EPANET2.0 
SIPDM Approach 
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4.7 Summary 
The SIPDM approach presented in chapter 3 was validated, demonstrated, and 
compared to several other PDM methods reported in the literature on a number 
of benchmark and real-life networks in this chapter. In section 4.2, the SIPDM 
approach is applied on a simple looped network under steady-state analysis, and 
the obtained results were compared to some other PDM methods found in 
literature.  Then, the approach is demonstrated and validated on a number of 
more complex, large and challenging networks under different flow conditions for 
steady-state analysis. In section 4.4, the validated SIPDM approach is applied on 
a simple network under EPS analysis. Finally, the approach was examined on a 
large semi real-life case study under EPS analysis.  
The results obtained demonstrate the ability of the SIPDM approach to predict 
network pressures and flows in a consistently accurate, numerically stable, and 
computationally efficient manner under pressure-deficient and normal-flow 
conditions in both steady-state and EPS. Also, in comparison to some other 
common PDM methods found in literature as well as DDM method (i.e., 
EPANET2.0 solver), the SIPDM possess the following key advantages: (1) it 
predicts the same or more-accurate pressures and flows for network nodes under 
both pressure-sufficient and pressure-deficient conditions; (2) except 
EPANET2.0, it does this in a generally more computationally efficient manner, 
especially when applied to larger pipe networks as illustrated in case studies 2; 
and (3) unlike some PDM methods, it can be used for extended period simulation, 
i.e., not just steady-state hydraulic analysis. 
In the next chapter, the full performance of the real-time operational response 
methodology presented in chapter 3 is tested, verified and demonstrated under 
two failure scenario on a real-life D-Town network.  
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 CASE STUDY ON REAL-TIME 
OPERATIONAL RESPONSE METHDOLOGY 
 
 Introduction  
This chapter illustrates the application of the real-time operational response 
methodology presented in chapter 3 on a case study of D-Town network.  
The chapter is organized as follows. After this introduction, the description of the 
case study is introduced and given in section 5.2. Once this done, the details of 
the interventions considered in the analysed case study in this chapter are 
described in section 5.3. In section 5.4, the details of the demand data in the case 
study network are provided. Then, the description and the details of the two 
hypothetical failure event scenarios (i.e., pipe burst) are given in section 5.5. 
section 5.6 reports the results and discussions obtained under each failure event 
scenario in two separate sub-sections, also the obtained results are compared 
with the enumeration method for performance comparison purpose. Finally, the 
chapter is summarised and relevant conclusions are drawn in section 5.7. 
 
 Description 
The proposed real-time response methodology in chapter 3 has been tested and 
verified on the modified D-Town water distribution network shown in Figure 5.1. 
D-Town network is based on a real-world medium-sized network. This benchmark 
network was introduced for the Battle of the Water Calibration Networks (BWCN) 
(Ostfeld et al. 2010) and subsequently used for the Battle of the Water Networks 
II (BWN-II) (Marchi et al. 2012). This system is chosen for its real-world 
complexity of having multiple tanks supplying water to multiple pressure zones, 
with the subsequent need to control multiple pump stations.    
The D-Town network introduced at the BWN-II competition consists of five district 
metered areas (DMAs) (i.e., DMA1-DMA5) required to be upgraded and an 
additional new zone to be designed (i.e., DMA6) in order to cope the increased 
water demand. The Guilodin et al. (2012) solution was chosen by the BWN-II 
scientific committee as the best one (Marchi et al. 2013) and hence is used here 
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as a case study to validate the real-time response methodology presented in 
chapter 3. 
In total, the above D-Town network consists of 443 pipes, 399 nodes (of which 
348 are demand nodes), 11 pumps, five pressure reducing valves (PRVs), one 
throttle control valve (TCV), 7 storage tanks, and a single reservoir with constant 
head. The network services approximately 240,000 inhabitants. The pipe network 
properties, and other pump, valve, and nodal data were taken from Marchi et al. 
(2012). The modifications made to the original network are shown in black in 
Figure 5.2 and their detail are summarized in Table 5.1. All data for the existing 
network components were incorporated into the EPANET2.0 (Rossman 2000a) 
input file D-Town.inp available and can be downloaded from the Centre for Water 
Systems at the University of Exeter (CWS 2018). 
 
 
Figure 5.1. D-Town network layout (Marchi et al. 2012). 
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Figure 5.2. Schematic representation of the Guidolin et al. (2012) solution: 
modifications to the original network (Marchi et al. 2012) are shown in black. 
 
Table 5.1 Modifications to the original D-Town (Marchi et al. 2012) by Guilodin 
et al. (2012) 
Pump 
replaced 
Pump 
added 
Tank # 
(volume 
added, m3) 
Number of 
replaced pipes 
Diesel 
generator 
inserted  
PU1(10a), 
PU2 (8b), 
PU3 (10a), 
PU6 (10a), 
PU7 (8b), 
PU10 (10a) 
PU1-1 (8b), 
PU2-1 (8a), 
PU4-1 (10a 
T4 (1,000) 38 (see Figure 
5.2) 
PU1, PU2, 
PU3, PU1-1, 
PU4, PU5, 
PU6, PU7, 
PU8, PU9, 
PU10, PU11  
Note: the pump curve is reported in brackets in column one  
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5.2.1 System operation  
The D-Town system operation is shown on a schematic in Figure 5.3. The water 
is supplied to the town by a large reservoir (R1) and it is balanced via seven water 
tanks (T1-T7). Water is pumped into the system by using pumping station S1 and 
delivered to tanks T1 and T2. Water supply to T2 is controlled by the TCV (V2). 
Pumping stations S2 and S3 supply water to tanks T3 and T4 respectively, 
pumping station S4 supplies water to T5 and station S5 supplies water to tanks 
T6 and T7.  
  
 
Figure 5.3. D-Town system schematic (after Ostfled et al. 2012). 
 
The D-Town network was analysed under two operational scenarios, a normal 
operation scenario, for which the network was subject to normal demand 
loadings, and a power outage event scenario. The power outage was assumed 
begin at any hour within the analysed 168 hrs (i.e. one week) simulation time, 
and to last for two hours. Within the power outage scenario, all pumps not 
powered by diesel generators are required to be shut down. In both scenarios, 
the system is able to provide a required pressure of 20 m or more to nodes with 
a non-zero demand and a minimum pressure value of zero to other zero-demand 
nodes. Also, the constraint of staying tanks to not be empty were met. 
Figure 5.4 provides a typical water depth at each network storage tank (Guilodin 
et al. 2012) under normal demand loading scenario over 168 hrs simulation time. 
the initial volume at each tank over the analysed simulation period was set to the 
half of the volume of the tank in order to ensure that tanks are not stayed empty 
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during the normal operation analysis period. Each tank is described by using the 
following 5 values: diameter, elevation, minimum level, maximum level and initial 
level as illustrated in Figure 5.5. Under normal operation scenario, the tank water 
level is forced to stay between the minimum and the maximum tank level, so that 
the volume between the tank bottom elevation and the minimum level represents 
a reserve volume. However, during power outage scenario, tanks are allowed to 
operate below their minimum level, i.e., to utilise the reserve volume. It is worth 
to mention that the minimum water level at tanks T1, T2, T4, T5 and T6 was set 
to zero. Whilst it set to 0.57 m at tank T3, and 0.09 m at tank T7. The power 
outage is allowed to occur at any time during the simulation.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Water depth observed at the D-Town network tanks under normal 
system operation. 
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Figure 5.5. Tank description in EPANET2.0. 
 
The operational response methodology shown in chapter 3 is tested on different 
failure events (e.g., pipe bursts) which are allowed to occur at any time during the 
day. Also, for the pipe failure starting at time to, initial water level in the tanks will 
be the one determined from the normal operation conditions at this time (see 
Figure 5.4). It is assumed that these tank levels would be available in a real-life 
system via the SCADA system. Additionally, an assumption is made here that 
tank’s reserve volume is allowed to be used during failure events, i.e., starting 
from time to.   
 
 Interventions  
The following interventions are considered in the real-time operational response 
methodology for the D-Town network. 
 
5.3.1  Isolation valves  
The information about the isolation valve locations is not available in D-Town. 
Therefore, 213 isolation valves were added to the network as shown in Figure 
5.6. The locations of these valves were obtained based on the guidelines given 
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in Jun (2005). Namely, the configuration uses the N–1 rule (Walski, 1993) as the 
starting point and a few valves are removed. Clearly out of 442 isolation valves, 
229 are removed. The removed valves usually tend to be those placed on the 
upstream pipe (i.e., the one where water most commonly flows to the node). All 
isolation valves in the network are assumed accessible, operational and initially 
fully open.  
 
5.3.2 Overland bypasses  
Due to the lack of real data, assumptions are made about the location of fire 
hydrants. A total of 133 network nodes are considered as hydrant points, as 
shown in Figure 5.6. The configuration of these hydrant points are obtained based 
on the hydrant installation guidelines given in Thames Water (2015). All fire 
hydrants in the network are assumed accessible and fully operational. The pairs 
of hydrants with connection distance LD ≤ LDMax = 300 m are considered as 
potential overland bypass candidates. This LDMax value was chosen in 
consultation with engineers in a UK water company. Accordingly, a total of 307 
possible overland bypasses were identified. The overland bypasses are assumed 
to have a nominal diameter of 200 mm and Hazen-Williams roughness coefficient 
of 100. The possible overland bypasses are modelled as additional (dummy) 
network pipes in the EPANET2.0 input data file and hydraulic solver with initially 
closed status.  
 
5.3.3 Pressure reducing valves (PRVs) 
There are five PRVs in the D-Town, namely V45, V47, V1, N15 and V40, and 
their locations are shown in Figure 5.6. These PRVs can be used as potential 
recovery interventions in the proposed response methodology by modifying the 
regular PRV settings. The size (i.e., diameter) and regular pressure settings for 
each PRV are described in Table 5.2. The PRV setting is allowed to change at 
the optimization stage as follows: no increase, 5% increase, 10% increase, 15% 
increase, 20% increase or 25% increase, all relative to the regular pressure 
setting. 
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Table 5.2. Properties for the PRVs in the D-Town network. 
PRV identifier Diameter, mm Regular pressure setting, m 
V45 152 30.8 
V47 102 26.73 
V1 203 37.11 
N15 102 0 
V40 203 50 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6. The location of pipe bursts, isolation valves, hydrant points, and 
PRVs in D-Town network. 
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 Demand Data 
Monthly water demands taken from the billing records at each node are available 
for a period of 168 h (1 week). The typical diurnal patterns for each DMA are 
estimated from the above real demand data and their values are illustrated in 
Figure 5.7. These patterns are used to estimate the required demand at each 
network node at any time in the duration168 hr by multiplying the base demand 
and corresponding multiplier value shown in Figure 5.7. The patterns are a 
composite of demands that occurs during weekday flows, weekend flows and 
seasonal flows. Due to varying diurnal patterns in each DMA, several time periods 
were found as peak conditions, for example, 166:00 hr (maximum demand for 
whole system), 117:00 hr (maximum demand for DMA 5), 105:00 hr (maximum 
demand for DMA 3 and 6), 53:00 hr (minimum demand for the whole system) and 
3 hr (minimum demand for DMA 5).  
Changes in consumer water demands behaviour during the burst event are not 
considered in the case study presented in this chapter, and, instead, consumer 
demands are simulated as homogeneous, and aggregated only at nodes using 
the flow patterns shown in Figure 5.7. All nodes are assumed to be residential 
consumers. The number of consumers at each residential node is calculated by 
dividing the base demand value at that node by the daily water consumption per 
consumer, which is assumed as 150 litres per person per day (Aquaterra 2008). 
Figure 5.8 shows the based demand and the number of consumers allocated to 
each residential node. 
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Figure 5.7. Demand multiplier factors for D-Town network. 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Allocated (a) base demand (b) number of consumers at each node 
for D-Town network. 
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 Failure Event Scenarios  
The network and response methodology are tested and demonstrated under two 
hypothetical pipe failure event scenarios. The first scenario involves a large burst 
on pipe P307 at an off-peak hours in DMA1 with a variable outflow having an 
average value of 11.2 l/s as shown in Figure 5.9. The second scenario involves 
another medium burst on pipe P424 in DMA5 that occurs at the peak demand 
hour with a variable outflow, having an average value of 6.4 l/s as shown in Figure 
5.9. Both pipes are critical in terms of water supply and their locations are shown 
in Figure 5.6. Pipe P307 is one of the key pipes in the network supplying water to 
the bounded area by the hidden line of DMA1, and DMAs 2, 3 and 6, while P424 
is supplying water to DMA 5 as shown in Figure 5.6.  
The first scenario has been selected to demonstrate the performance of the 
response methodology in term of search space reduction whilst finding optimal 
recovery interventions within the affected DMAs and adjacent DMAs in near real-
time. The second scenario aims to demonstrate the effect of bringing water into 
an affected area by changing the valve settings and installing overland bypasses 
in a nearby unaffected DMA1with the aim to enhance flow conditions (i.e., supply 
interruption, pressure) in a disconnected DMA5 in near real-time.  
The results obtained from both scenarios are also compared to the results 
obtained by using the Enumeration method with the aim of assessing the overall 
performance and convergence of the NSGA-II that used at the optimization stage 
in the proposed response methodology in chapter 3. 
Pipe bursts for the two scenarios can be modelled in a number of ways, as 
discussed in the literature review chapter in section 2.3.2. The realistic way 
chosen in this chapter models bursts using EPANET’s emitters as pressure 
dependent outflows with the simplifying assumption that their pressure exponent 
is always equal to 0.5, i.e. regardless of pipe material or other factors. Therefore, 
to simulate pipe bursts on pipes P307 and P424, pressure dependent outflows 
are assigned to the downstream nodes (Yoo et al. 2016) of respective pipes as 
follows: 
 
Q= Cd. Pγ                                                                                                          (5.1) 
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Where: Q is the flow rate, P is pressure at downstream node, Cd is a discharge 
coefficient and γ is a pressure exponent. The above generalized orifice equation 
is used in EPANET for modelling the pressure sensitive outflow such as pipe 
bursts and leakage.  
As mentioned above, the γ exponent value is fixed at 0.5. The value of this 
exponent can generally vary from 0.5 to 2.5, however, as suggested by Cassa et 
al. (2010) values higher than 1.5 estimated during field trials do not have grounds 
in theoretical foundations. The chosen value of the emitter exponent of 0.5 agrees 
with Lambert (2002) who suggested that detectable leaks and bursts in metal 
pipes typically have values of exponent close to 0.5. In this case, the emitter 
coefficient is calculated based on the estimated burst flow and actual pressure at 
the burst location. This approach provides results that are more realistic, 
however, it requires an extra steady state simulation to obtain pressure at the 
beginning of the impact simulation to calculate the value of the discharge 
coefficient Cd using Equation 5.1. 
The above two bursts are modelled using EPANET 2.0 emitters with discharge 
coefficient of 1.5 for P307 and 1.0 for P424. Figure 5.9 shows the outflow profiles 
from a pressure sensitive burst at pipe P307 and P424, from the time when burst 
occurred to the time of isolation, respectively. Note, the emitter coefficient is 
removed from burst pipe from the moment when the isolation starts, namely at 
2:00 for the first scenario and 14:00 for the second scenario. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Outflow profile from the pressure sensitive burst at (a) pipe P307 (b) 
pipe P424. 
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The hydraulic simulations are conducted using the EPANET 2.0 (Rossman 2000) 
solver based on the SIPDM method explained in the section 3.5.1 in chapter 3. 
The full response methodology including optimization tool that explained in the 
flowchart given in Figure 3.6 in chapter 3 was developed and coded in the 
MATLAB R2015 environment. All simulation runs were performed on computer 
with the Intel(R) processor, Core (TM) i5-4570 CPU @ 3.2 GHz and 64-bit 
Windows 7. 
The following assumptions are made: 
1. The burst in the first scenario is assumed to occur at 0:00, detected and 
located at 1:00 and ultimately isolated at 2:00. The pipe burst in the second 
scenario is assumed to occur at 10:00, detected and located at 13:00 and 
fully isolated at 14:00. Both bursts are assumed to remain isolated for 
24:00 hours. 
 
2. The impact assessment horizon for assessing interventions performance 
is assumed to be 24:00 starting from time 2:00 and last at time 26:00 for 
the first scenario, while it is assumed to start at time14:00 and last at time 
38:00 for the second scenario.  
 
3. Due to the lack of real cost data for interventions, the values of unit weight 
coefficients shown in Equation 3.3 in chapter 3 are assumed all equal to 
one (i.e., wv = wo= wp =1). 
 
4. It is assumed that no water is delivered to the consumers allocated to a 
node if the available pressure head is less than 0 m, the demand is partially 
delivered if it is between 0-20 m and fully delivered otherwise. The emitter 
exponent for all added artificial emitters to demand nodes in the SIPMD 
hydraulic solver is assumed to be equal to 0.5. 
 
5. For the NSGA-II parameters crossover operator, mutation operator and 
population size, the following values were selected: 0.85, 0.05 and 20, 
respectively.  
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6. The maximum allowed number of interventions INVmax is limited to 10 (as 
explained in Chapter 3 section 3.4.3). 
 
7. The hydraulic analysis in EPANT2.0 is assumed to be started at time 0:00 
and last at time 26:00 for the first scenario, whilst it is assumed to be 
started at time 10:00 and last at time 38:00 for the second scenario. In 
both scenarios, hydraulic time step in EPANET2.0 is fixed at 15 min for all 
hydraulic runs. 
 
 Results and Discussions  
5.6.1 Segment identification analysis  
The first phase in performing the response methodology is to identify the system 
segments (offline) that can be used to isolate the failure location (online). The 
segment identification algorithm presented in section 3.3 is used here to define 
the segments in the D-Town network. A total of 152 of network segments were 
identified this way. Table A1 in Appendix A presents the summary of these 
segments. Out of the 152 regular segments, 36 segments result in unintended 
isolations. These are the segments that are disconnected from the source of D-
Town network and all storage tanks (i.e., T1 to T7), i.e., have no means of 
receiving water directly from any of these.  
On average, each regular segment includes 3 pipes and 3 nodes, which need at 
least 3 isolation valves to separate this segment from the rest of the network. The 
largest segment identified contains 13 pipes, 12 nodes and requires closing 7 
valves to isolate it. Whilst, the smallest segment involves only one pipe, one node 
and needs one valve to be closed to separate this segment from the rest of the 
network. Most of the smallest segments are those that contain a storage tank and 
the nodes which are normally located in at the dead-end pipes in the network.   
The isolation of pipe P307 in the first failure scenario leads to the interruption of 
supply to four additional pipes (i.e., P302, P296, P120, and P118) and two nodal 
demands (i.e., J432, J433), as shown in Figure 5.10. The isolation of this segment 
requires closing 4 isolation valves located on pipes P120, P307, P302 and P118 
(defined using green rectangular in the figure) and these are closed from 2:00 
until 26:00. As a result of isolating the above segment, two hydrants (defined 
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yellow circle in the figure) are disconnected from the rest of the network and they 
are dropped from the list of potential interventions during the recovery stage.  
On the other hand, the isolation of a burst on pipe P424 in the second scenario 
led also to the disconnect pipe P53 and a non-demand node (J384) from the rest 
of the network, as shown in Figure 5.10. The isolation of P424 requires closing 
two isolation valves located on pipes P424 and P53 from time 14:00 to time 38:00.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Segmentation details for failure at pipes: (a) P307 and (b) P424. 
 
5.6.2 Response in the first failure scenario 
5.6.2.1 Impact assessment  
The impact assessment of the simulated burst on pipe P307 on the system’s 
ability to deliver requested water demand is shown in Figures 5.11. This figure 
shows the impact in terms of shortfall in the system. The shortfall is estimated by 
finding the difference between the total required demand (including the required 
demand at the isolated consumers) and the actual water delivered. The shortfall 
is calculated by using the SIPDM solver. Figure 5.11 also shows the total 
cumulative volume of water undelivered in the system (including the isolated 
area), which is estimated by using Equation 3.15.  
 
Burst location Hydrant point Isolated hydrant point 
Isolation valve Target isolation valve 
(a) (b) 
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Figure 5.11. The estimated impact of pipe P307 failure on the system (including 
the isolated area) in terms of (a) shortfall (b) total cumulative volume of water 
undelivered. 
  
The above impact assessment shows that nodal demands located downstream 
of the isolated area in DMA1 start to receive partial flow only 7 hours after the 
isolation (i.e., at 9:00), as illustrated in Figure 5.11. As mentioned earlier, the 
isolation of pipe P307 leads to the interruption of supply to four other pipes and 
two nodal demands from the main water supply in the network. As it can be seen 
from the Figure 5.11, the total cumulative volume of undelivered water to 
consumers increases steadily until about 16:00 when it suddenly starts increasing 
more rapidly. This is because at this point in time most nodal demands in DMA1 
and DMA2 are starting to suffer from low-pressure conditions, This is due to the 
increasing demand requirement in the network and water in storage tanks T2 and 
T4 declining substantially and eventually draining out to zero at 13:00 and 16:00, 
respectively, as illustrated in Figure 5.12.  
The major increases in undelivered demands occur at peak time after the 
isolation period (i.e., at 17:00, 20:00, and 22:00) as shown in Figure 5.11. On the 
other hand, all network nodes (except the isolated ones) remain less affected by 
pressure deficient conditions during the network low flow conditions after 22:00. 
Although the nodes located in DMAs 3 and 6 have partial water supply (prior to 
the isolation) through the pipes in the isolated area, they remain unaffected and 
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have received all required demand over the whole impact assessment horizon. 
This is because the demand requirement (as shown in Figure 5.8) and elevation 
at these nodes are low compared to the rest of the network, and hence pressure 
heads are sufficiently high to deliver the full demand required.  By the end of 
impact horizon (i.e., 26:00), the total of 533 m3 of water was not delivered as 
shown in Figure 5.11. This value is used as a reference (IMR) for evaluating 
operational recovery interventions.  
Figure 5.13 shows also that the amount of water not delivered to the isolated area 
and the shortfall are relatively low when compared to total undelivered flow (IM) 
and shortfall in the system. It is worth to mention that the shortfall in the system 
that occurred between time 2:00 and 9:00 is occurring only because of the 
isolated consumers assigned to nodes J432 and J433, other demand nodes 
remain unaffected by the pipe burst. At the same time, the water depth at tank T2 
and T4 declined compared to the normal operation scenario, as shown in Figures 
5.12 and 5.4.    
 
 
 
Figure 5.12. Water depth at tank T2 and T4 under (a) pipe P307 failure 
scenario (b) normal operation scenario. 
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Figure 5.13. The estimated impact of isolating pipe P307 on the isolated nodes 
in terms of (a) shortfall (b) total cumulative volume of water undelivered. 
 
5.6.2.2 Recovery phase  
In order to mitigate the impact of pipe P307 isolation on the system (e.g., affected 
demand nodes located in DMA 1 and 2), the network recovery phase was initiated 
at 9:00 (i.e., 7 hr after the event isolation), and lasted until the end of isolation 
duration.  
A total of 402 intervention candidates (i.e., decision variables) are identified 
automatically by the offline preparation stage. This involves 247 potential 
overland bypasses, 152 potential isolation valves that could be manipulated and 
3 PRVs (i.e., V1, V45 and V47) whose their settings could be potentially changed. 
Most of the above interventions are located in the two affected DMAs (1 and 2). 
Note that out of the total of 247 potential overland bypasses, 35 connect DMA1 
with the unaffected nearby DMA5, and further 20 connect DMA2 with nearby 
unaffected DMA4.  
All intervention candidates are assessed for further consideration in the online 
preparation stage. It is worth to mention that during the offline preparation stage 
126 interventions available in the network were removed and that involves 60 
overland bypasses, 61 isolation valves, and 3 PRVs (i.e., V1, V40 and N15). All 
of these candidates were located on the unaffected DMAs 3, 4, 5 and 6.  
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Figure 5.14. The network showing isolated area and the direction of flows for 
pipe P307 failure scenario at most critical time of 20:00. 
 
The online preparation stage starts with removing intervention candidates that do 
not fall on the flow path (shown as shaded area in Figure 5.14) for the most critical 
time 20:00. This time is most critical because the demand requirement and 
shortfall are peaked at this time as shown in Figures 5.7 and 5.11, respectively. 
The above flow path was identified based on the procedure explained earlier in 
section 3.4.4.2. Accordingly, 128 overland bypasses, 85 isolation valves, and 
PRV V1 and V47 were removed from further consideration. This represents a 
reduction of about 53% in terms of optional intervention candidates identified in 
the offline preparation stage (404 in total).  Most of these interventions are located 
at the upper part of DMA1 and trunk mains in DMAs 1 and 2, as shown in the 
Figure 5.14. Note until this stage of the preparation, the search space was 
reduced by 65% from the total interventions available in the network (525 in total). 
 
145 
 
For the remaining 186 candidates (isolation valves and overland bypasses), 
impact IM was obtained by running the EPANET hydraulic solver (based on the 
SIPDM) for each candidate recovery intervention individually. Finally, after 
ranking all interventions, the best 10 individual interventions with the lowest IM 
values (i.e., those that produce impact less than IMR) were identified as shown in 
Figure 5.15. As it can be observed from this figure, all identified interventions 
reduce the volume of undelivered water to consumers (IM) in particular OV5, 
OV223, OV225, OV224, OV217 and OV221, when compared to the “do nothing” 
intervention (IMR = 533 m3). Interestingly, the best candidate intervention, which 
involves installing an overland bypass (OV5) between fire hydrants at J13 and 
J11, is very close to the isolated area. In fact, it is parallel to pipe P307 as shown 
in Figure 5.16. This means that identified interventions near the isolated area 
have more chances to reduce the negative impact, which also makes sense from 
an engineering point of view. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.15. Best ranked operational recovery interventions for pipe P307 
failure scenario. 
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Figure 5.16. The location of recovery interventions for INV=3 (OV5, OV217, 
and OV225) for P307 failure scenario. 
 
The selected 10 overland bypass intervention candidates (possible choices of 0-
do not install and 1-install) are combined with the possible modifications to V45 
settings (possible choices: 30.8, 32.34, 33.88, 35.42, 36.96 and 38.5 m) to make 
the full list of possible interventions that were optimised using the NSGA-II. Given 
the full search space size of 210*61 = 6,144, the population size and total number 
of generations were set to 20 and 150, respectively. The Pareto optimal front was 
obtained after 10 generations and it involves only three non-dominated solutions, 
as shown in Figure 5.17. The other solutions for INV= 3, 4 and 5 are all dominated 
and are added to the figure for comparison purposes only.  
The full model run, pre-optimisation selection involving both offline and online 
preparation stages in addition to optimisation itself, took approximately 30 min of 
computational time, mostly to perform relevant hydraulic solver runs. Note that 
this is smaller than the 1 hour time step adopted in this near real-time analysis. 
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At the same time, the Enumeration method took about 8.5 hrs to identify the 
equivalent Pareto front from all, 6,144 possible solutions. Note that this notably 
longer time prevents the use of Enumeration method in near real-time.  
 
 
Figure 5.17. The final optimal recovery interventions for pipe P307 failure. 
 
Figure 5.18. The estimated impact of pipe P307 failure on the system (including 
the isolated area), after introducing recovery interventions, in terms of (a) 
shortfall (b) total cumulative volume of water undelivered. 
 
As it can be seen from Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18, two specific recovery 
interventions (OV5 and OV217) appear in all optimal solutions. Together they 
reduce IM from 533 m3 (for INV=0) to a minimum value of 138 m3, as well they 
reduce the shortfall over the time.  Furthermore, following the implementation of 
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these two overland bypasses, starting from time 9:00, most nodes in DMA1 and 
DMA2 start to receive either the full or reduced quantity of water as shown in 
Figure (5.16). Note that one of these two bypasses, OV217, is connecting DMA5 
with DMA1 (see Figure 5.16). This means that supply from DMA5 to DMA1 (or 
the combination of two DMAs) has a considerable impact on recovering deficient 
nodes in DMA1 to normal pressure conditions. However, this is not always true, 
as for example in the case of INV=3 (which brings water from DMA4 to DMA2 by 
opening OV225), where the volume of water undelivered (IM) increased when 
compared to INV=2. This is because the water delivered from DMA4 to DMA2 
has improved situation in DMA2, but has also worsened the supply conditions in 
DMA4. 
Figure 5.17 also shows that increasing the number of intervention combinations 
does not necessarily lead to a reduced volume of undelivered demand. This is 
clearly observed in the same table, where the dominated solutions with 
interventions for INV = 3, 4 and 5, produced a larger impact reduction than the 
solution for INV=2 did. Eventually, the solution for INV=2 could be adapted as the 
optimal recovery option, i.e., the solution nearest to the ideal point (INV=0, IM=0), 
and can be proposed to the control room operator. 
 
5.6.3 Response in the second failure scenario 
In order to further validate the proposed response methodology and assess its 
computational performance, the same WDS described above was tested 
assuming a second failure, sudden pipe burst at pipe P424.  
 
5.6.3.1 Impact assessment 
The isolation of a burst on pipe P424 led to the unintended isolation of the pipe 
P53 and a non-demand node (J384) from the rest of the network. As a result, the 
system (in particular consumers allocated to demand nodes in DMA5) was 
subjected to abnormal flow conditions starting from 15:00. This can be observed 
from the Figure 5.19. However, the supplied volume of water to consumers 
remained unchanged from the original requirements during the period from 10:00 
to 15:00 whilst the water depth at tanks T6 and T7 slightly fluctuated and declined 
as compared to normal demand stress condition in the network (see Figure 5.20). 
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The two tanks were able to deliver the full demand to all nodes in the DMA5 until 
14:00 (i.e., one hour after the isolation), and partial demand until 17:00, as shown 
in Figure 5.20. This because the modified D-Town was designed to provide full 
demand requirement for two hours under the power outage failure, as 
demonstrated by Gulodin et al (2012). Also because of the burst on pipe P424, 
the station S2 was disconnected from DMA5.    
From the Figure 5.19 it can be observed that the cumulative volume of 
undelivered flow (IM) reached 112 m3 for 2 hours after the time of isolation (i.e., 
at 16:00). The cumulative volume of undelivered water increased to 226 m3 at 
17:00 resulting in all 49 nodes in DMA5 suffering from undelivered demand. From 
this point in time onward, all consumers in DMA5 remained without water until the 
end of impact horizon considered (i.e., 38:00) and the total volume of undelivered 
water ultimately increased to approximately 3,200 m3, as shown in Figure 5.19. 
The reason for such a high volume of undelivered water in DMA5 is that this DMA 
was fully disconnected from the main water source by the pipe burst isolation. 
The two tanks T6 and T7 initially compensated for this failure, but ended up being 
completely empty at 17:00 and 15:00, respectively. 
 
Figure 5.19. The estimated impact of isolating pipe P424 on the DMA5 nodes in 
terms of (a) shortfall (b) total cumulative volume of water undelivered. 
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Figure 5.20. Water depth at tank T6 and T7 under pipe P424 failure scenario. 
 
5.6.3.2 Recovery phase  
In order to mitigate the impact of pipe P424 isolation, the network recovery was 
assumed to start at 15:00 and last until the end of isolation duration (i.e., 38:00). 
A total of 85 intervention candidates (i.e., decision variables) have been identified 
in the offline preparation stage as potential recovery solutions. Note that this 
represents only about 16% of the total available interventions (i.e., 525). The 
candidate interventions involves potentially closing 30 isolation valves, modifying 
one PRV (i.e., V45) setting and installing and using overland bypasses within 
DMA5 (30 bypasses) and between DMA5 and the neighbouring DMA1 (24 
possible bypasses). The initial pressure setting of the V45 was fixed at 50 m and 
was increased during recovery to one of 6 following possible choices: 50, 52.5, 
55, 57.5, 60 and 62.5 m. The possible decision variable values for overland 
bypass and isolation valve interventions are 0 for closed status and 1 for open 
status. Based on the flow direction in the pipes over the horizon considered (form 
14:00 to 38:00), all interventions inside DMA5 were eliminated from the online 
preparation stage before performing individual evaluation. This is due to the fact 
that all components in DMA5 are disconnected from the main water source.  
The evaluation of the remaining 24 candidate solutions (bypasses that connect 
DMAs 5 and 1) took 2 minutes of computational time, mostly to perform relevant 
hydraulic solver runs. The results obtained led to a conclusion that only seven of 
these overland bypasses reduce the impact (i.e., produce IM < IMR =3,183 m3). 
Accordingly, these seven bypasses and modified V40 settings (located in DMA1) 
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are selected as eight potential optimisation candidates. The two-objective 
optimizer (based NSGA-II) was introduced to find the optimum Pareto 
combinations amongst possible interventions. The total number of hydraulic 
evaluations to cover the full solution search space is 27*61= 768. Hence, the 
population size and the total number of generation are set to 15 and 30, resulting 
in 450 evaluations. The final set of solutions was obtained only after 6 generations 
(i.e., 90 hydraulic evaluations) and the detail of these solutions are summarized 
in Figure 5.21. The figure also shows the solutions with INV =5, 6, 7 and 8, which 
are all dominated by other solutions. This was done for comparison purposes. 
The full model run (pre-optimisation selection and optimisation itself) took 
approximately 10 min of computational time. The Enumeration method required 
64 min to identify the same set of optimal solutions. Note that even though the 
difference in computational times between optimisation and enumeration is not 
as large as in the first failure scenario, performing the NSG-II optimisation is still 
much more computationally efficient than Enumeration and is the only one 
feasible (given a 1 hour time step for real time analysis).  
 
 
Figure 5.21. The final optimal recovery interventions for pipe P424 failure 
scenario. 
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Figure 5.22. The estimated impact of pipe P424 failure on the system (including 
the isolated area), after introducing recovery interventions, in terms of (a) 
shortfall (b) total cumulative volume of water undelivered. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.21, all eight recovery interventions (INV=1-8) reduced the 
impact following a pipe burst compared to the ‘do nothing’ option (INV=0). 
Interestingly, two specific interventions (overland bypass OV14 and modifying 
PRV1 setting to 60 m) have appeared in all optimal solutions besides INV=1. This 
means that both interventions have a significant effect on mitigating the negative 
impact of failure as illustrated in Figure 5.22. Together they reduced IM from 
3,183 m3 (for INV=0) to 539 m3 (for INV = 2) - see Figure 5.21. Further, from 
16:00, most nodes in DMA5 started to receive either full or reduced water 
delivery, as shown in Figure 5.23. With INV=3 (or opening OV11 as well) the 
impact has further declined, with both overland bypass solutions (OV14 and 
OV11) connecting DMA1 with DMA5 (Figure 5.23c). This means that supply from 
DMA1 to DMA5 (or the combination of two DMAs) has a significant impact on 
recovering deficient nodes in DMA5 to normal pressure conditions as highlighted 
in Figure 5.23.  
Having said this, increasing the number of intervention combinations does not 
necessarily lead to a reduced volume of undelivered demand. This is clearly 
observed in Figure 5.21, where solutions with interventions for INV = 4, 5, 6 and 
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7 produced almost similar impact reduction as the solution for INV=3 did. This is 
because the added overland bypasses in these interventions conveyed water 
from DMA1 to low hydrant points in DMA5. More interestingly increasing the 
number of interventions from 7 to 8 produced larger IM value (as shown in Figure 
5.21). This is because the additional intervention (e.g., OV18) involves bringing 
additional water from DMA1 to DMA5 which, in turn, negatively affects the nodes 
located in DMA1, which then do not receive the full required demand. Ultimately, 
the solution for INV=3 is adapted as the optimal recovery option as the solution 
nearest to the ideal point (INV=0, IM=0). 
 
 
Figure 5.23. Effect of the number of interventions on system recovery at time 
15:00 for: (a) INV=0, (b) INV=2, (c) INV=3, (d) INV =4. 
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 Summary  
The application of the real-time operational response methodology described in 
chapter 3 was tested, validated and demonstrated on a semi-real case study of 
D-Town network in this chapter. The network was tested under two hypothetical 
pipe burst failure scenarios.  
The results obtained demonstrate the potential effectiveness and benefits of 
using the proposed response methodology. Moreover, the results shows that the 
proposed response methodology can effectively reduce the negative impact of 
unplanned failure events in water distribution networks (once these events are 
detected and located). This is achieved via the automated identification of optimal 
operational recovery interventions in near-real time.  
The results obtained also show that changing the topology of a WDS by 
introducing recovery interventions can reduce substantially the negative impact 
of failures on consumers when compared to the “do-nothing” option. In addition, 
increasing the number of recovery interventions under contingency situations 
does not necessarily lead to improved network operating conditions. Finally, the 
results obtained demonstrate that the proposed narrowing down of response 
interventions based on the two preparation stages (i.e., offline and online) can 
effectively reduce the search space size before applying real-time optimization. 
The Pareto optimal interventions identified can be ultimately presented to the 
control room operator for making suitable decisions under contingency situations 
in near real-time. 
In the following chapter 6, a summary of the research work carried out and 
presented in this thesis is given together with the thesis main conclusions and a 
discussion about the directions of the future research work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Summary  
The aim of this thesis was to develop an efficient response methodology to 
reduce the impacts of unplanned failure occurrences (e.g., pipe bursts) in a WDS 
and restore the flow conditions in the network to normal service level once the 
failure has been detected and located. The response methodology proposed in 
this thesis is based on the current practice in the UK water industry and can assist 
WDS operators in making more informed decisions and prioritise interventions/ 
actions more effectively.  
Two stages were defined for the operational response: (i) the isolation of a 
potential failure event with associated segment (if any), followed by (ii) the 
recovery stage. The isolation includes finding the nearest set of valves to isolate 
the failure location and identify the interrupted/isolated consumers from water 
sources because of the failure event. The recovery stage involves selecting the 
optimal combination of individual operational interventions, with the aim to 
minimize both the negative impact of reduced/interrupted supply over a 
predefined impact horizon (estimated as the volume of water undelivered) and 
the associated operational costs (estimated in this thesis via the weighted total 
number of operational interventions required). This two-objective optimisation 
problem was solved by using the NSGA-II. 
The optional choices considered are opening valves within the affected DMA and 
between the affected and nearby DMAs, resetting pressure at the outlet of PRV(s) 
and installing temporary overland bypasses between suitable hydrant points. The 
optimal set of interventions was determined using a new methodology presented 
in this thesis that makes use of multi-objective optimisation coupled with a 
pressure-driven model (PDM) hydraulic solver to evaluate potential solutions.  
The developed Single Iteration PDM (SIPDM) approach for assessing the 
negative impacts associated with the failure events is based on using a specific 
set of elements added to each deficient pressure demand node in the network. 
This enables modelling the minimum pressure head below which no flow occurs, 
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the required pressure above which the full demand required is delivered, and the 
partial flow conditions for the pressure heads in between these two characteristic 
values. The SIPDM approach suggested here uses the Wagner et al. (1988) 
relationship for the latter, although other relationships could be modelled if 
deemed more suitable.  
The overall response methodology is presented chapter 3 and was tested, 
validated and demonstrated on a case study of D-Town network in chapter 5. The 
SIPDM approach presented, validated and demonstrated in chapter 4. 
 
 Conclusions  
The work carried out in this thesis forms a useful contribution to the water system 
research field through the key conclusions shown in the following two sub-
sections.  
6.2.1 Real-time operational response methodology  
The operational real-time response methodology proposed in this thesis is 
intended to provide support to operators when making relevant decisions, i.e. 
help them do their job even better under emergency condition. This applies 
especially to cases when failures are more complex in nature (e.g., affecting a 
larger part of the water distribution system and customers) and decisions need to 
be made quickly. The following main conclusions can be made from the results 
obtained in chapter 5: 
 
1. The proposed operational response methodology can effectively reduce 
the negative impact of unplanned failure events in water distribution 
networks (once these events are detected and located). This is achieved 
by automated identification of optimal operational recovery interventions 
in near-real time, i.e. identify and shortlist suitable candidate operational 
interventions prior to optimisation in near real-time short time. The Pareto 
optimal interventions are identified by addressing the trade-off between 
the reduced negative impact due to interventions applied and the 
associated intervention costs. These could be ultimately presented to the 
control room operator for making suitable decisions under contingency 
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situations in near real-time. This, in turn, is expected to result in improved 
operational efficiency and emergency preparedness, reduced water loss 
and shortened response time. 
 
2. The Pareto optimal recovery interventions considered here (valve 
manipulation, PRV resetting and installation of temporary overland 
bypasses between fire hydrants) can, in some cases, result in changing 
temporarily the topology of the analysed WDS. It has been shown that this 
can be very beneficial, i.e. it can reduce substantially the negative impact 
of failures on consumers (when compared to the “do-nothing” option). At 
the same time, increasing the number of recovery interventions under 
contingency situations does not necessarily lead to improved network 
operating conditions. The reason for this is that most of impact reduction 
seem to be achieved by a small number of carefully selected interventions. 
 
3. The new intervention selection methodology shown in section 3.4.4 can 
effectively and considerably reduce the number of the interventions (i.e. 
decision variables) in near real-time for a given network and consequently 
reduce the search space during the process of finding optimal intervention 
solutions under emergency failure conditions. This is beneficial as the time 
available to perform optimisation in near-real-time is limited. In particular 
helpful in the case of more complex networks and events, affecting a larger 
area/number of consumers and/or when the response needs to be 
identified quickly. 
 
4. The developed segmentation method shown in section 3.3 is able to: (1) 
delineate segments (including both regular and unintentional) containing 
failed components (e.g., pipe burst) for a water distribution system; (2) 
identify the location of all necessary valves to isolate the failure event; (3) 
provide numerical performance measures for assessing failure impacts in 
terms of the number of customers out of service (i.e., isolated) and (4) 
utilize the industry standard EPANET software to perform hydraulic 
calculations to combine both topological and hydraulic failures. The 
segmentation method can handle very large size networks due to simple 
and scalable matrix calculations and search evaluations used. 
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6.2.2 Pressure driven analysis 
A simple and robust PDM methodology and tool (SIPDM) is developed here to 
model the behaviour of real networks under pressure deficient conditions 
resulting from the failure events in a WDS (e.g., pipe bursts). The results obtained 
in chapter 4 lead to the following main conclusions:  
1. The proposed SIPDM approach is able to simulate effectively and 
efficiently the WDN under both normal and pressure-deficient conditions 
and in both steady-state and extended period simulations. The predicted 
flows and pressures in the network are accurate, numerically stable, and 
obtained in a computationally efficient manner.  
 
2.  When compared to other PDM methods reported in the literature, the 
SIPDM possesses the following key advantages: (1) it predicts the same 
or more-accurate pressures and flows under pressure-deficient conditions; 
(2) it does this in a generally more computationally efficient manner, 
especially when applied to larger pipe networks; and (3) unlike some PDM 
methods, it can be used for extended period simulation, i.e., not just 
steady-state hydraulic analysis.  
 
3. When SIPDM is compared to a DDM type approach, the following key 
differences are observed: (1) SIPDM predicts the same pressures and 
flows under pressure-sufficient conditions, and more realistic and accurate 
pressures and flows under pressure-deficient conditions, for both steady-
state and EPS analysis; (2) As expected, SIPDM is slower than DDM by 
about 30% which is acceptable when compared to other PDM methods 
tested. 
 
4. The proposed SIPDM approach works well with the widely used 
EPANET2.0 software, although there is no reason why it should not work 
well with other popular hydraulic solvers, including the commercial ones. 
The reason for this is the generic nature and relative simplicity of the 
SIPDM approach and the fact that it does not require any hydraulic solver 
source code modifications.  
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Based on the aforementioned, the SIPDM approach proposed lends itself 
naturally to tackling practical problems such as WDN reliability, optimal location 
of isolation valves, and multi-objective optimization. 
 
 
 Future Work Recommendations 
The recommendations for further work regarding the proposed real-time 
operational response methodology are as follows: 
 Further evaluation and demonstration of the benefits of response 
methodology, especially on more complex real-life case studies and under 
actual online failure environment conditions. This will provide opportunities 
to address issues such as inoperable valves and considering other 
available recovery intervention options (such as booster pumps and using 
emergency volume in storage tanks).  
 
 Improved impact modelling of operational interventions which in this thesis 
has been limited to quantifying the volume of water not delivered only. 
Additional impacts need to be considered (e.g., traffic interruptions due to 
a large burst, damage to local properties or shops flooding caused by a 
pipe burst, etc.).  
 
 The cost model for operational interventions should be modified to make 
these more realistic. This can be done by involving elements such as the 
travel time of the network operators from the control room to the location 
where the recovery intervention is needed, the time required to install an 
overland bypass or modify the setting for a particular isolation valve or 
PRV, to name the few.  
 
 Wider range of possible operational interventions need to be considered 
(e.g., provision of bottled water or water delivered by cisterns, etc.), 
together with associated impact and cost models.  
 
 Additional and more realistic criteria (e.g., water quality considerations, 
sensitivity of different consumers, behaviour of consumers affecting the 
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water demand under failure conditions, resilience, to name the few) could 
be used to drive the selection of operational recovery interventions. 
Regarding the pressure-driven model, further research should focus on the 
relationship between pressure and demand. This relationship has physical basis, 
but it is also has an element of human behaviour involved. Demands are an 
estimate based on metred usage. As pressure drops, there is a physical element 
involved in the ability to deliver the water to a location. However, as pressure 
drops, some of the demand may completely to be stop or be reduced 
dramatically. For example, if a person perceives lower pressures some normal 
practices may be reduced. These behaviour should also be considered when 
determining the proper relationship between demand and pressure in low-
pressure conditions. Water utilities generally keep records on pipe failures or 
other service disruptions. These data, in conjunction with other system data such 
as tank levels or observations of water meters, could be used more effectively to 
estimate the above relationship. 
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Appendix A Segment Analysis Detail 
 
Table A1. Segment analysis for D-Town 
 
 
Regular isolated 
links 
Unintended isolated 
links 
Regular isolated 
nodes 
Unintended isolated 
nodes 
List of isolation 
valves 
S1 V47 P304,P290,P288,P286 J169,J129 J224,J222,J182,J152 P1041,P286,P288 
S2 12,13  N10,N9  8,12,14 
S3 10,11  N3  9,10,11 
S4 9,14  N4  7,9,14 
S5 7  N8  6,7 
S6 4,5,8  N6,N5  4,8 
S7 2,3,6,N15  N11,N7,N1,J145  P94,P95,4,6,10 
S8 1  N2  1,11,12 
S9 P998  J204  P1000,P159,P998 
S10 P996  J332  P397,P996 
S11 P995,P997  J201,J308  P995,P996,P998 
S12 P991,P992  J202  P991,P992 
S13 P981 P978,P976,P249,P161 J361 J360,J359,J358,J355 P161,P981 
S14 
P968,P969,P970,P994  
J199,J200,J198, 
J1154 
 
P967,P990,P993, 
P994 
S15 
P964,P965,P966,P971  J205,J367  
P963,P964,P966, 
P971 
S16 
P949,P953,v1 
P946,P944,P942,P941, 
P940,P939 
J88,J35 J31,J30,J27,J26,J25 P243,P949,P953 
S17 P943  J81  P943 
 
182 
 
S18 
P939,P940,P941, 
P942,P944,P946 
 
J31,J30,J27, 
J26,J25 
 P949 
S19 P938  J257,J251  P163,P937,P951 
S20 P934,P935,P937  J23,J22,J385  P1016,P933,P937 
S21 
P914,P929,P930 
P932,P931,P810,P780, 
P754,P697,P671,P670, 
P610,P510 
J21,J401,J399 
J20,J19,J18,J17,J16, 
J15,J406,J394 
P280,P914,P932 
S22 P86  J135,J134  P165,P385,P386 
S23 P855,P858  J92,J76  P858 
S24 P821,P822  J267,J354  P822 
S25 P810,P931  J20,J406,J394  P780,P914 
S26 P807  J350  P807 
S27 
P805,P806 
P889,P804,P801, 
P800,P241 
J266,J265 
J347,J345,J344, 
J1170,J1169 
P804,P806 
S28 P804,P889 P801,P800,P241 J1170,J1169 J347,J345,J344 P800,P801,P804 
S29 P801  J347  P801 
S30 
P794,P795,P798 
P889,P807,P806,P805, 
P804,P801,P800,P241 
J260,J255,J239 
J266,J265,J350,J347, 
J345,J344,J1170, 
J1169 
P794,P806,P807 
S31 P789,P961,P963  J366  P789,P961,P963 
S32 
P786,P787,P788, 
P791,P797 
 T3,J258,J227,J216  P786,P791 
S33 P785  J215  P785 
S34 P783,P784  J213,J197,J190  P779,P785,P786 
S35 P777,P779  J185  P777,P779 
S36 P775,P776  J184,J178  P775 
S37 P771,P772  J176,J170,J168  P769,P775,P777 
S38 P767,P768,P769  J158,J157,J94  P763,P769 
S39 
P755,P756,P763, 
P94,P95 
 J141,J140,J123  P763,P94,P95 
 
183 
 
S40 P752  T7  P752 
S41 P724  J268  P724 
S42 P68,P924 P71,P119 J195 J191,J189,J188 P68,P924 
S43 
P610,P670,P671, 
P780,P932 
P754,P697,P510 J18,J17 J19,J16,J15 
P610,P671, 
P780,P932 
S44 P597  J284,J281  P1022,P529 
S45 
P596,P846,P847, 
P852 
 J118,J58  P596,P847,P852 
S46 
P55,P761,P808 
P781,P766,P309, 
P223,P177,P11 
J83 
J235,J230,J305, 
J303,J319,J318 
P55,P761, 
P781,P808 
S47 P510,P697,P754  J19,J16,J15  P610,P671 
S48 
P5,P8,P9,P927 
P90,P89,P70,P69, 
P259,P258,P132, 
P130,P129,P128,P 
127,P126,P124 
J1223,J218, 
J212,J210 
J40,J379,J377,J376, 
J375,J374,J373, 
J372,J226,J225,J316 
P21,P69,P7,P9 
S49 P49,P861  J74,J72  P861 
S50 P46,P866,P871  J61,J70,J69  P866 
S51 
P446,P450,P465,P467 
,V2 
 
J14,J422,J421, 
J418 
 P445,P467 
S52 
P443,P445,P892,P96  
J13,J12,J417, 
J414 
 P307,P445,P484 
S53 
P44,P633 
P871,P866,P861, 
P859,P858,P855, 
P51,P49,P48,P46,P42 
J67 
J92,J61,J77,J76, 
J74,J73,J72,J71, 
J70,J69,J68,J54 
P44,P633, 
P852,P853 
S54 P424,P53  J384  P424,P53 
S55 
P42,P48,P51,P859 
P871,P866,P861,P858, 
P855,P49,P46 
J77,J73,J71,J54 
J92,J61,J76,J74, 
J72,J70,J69,J68 
P51,P633,P861 
S56 
P399,P402,P410,PU10, 
PU11 
 
J323,J317, 
J309,J307 
 P399,P424 
S57 P384  J575  P1025,P384 
S58 P380,P381,PU6,PU7  J291,J290,  P237,P379 
 
184 
 
J289,J415 
S59 
P38,P609,P842  J56,J55  
P596,P609, 
P842,P847 
S60 
P375,P376,P378,P796 
,PU4,PU5 
 
J300,J299,J292, 
J288,J256,J238 
 P374,P791,P794 
S61 P37,P986  J52,J381,J348  P984,P987 
S62 
P347,P348,P349,P350 
P346,P339,P338, 
P330,P329 
T4,J240,J509, 
J503 
J504,J502,J501, 
J499,J500 
P329,P349 
S63 P344,P383 P501,P267 J571 J147,J572 P344,P383,P501 
S64 
P336,P340,P341,P343, 
P385,P386 
 
J498,J496, 
J495,J576 
 
P340,P344, 
P385,P386 
S65 
P329,P330,P338,P339, 
P346 
 
J504,J502,J501, 
J499,J500 
 P329 
S66 P32  J2  P103,P32 
S67 P298,P301  J11,J434  P298,P302 
S68 P291,P293,P308  J427,J426,J425  P292,P308 
S69 P288,P290,P304  J224,J222,J152  P288 
S70 P286  J182  P286 
S71 P284,P285,P502  J153,J151,J574  P502 
S72 
P282,P294,P299,P303  
J10,J439,J436, 
J429,J428 
 P295 
S73 
P280,P305 
P932,P931,P930,P929, 
P914,P810,P780,P754, 
P697,P671,P670,P610, 
P510 
J407 
J21,J20,J19,J18, 
J17,J16,J15,J406, 
J401,J399,J394 
P280,P305 
S74 
P27,P28,P29 P30,P104,P101 
J1,J165,J164, 
J161 
J167,J166,J162 P26,P30 
S75 P268,P270,P275  J150,J149,J148  P268 
S76 P267,P501  J147,J572  P501 
S77 
P255,P817,P819,P972, 
P973,P974,P975,P989, 
 
J370,J369,J365, 
J444,J1158,J1157, 
 
P961,P964,P971, 
P973,P990, 
 
185 
 
P990 J1155,J1153 P994,P995 
S78 P252,P256,P933  J371,J364,J363  P308,P933 
S79 P249,P976  J360,J359  P976 
S80 
P242,P243,P947,P948, 
P954,P955,P956,P957, 
P958,P959 
P943 
J38,J36,J34,J33, 
J32,J29,J28 
J81 
P243,P943,P947, 
P955,P958,1 
S81 P241,P800  J345,J344  P800 
S82 P238,P292  J416  P238,P292 
S83 P237  J441  P237,P238,P305 
S84 P231,P841  J331,J330  P230,P841 
S85 
P228,P230,P813,P840 P811,P809,P225 J328,J327,J320 J324,J322,J321 
P230,P811, 
P815,P840 
S86 P225,P809,P811  J324,J322,J321  P811 
S87 
P223,P781 P766,P309,P177,P11 J319,J318 
J235,J230,J305, 
J303 
P11,P766,P781 
S88 P220,P993  J315,J314  P992,P993 
S89 P219,P759,P760  J298,J313,J312  P759,P761 
S90 P218  J311,J310  P808,P840 
S91 
P215,P287,P374, 
P379,P468 
 T2,J287,J420,J419  P374,P379,P467 
S92 P211,P725  J296,J295  P725 
S93 P201,P272,P482  J9,J8,J7  P174,P195,P482 
S94 P20,P21  J214  P20,P21,P991 
S95 
P184,P251,P815,P915  J1208,J362,J329  
P16,P184,P53, 
P815 
S96 
P18,P19,P297,P484  J438,J411  
P18,P19,P298, 
P484 
S97 P177,P766  J305,J303  P766 
S98 P174,P962  J6,J1058  P174 
S99 P166,P982,P983,P984  J382,J352,J349  P144,P184,P982, 
 
186 
 
P984,P988 
S100 P163,P500  J90,J252  P163 
S101 
P162,P245,P397,P398, 
P403,P409,P57, 
PU8,PU9 
 
J306,J304,J302, 
J301, J87,J85,J84 
 
P162,P397, 
P399,P58 
S102 P161,P978 P976,P249 J358,J355 J360,J359 P161,P976 
S103 
P16,P65 P822,P821 J353,J351 J267,J354 
P16,P822,P981, 
P982 
S104 P158,P160,P823,P826  J246,J237,J236  P160,P826 
S105 P157,P827,P830  J247,J244  P157,P826,P830 
S106 
P156,P246,P248, 
P264,P266, 
P492,P831 
 
J250,J249,J243, 
J242,J241 
 
P162,P248, 
P492,P831 
S107 
P155,P40,P844, 
P850,P851 
 J62,J60,J59,J57  P155,P609,P842 
S108 P154  J245,J66  P157,P248,P44 
S109 P150,P35  J82,J50  P35,P55 
S110 P15  T1  P15 
S111 P147,P987,P988  J232,J231  P987,P988 
S112 P144  T6  P144 
S113 P142,P951  J93,J37  P951,P953 
S114 
P141,P52,P753 P725,P724,P211 
J297,J78,J51, 
J221 
J268,J296,J295 
P35,P724,P725, 
P752,P759,P841 
S115 P140,P372,P58  J86,J220,J219  P155,P492,P58 
S116 P139,P7  J211  P139,P7 
S117 P134,P136,P195  J5,J4  P136,P195 
S118 P131,P967  J207,J206  P966,P967 
S119 P13,P14  J39,J24  P13,P15 
S120 
P126,P127,P128, 
P129,P259, 
P90,P89,P258, 
P132,P130,P124 
J40,J377,J375, 
J374,J225,J316 
J379,J376,J373, 
J372,J226 
P124,P128, 
P69,P89 
 
187 
 
P69,P70 
S121 
P125,P26 
P30,P29,P28,P27, 
P104,P101 
J163 
J1,J167,J166,J165, 
J164,J162,J161 
P125,P26 
S122 
P124,P130,P132, 
P258,P89,P90 
 
J379,J376,J373, 
J372,J226 
 P124,P89 
S123 P123,P880  J3,J1161,J1160  P120,P482 
S124 P122,P2,P3  J181,J173  P113,P122,P2 
S125 P121,P22  J193,J192  P22,P23 
S126 
P12,P159,P235 P234,P233,P10 J208,J337,J336 J335,J334,J333 
P10,P13,P139, 
P159 
S127 P119,P71  J191,J189,J188  P68 
S128 
P118,P120,P296, 
P302,P307 
 J433,J432  
P118,P120, 
P302,P307 
S129 
P115,P117,P295 
P303,P299, 
P294,P282 
J435,J431 
J10,J439,J436, 
J429,J428 
P115,P118, 
P136,P295 
S130 P112,P757,P758 P91,P111 J1024,J142 J976,J144,J143 P112,P758 
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